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ABSTRACT
An Analysis of First Amendment Jurisprudence
On the Supreme Court Case of Locke v. Davey
by
Alexander J. Herzog
Dr. Gerald C. Kops, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Educational Leadership
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Scholarship programs authored by state legislatures may conflict with a
state’s constitution. In the case of Locke v. Davey 540 U.S. 807 (2003), Joshua
Davey challenged the State of Washington’s withdrawal of his Promise
Scholarship claiming violation of his First Amendment rights under the United
States Constitution.
This historical case study analyzes the Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding legal issues concerning the issuance of state funded scholarships for
the purpose of religious studies. The study included a review of all relevant court
cases, court filings, legal journals and legal briefs.
Synthesizing this information provided a refined understanding of the
implications of the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and the impact of this case on federal and state funded scholarship
programs. An analysis of the impact of Locke and other relevant decisions is
offered to state administrators of scholarships that are publicly funded so that
administrators may review and adjust their policies in accordance with legal
precedent.
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A micro legal analysis of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion was also performed
using the judicial decision making template formulated by Judge Benjamin N.
Cardozo describing a general process for judicial decision making. Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion in the Locke v. Davey case was examined using the
template to determine whether his decision making approach is congruent with
the advice of Judge Cardozo. (Cardozo 1921) The micro analysis of the decision
indicated that Justice Rehnquist utilized the decision making template developed
by Judge Cardozo.
A macro legal analysis was also implemented to determine if the decision
in Locke v. Davey supported or refuted Jeffery Rosen’s theory that the Supreme
Court makes decisions based on public sentiment.(Rosen 2006). The macro
legal analysis determined that the decision in Locke v. Davey could be credibly
argued as supporting and refuting Rosen’s theory thereby highlighting the
imprecision of the theory and the need for further development of Rosen’s
theoretical framework.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Attending college today can be a costly endeavor. In 2007-08, the average
annual tuition for private schools was $20,492 per year; for public institutions, it
averaged $5,685 per year nationwide (Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac,
2007-08). However, if a student desires to attend an institution of higher learning,
there are avenues for making the pursuit of a higher education financially
possible.
Financial aid to pursue higher education is available in three forms: grants,
loans, and employment through the use of the Federal Work-Study Program.
(Free Application for Federal Student Aid http://www.fafsa.ed.gov/ ,2008) Grants
are often called scholarships, prizes, awards, or grants-in-aid and represent a
transfer of resources to students and involve no repayment. They can be funded
by federal or state dollars or from private entities and can be need-based, meritbased, or issued without any stipulations attached. (Panel on Student Financial
Need Analysis, 1971)
The United States federal government offers Pell Grants to undergraduate
students pursuing a degree in higher education based on demonstrated financial
need. In the fiscal year 2004-05, the United States federal government issued
$13 billion in Pell Grants to 5, 302,000 students seeking college educations. In
fiscal year 2005-06, the government provided $12.8 billion in Pell Grants to
5,387,000 students. These funds are to be used by student’s to attend
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institutions of higher education. (Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac, 200607; 2007-08).
The U.S. National Center for Education Statistics reported that in 2007 the
average tuition for public four year higher education institutions was $4,102 per
year and private four year tuition average $20,048 per year. The Statistical
Abstract of the United States published by the U.S. Census Bureau (2010) shows
that estimates of grant awards from the Federal Government for 2008 were at
90.7 billion dollars and in 2009 the estimate is 94.3 billion dollars. (Digest for
Education Statistics, Table 282, 2010) (Statistical Abstract of the United States,
Table 280, 2010)
Grants and scholarships may also be available through individual state
programs. For example, the State of Nevada subsidizes tuition through a
program called the Millennium Scholarship. Initially, these scholarships were
available to graduates of Nevada’s high schools with a grade point average
(GPA) of at least a 3.1 on a 4.0 scale in a core curriculum. Beginning in 2007,
Nevada high school graduates needed a 3.25 GPA to be eligible for the Guinn
Millennium Scholarship. In addition to the required grade point average,
applicants must pass all areas of the Nevada high school proficiency
examination. Students who earn the Millennium Scholarship must attend a
Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE) post secondary institution. A
student who elects to attend a NSHE community college will receive $40 per
enrolled lower division credit hour and $60 per enrolled upper division credit
hour. Those students that attend a NSHE state college will receive $60 per
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enrolled credit hour. Students enrolled at UNR or UNLV will receive $80 per
enrolled credit hour. Non-profit, non-sectarian institutions of higher education in
the state of Nevada such as Sierra Nevada College are also eligible to receive
scholarship funds. Such an institution must also be established under the laws of
the state and accredited by a regional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S.
Department of Education (NSHE Board of Regents, 2006).
The State of Washington also offered aid to students seeking higher
education. The state established the Promise Scholarship in 1999 (Washington
State Statute in 2002 Senate / House Bill 2807, 2002) to allow low-income
eligible students the opportunity to attend college.
Students receiving the scholarship were required to meet the following criteria:
•

Be reported by their public or private high school in the top 15% of
their graduating class or earn a combined score of at least 1,200 on
the SAT or at least 27 on the ACT on their first attempt;

•

Have a family income equal to or less than 135% of the state
median; and

•

Enroll at least half-time at an accredited college, university, or
vocational school in Washington state
(State of Washington Higher Education Coordinating Board
Policy Manual,1999)

The actual amount awarded for each student’s first year in Washington
was $1,125 in 1999-2000. Students could then reapply for the award for a
second year and were eligible for $1,542 in 2000-01 (Ibid).
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The funds were sent to the student’s college or university of choice and held in
the qualifying student’s name. Once the institution certified that the student was
enrolled in the institution at least half-time and eligible to receive the award, the
scholarship funds were released. The funds could be used for education-related
expenses including tuition, books, and/or room and board. The funds were
applied to the expenses at the institution first and the rest distributed to the
student to be used at his/her discretion (Ibid).
The mission of Washington’s Promise Scholarship was similar to many
other states that provide a program specifically to provide higher education
opportunities to bright individuals who otherwise could not attend college due to
financial constraints (Ibid).

Joshua Davey Background
Joshua Davey was a high school senior living in the State of Washington.
Joshua’s dream was to be a minister someday. He met the criteria of
Washington’s Promise Scholarship and applied for the aid in the spring of 1999.
He was awarded the scholarship to start college that fall. He applied to and was
accepted at Northwest College, an accredited, private, religious institution. In his
first year of college, Davey declared a double major in business administration
and pastoral studies.
The Promise Scholarship awarded to Davey was student-directed aid,
which means that as long as the person for whom the scholarship was intended
abides by and uses the money in accordance with the criteria set forth by the
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state, the money can be issued to the student for his or her educational needs.
Davey adhered to all the guidelines established when he applied for and received
the scholarship.
After he commenced his first semester of college, the State of Washington
revised the Promise Scholarship policy. The state revision denied scholarship
eligibility to students who selected a major of pastoral studies. In the revision, the
state claimed that issuing scholarship money to such students violated the State
of Washington Constitution.
In October 1999, Northwest College received notice from the Washington
Higher Education Coordinating Board stating that the Promise Scholarship
recipients who had declared a major of theology (pastoral studies) were no
longer eligible to receive the scholarship funds. This notice explained the state’s
position that funding religious education was prohibited by the state of
Washington’s constitution. As a result of the change in policy, Davey’s
scholarship was revoked.
Washington Constitution
The State of Washington’s constitution Article I, section 11 states:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief
and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be
molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the
liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to
excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace and safety of the state. No public money or property shall be
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appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, That this article shall not be so construed as to forbid the
employment by the state of a chaplain for such of the state custodial,
correctional, and mental institutions, or by a county's or public hospital
district's hospital, health care facility, or hospice, as in the discretion of the
legislature may seem justified. No religious qualification shall be required
for any public office or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror, in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion,
nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his religious belief to
affect the weight of his testimony. (Washington State Constitution
AMENDMENT 88, 1993 House Joint Resolution No. 4200, p 3062.
Approved November 2, 1993)
In the State of Washington’s constitution, the written phrases, “No public
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship,
exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment,” has its
origins in the Blaine Amendment proposal of 1876.
In 1875, Senator James G. Blaine proposed an amendment to the United
States Constitution. His proposal was popularly identified as the Blaine
Amendment. Senator Blaine wanted to be sure that there would be no spending
of state tax dollars for the benefit of religious organizations. At the time, the First
Amendment, as interpreted, only governed actions by the federal government,
not state governments. Several states were providing funding to religious schools
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and activities and in some cases were even recognizing official state churches
(Boston, 2002). During this time, the United States Catholic population was
growing at rapid rate and benefited greatly from states that funded religious
schools. Scholars have argued that Blaine’s (a Protestant) motivation for drafting
the proposed amendment was a personal resentment of the Catholic Church and
its influence on state governments (National Association of Secondary School
Principals, 2003).
Blaine’s proposal would have added the following amendment to the U.S.
Constitution:
"No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in
any State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund
therefore, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the
control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so
devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations."
Senator James Blaine 1875
The amendment was passed by the House (180 -07) but failed to pass the
Senate by four votes. (The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 2003) Supporters
of the proposal were not deterred. They adopted another strategic method to
impose the requirements of the Blaine Amendment on the states. States that
were seeking admission into the Union were pressured into including language
similar to the Blaine amendment in their state constitutions as a precondition for
favorable congressional action (Boston, 2002).
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Senator Blaine’s proposed amendment was to protect the integrity of
public school funding, the obligation of states to provide universal education, the
role of ensuring and funding education at the state level, and to curb the funding
of religious instruction and training (Hamburger, 2002).
Phillip Hamburger writes in his book, Separation of Church and State
(2002), that some contend that the Blaine Amendment came about from an antiCatholic movement to prevent federal or state funding of parochial schools.
Hamburger further states however, that other historians argue that there is no
significant proof that the Blaine Amendment came about as an anti-Catholic
movement (Hamburger, 2002 p.. 298).

Locke v. Davey
Having been denied his scholarship, Davey filed a lawsuit against the
State of Washington in the United States District Court Western District of
Washington at Seattle (Docket No. C00-61R). Davey challenged the policy of the
Higher Education Coordinating Board on the grounds that it violated the Free
Exercise and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. He also claimed his right to Equal Protection of the law was
violated.
On October 5, 2000, U.S. District Court Judge Barbara Rothstein issued
an order granting the state’s motion for summary judgment. Judge Rothstein’s
decision held that “as a matter of law, the Higher Education Coordinating Board
was entitled to complete dismissal of Davey’s complaint” (Davey v. Locke 2000
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Lexis 22273, p.. 4). Judge Rothstein denied Davey’s claim of violation of the Free
Exercise clause stating, “While a citizen may not be unduly prohibited from
practicing his religion, he may not demand that the government pay for those
religious pursuits” (Ibid p. 11). Furthermore, she wrote that “religion-based
conduct is not entitled to a Free Exercise exception to generally applicable
regulations” (Ibid p. 12). According to Judge Rothstein, the Free Exercise clause
in the U.S. Constitution did not give Davey the ability to avoid the State of
Washington’s constitutional provision that prohibits the state from paying for
religious training. (Ibid)
Davey appealed Judge Rothstein’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Arguments in the case were presented May 6, 2002. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the lower court’s decision on a 2-1 vote. Circuit Judge Pamela Ann
Rymer wrote the majority opinion stating, “The Higher Education Coordinating
Board’s policy lacks neutrality on its face,” and “HECB impermissibly deprived
Davey of his scholarship” (Ibid, p. 3). Rymer added that the Washington
constitutional provision prohibiting the funding of religious training did not supply
a compelling government interest. “Washington’s interest in avoiding conflict with
its own constitutional constraint against applying money to religious instruction is
not a compelling reason to withhold scholarship funds for a college education
from an eligible student just because he personally decides to pursue a degree in
theology” (Ibid, p. 20).
Washington Governor Gary Locke petitioned for a rehearing by the full
court. The petition for a rehearing en banc was denied and Locke filed a petition
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for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on February 24, 2003.
The Supreme Court granted the petition on May 19, 2003, and scheduled oral
argument for December 2, 2003.

Overview of First Amendment Religion Clauses
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for redress of grievances
(U.S. Constitution, 1791).
This amendment of the Constitution, written more than 200 years ago,
prohibits Congress from adopting laws interfering with the exercise of religion. It
also prohibits Congressional action in establishing a religion. The U.S.
Constitution, as currently interpreted, prevents both federal and state
governments from interfering with civil liberties protected by the First
Amendment.
However, that same document fails to resolve the inherent tension
between the right of free exercise and admonition to refrain from adopting laws
respecting the establishment of religion. In his book, Separation of Church and
State (2002), Harvard professor Philip Hamburger traces the history of the
premise that citizens of the United States have held for many years: that the First
Amendment requires separation of church and state (Hamburger, 2002).
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Hamburger explains that the phrase “separation of church and state” was first
used in a letter written by Thomas Jefferson in 1802 to the Danbury Baptist
Association. Jefferson stated, “I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act
of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
therof,’ thus building a wall of separation between church and state” (Ibid, p. 1).
Hamburger further explains that Jefferson’s intention in claiming the First
Amendment erects a wall of separation between church and state was based on
his distaste for the Federalist clergy of New England. Hamburger writes that
historians claim Jefferson’s letter was written because he was writing to a
congregation of a denomination of which he was not a member (Ibid p. 7).
Jefferson wanted to remove all fears that the federal and state governments
would make dictates to the church and vice versa. Jefferson’s words were
actually derived from the words of Roger Williams, a Baptist and a prominent
preacher. The “wall” Jefferson referred to was understood as one-directional; its
purpose was to protect the church and the church to be free to teach the people
Biblical values (Eidsomoe, 1987).
Williams’ original words were:
“When they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation
between the garden of the Church and the wilderness of the world, God
hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made
his garden a wilderness, as at this day. And that therefore if He will eer to
please to restore His garden and paradise again, it must of necessity be
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walled in peculiarly unto Himself from the world.”
Roger Williams (Eidsomoe, 1987, p.14).
Mark DeWolfe Howe supports Jefferson’s statement. “The First
Amendment was seen in the eighteenth century as a way religion and churches
would be protected from the state while Jefferson sought to protect the state from
the demands of churches,” he said (Howe, 1965, p.19).
Since the First Amendment was adopted, scholars have debated its
meaning and intent. The task of interpreting and applying the First Amendment
religion clauses has fallen on the shoulders of the U.S. Supreme Court since
Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803). First Amendment jurisprudence is
complex. But as the Locke v. Davey case approached the court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was leading a majority of justices insisting that religious organizations
and activities must be judged in a viewpoint neutral manner.
A columnist for the National Review Magazine, Richard Garnett, wrote this
on the U.S. Supreme Court’s view on the First Amendment: “Under the
leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the court has made it increasingly clear
that the First Amendment forbids viewpoint discrimination in the administration of
public-welfare programs and also that religious believers and institutions may not
be singled out for special disadvantages and burdens” (Garnett, 2003, p.2).
The basis for Davey’s argument is that as a religious believer, he was being
singled out for special disadvantages and burdens. A divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit agreed.
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Higher Education and Religion
Generally speaking, institutions of higher education support two models of
operation. They are either public institutions that depend on direct taxpayer
support or they are private institutions that operate on private or non-public
funds. Private institutions may also have a religious affiliation; however there are
a number of private colleges and universities, such as Vassar College in New
York and Beloit College in Wisconsin, that have no sectarian affiliation. Private
institutions with religious affiliations include Notre Dame in Indiana and Brigham
Young University in Utah, among others. Private sectarian institutions often
promote their religious affiliation in their institutional mission, operation, or within
their curriculum.
The relationship between public institutions and religion has proven to be
a controversial issue. A number of cases highlight this issue.
Some key cases formulate and identify the Supreme Court’s view on the religion
clauses, further explained in chapter two, of the First Amendment and provide a
foundation for this study. These cases were referred to in the merit briefs
presented by the petitioner and respondent in the Locke v. Davey case.
In 1940, the Supreme Court decided a case that addressed the First
Amendment but set the stage for the Court’s stance on the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was the first case that applied the First Amendment religion
clause to a state, in this case a local ordinance. Jesse Cantwell, a Jehovah’s
Witness, and his sons often preached on street corners and distributed religious
material in support of their beliefs. The event that spurred the case occurred
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when the father and sons were proselytizing in a predominantly Catholic
neighborhood. Two pedestrians, who happened to be Catholic, heard an antiRoman Catholic message on Cantwell’s portable phonograph and reacted
angrily. The Cantwells were arrested for violating a local ordinance requiring a
permit for solicitation and pursuing activities inciting a breach of the peace
(Cantwell v. State of Connecticut 310, U.S. 296, 1940).
The local statute read as follows:
No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable
thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from
other than a member of the organization for whose benefit such person is
soliciting or within the county in which such person or organization is
located unless such cause shall have been approved by the secretary of
the public welfare council. Upon application of any person in behalf of
such cause, the secretary shall determine whether such cause is a
religious one or is a bona fide object of charity or philanthropy and
conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity, and, if he
shall so find, shall approve the same and issue to the authority in charge a
certificate to that effect. Such certificate may be revoked at any time. Any
person violating any provision of this section shall be fined not more than
one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both.
New Haven, Connecticut Ordinance (126 Conn. 8 A.2d 535.)
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of the Cantwell family. The
court held that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate,
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restrictions based on religious grounds were not. The statute allowed local
officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not
religious; therefore it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Although the message the Cantwells professed was offensive to many, it
did not entail any threat or bodily harm. Therefore the Court concluded the
expression was protected as religious speech (Cantwell v. State of Connecticut
310 U.S. 296, 1940 p.. 309). This was the first case where the First Amendment
was applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The next case that we examine involves the Free Exercise of religion as it
conflicts with the administrative policies of a public institution of higher education.
In the case of Widmar v. Vincent (1981), a religiously-affiliated student group
called Cornerstone had been using the University of Missouri–Kansas City’s
facilities to hold its meetings. The university instituted a policy that its facilities
could not be used by student groups for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching.
The policy read as follows:
4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein
provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. The general prohibition
against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship or
religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering
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of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions
held in University facilities.
4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be
used for religious services but not for regular recurring services of any
groups. Special rules and procedures shall be established for each such
chapel by the Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall
be given to any religious group.
University of Missouri--Kansas City Student Union Policy, 1970
The university’s argument for enforcing this policy was based on the
institution’s obligation to respect the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment and therefore refrain from supporting religion. The student group
sued the university and eventually the U.S. Supreme Court decided in their favor
(Widmar v. Vincent 454 U.S. 263 1981). The Supreme Court found that the
institution violated viewpoint neutrality by treating a religious organization
differently than other student groups. The Court ruled that the University of
Missouri--Kansas City could not prevent a student religious group from using
university facilities for the purpose of meeting. In this case, we see the beginning
of the viewpoint neutrality jurisprudence principle as it applied to public university
policy. An institution of higher education cannot discriminate against religion in
it’s practices.
The case of Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia 515 U.S. 819 (1995) further illustrates the Supreme Court’s viewpoint
neutrality jurisprudence applicable to a university setting. A student group called
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Wide Awake Productions (WAP), whose members attended the University of
Virginia, was denied funding for the printing of a campus magazine that “offers a
Christian perspective on both personal and community issues” (Rosenberger v.
University of Va. 515 U.S. 819, 1995 p.. 6). The University of Virginia had funded
printing expenses of a number of student groups, but denied the WAP’s funding
request claiming the rejection was due to the religious activities the group
promoted. The students challenged the denial as a violation of their First
Amendment speech and press rights (Ibid) arguing the institution’s policy must
be neutral in awarding of funding to student groups. The U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that a public institution that funds student organizations may not refrain
from funding religiously affiliated student organizations that meet all the
institution’s criteria for funding (Ibid).
These three cases reflect the struggle that administrators and civic leaders
sometimes encounter when trying to interpret the First Amendment religious
clauses. The case of Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, which noted that the
state must apply the religion clauses to state actions, set a precedent. In the later
cases, we find the inception of the viewpoint neutrality doctrine for judging state
action influencing religion.

Research Problem
This decision presents three opportunities to add to the research literature.
First, a careful analysis of the courts’ rulings will be performed to identify the
implications of the precedent for post secondary institutions with state student aid
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programs. A thorough analysis of this decision is necessary to formulate and
provide guidance to states that provide scholarships from public funding sources
or for those states contemplating establishing such a scholarship through the use
of public funds. Next, the decision offers an opportunity to examine the judicial
decision making styles of Chief Justice Rehnquist utilizing a micro lens of judicial
decision making proposed by Benjamin Cardozo in The Nature of the Judicial
Process (reprinted 2005). Cardozo discusses at length the decision making
process that a judge should employ when making decisions. The decision
making process of Chief Justice William Rehnquist has not yet been reviewed
utilizing the Cardozo decision making template. Third, Locke v. Davey (2003) will
be analyzed using a macro lens provided by Jeffery Rosen in his recent treatise
entitled The Most Democratic Branch (2006). Rosen addresses the role of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision making in our system of governance and offers a
theory to suggest that the Supreme Court’s decisions are largely dependent on
the sentiment of the American public. Locke v. Davey will be assessed to
determine whether the ruling in the case supports or refutes Rosen’s thesis.

Research Questions


How did the Supreme Court resolve the Free Exercise and Establishment
clause issues presented in the Locke v. Davey case?



What were the major cases the Supreme Court used to reach their
decision?
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What was the rationale of the justices who disagreed with the Court’s
holding?



What additional concerns have emerged due to the Supreme Court’s
decision?



What is the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s decision on
institutions of higher education and how will the court’s decision impact the
37 states that have Blaine Amendments in their state constitutions?



How does the Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v. Davey fit into the
theory proposed by Jeffrey Rosen in his book The Most Democratic
Branch (2006) regarding the role of the Supreme Court in our system of
government?



Does the Opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Locke v. Davey indicate that he
uses the judicial decision making template prescribed by Benjamin
Cardozo in his book The Nature of the Process (1921)?

Method of the Study
“Legal research is the process of identifying the law that governs an
activity and finding materials that explain or analyze that law” (Cohen & West,
2000, p.. 2).This study will use traditional methods of legal research in order to
find and analyze cases that are relevant to the study. All the court cases
identified by the petitioners, respondents, and briefs will be examined and
studied. The precedents will be presented in case brief format to asses their
impact on the case.
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The amicus briefs (a brief submitted by outside parties interested in the
dispute) will also be examined and filtered to identify particular arguments they
thought would assist the Supreme Court in determining a resolution to the case.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s oral arguments and the court’s opinion will
also be reviewed and analyzed. Finally, legal journals and news articles will be
reviewed for arguments that were presented on the case.

Content Analysis
The research will be conducted by an internal and external evaluation.
“An internal evaluation involves reading the particular legal authority you have
found and determining whether, on its own terms, it applies to the fact situation in
your research problem.” (Wren & Wren, 1986, p. 79).
Once an internal evaluation is completed, then an external evaluation will
be conducted to determine the validity of the research evaluated (Wren & Wren,
1986). The external evaluation examines the current validity of laws and rulings
of legal cases through the use of Shepardizing cases. Shepardizing a case
involves looking up a particular case to determine if a ruling is still relevant to the
current time period. In addition, the external evaluation examines what change, if
any, was addressed in the courts and other factors that may have been involved
with the case. (Wren & Wren, 1986, p. 90).
The researcher attended the oral arguments before the United States
Supreme Court. Observing the oral argument enriched the writer’s perspective
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on Supreme Court decision making and informed the content analysis of the
decision.
Synthesizing the precedent, petitions, merit briefs, amicus briefs and oral
arguments will provide a refined understanding of the impact of the Locke v.
Davey decision on Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Careful analysis of the Court’s decision may also reveal the impact on federal
and state-funded scholarship programs. It will also provide guidance to higher
education leaders and policy makers’ regarding establishing state-funded
scholarship programs.

Definition of Terms
For the purpose of this study, the following definitions of terms are
provided:
Amicus curiae: Friend of the court brief. One who gives information to the
court on some matter of law, which is in doubt. The function of amicus curiae is
to call the court’s attention to some matter which might otherwise escape its
attention (Gifis, 1997).
Bill of Rights: The first 10 amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which
articulate the fundamental rights of citizenship. They were added to the U.S.
Constitution in 1791. It is a declaration of rights that are substantially immune
from governmental interference, and constitutes reservations of limited individual
sovereignty. Among such rights guaranteed in the federal Constitution are the
rights to speak, assemble, and practice religion free from federal government
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regulations; and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
and the right to a trial when tried for a criminal offense. Originally, the Bill of
Rights was intended to be restrictive upon federal power; however, the various
amendments have mostly been incorporated to apply to state governments
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution (Gifis, 1997).
Certiorari: Gaining appellate review. An order issued from a superior court
to one of inferior jurisdiction, commanding the latter to certify and return to the
former a record in the particular case. In the U. S. Supreme Court, the writ is
discretionary with the court and will be issued to any court in the land to review a
federal question if at least four of the nine justices vote to hear the case (Gifis,
1997).
Declaratory relief: Also known as declaratory judgment. This is a judgment
of the court for the purpose of establishing the rights of the parties or expressing
the opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering anything to be
done. The distinctive characteristics of a declaratory judgment are that it stands
by itself, and that no executory process follows as a matter of course (Gifis,
1997).
En banc: A number of appellate courts sit in divisions of three or more
judges from among a larger number on the full court. These parts will generally
decide a particular case but sometimes either on the court’s motion or at the
request of one of the litigants, the court will consider the matter sitting as the full
court. This is called a rehearing en banc (Gifis, 1997).
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Equal protection of the laws: Constitutional guarantee embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states in relevant part that
“no state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws” (Gifis, 1997).
First Amendment: The first of 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution
(otherwise known as the Bill of Rights). Originally intended to restrict federal
power, the various rights of political and religious freedom articulated in the
amendment have been held applicable to state government through the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The First
Amendment guarantees freedoms of speech, press, assembly, petition, free
exercise of religion, and non-establishment of religion (Gifis, 1997).
Petitioner: One who presents a petition to a court to take an appeal from a
judgment. The adverse party is called the respondent (Gifis, 1997).
Public Policy: A general plan of action adopted by government to solve a
social problem, counter a threat, or pursue an objective (Janda, Berry, &
Goldman, 2000).
Rational basis test: A method of constitutional analysis under the equal
protection clause used to determine whether a challenged law bears a
reasonable relationship to the attainment of some legitimate governmental
objective. The principle is that the constitutionality of a statute will be upheld, if
any rational basis can be conceived to support it. If the violation of a fundamental
right, such as the right to vote, right to free speech, or the creation of a suspect
classification such as color, religion, national origin, or indigence, is alleged then
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the law is subject to strict scrutiny and may only be upheld if the government
shows a compelling interest in sustaining the statute (Gifis, 1997).
Remand: When a judgment is reversed, the appellate court usually
remands the matter for a new trial to be carried out consistent with the principles
announced in its opinion. Often, the court will simply direct that the matter be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
opinion (Gifis, 1997).
Respondent: Any one who answers or responds may properly be called a
“respondent.” The term also refers to the party against whom an appeal is
brought (Gifis, 1997).
Stare Decisis: (“Let the decision stand”) A rule by which common law
courts are reluctant to interfere with principles announced in a former decision
and therefore rely upon judicial precedent as a compelling guide to decision of
cases raising issues similar to those in a previous case. (Gifis, 1997).
Strict scrutiny test: A test to determine the constitutional validity of a
statute that creates a classification of persons. Under this test, if a classification
scheme affects fundamental rights, it requires a showing that the classification is
necessary to, and the least intrusive means of, achieving the compelling state
interest. The governmental body passing the legislation in the question bears a
heavy burden of justification to show that the law is necessary to promote a
compelling state interest and is being accomplished by the least drastic and
intrusive means (Gifis, 1997).
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U.S. Federal Courts: These courts derive their legitimacy from Article III of
the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. District Courts are the general courts of original
jurisdiction or the federal trial courts. The U.S. Courts of Appeal (formerly circuit
courts of appeal) are the appellate review courts. The U.S. Supreme Court is the
only court directly created by the U.S. Constitution, and is the court of last resort
in the federal system. The U.S. Supreme Court has the final appellate review of
lower federal courts and of state court decisions involving questions of federal
law (Gifis, 1997).
Viewpoint neutrality: When opening a public forum, government may not
restrict speech at that forum based upon the view of the speaker (Lamb’s Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 113 S. Ct. 2141, 1993).

Limitations of the Study
All studies have limitations. This study is no different. This study will be
limited by the amount of relevant case history, and the accessibility of historical
documentation and information available to the researcher. The researcher’s
content analysis is a personal interpretation of the data presented surrounding
the case and will also limit the nature of this study. An effort to reduce the role of
personal analytical bias was grounded in utilizing standard legal research
methods and content analysis.
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Significance of the Study
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a historical case study about
the legal controversies over the issuance of state-funded scholarships for the
purpose of religious studies. To accomplish this task, the study explored the
application of First Amendment jurisprudence to the use of public funds for
religious study. The Locke v Davey decision was also analyzed using micro and
macro analytical lenses. Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo’s landmark book entitled
The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) provided the micro lens for judicial
decision-making. The study offers clues regarding the decision making process
employed by Justice Rehnquist when compared to advice given by Justice
Cardozo regarding the judicial process. The clues should be of value to scholars
wishing to further analyze the means and methods employed by the Chief Justice
in reaching his judgments.
The macro analytical lens was based on Rosen’s book The Most
Democratic Branch (2006). The study provides an analysis of first impression into
the vitality of Rosen’s theory of the Supreme Court’s role in our government
system.
Finally, the analysis of the Locke decision’s impact on post secondary
institutions should prove valuable to policy makers and higher education
administrators implementing state funded scholarships in jurisdictions where the
state constitution includes Blaine language.
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Summary
The researcher has presented an introduction to the importance of
financial aid in higher education, a case synopsis of the Locke v. Davey an
overview of relevant First Amendment religion clauses and the relevant history of
case law that involved the religion clauses in higher education. The research
problem and research questions were presented. The method of the study was
also introduced in Chapter 1. In addition, the Chapter defined legal terms
relevant to the study. The limitations of the study and the significance of the
study were also described.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The Bill of Rights
The span of time when the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were
established saw much turmoil. The U.S. had just come together as a nation and
fought Great Britain in the Revolutionary War. The colonists were still reeling
from Great Britain’s harsh rule of the colonies and the violation of civil rights
before and during the Revolution by the British (Patrick, 2003).
With the memories of being ruled by a monarchy still fresh in the minds of
the founders of the newly founded United States of America, discussions
surrounding the creation and sustainability of a democratic society were plentiful.
One such discussion concerned the creation of a Bill of Rights for the newly
adopted United State of America Constitution.
The first mention of creating a Bill of Rights for the U.S. Constitution was
made by George Mason of Virginia during the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
Mason wanted a federal Bill of Rights designed to limit the federal government’s
power. The 13 newly founded states included a “Declaration of Rights” in their
state constitutions. The State of Virginia was one of the first states to do so.
Consequently their state constitution became a model for other states as they
adopted their own Declarations of Rights (Patrick, 2003)
Robert Sherman from Connecticut opposed the idea of including a Bill of
Rights to the U.S. Constitution. He contended that the various State Declaration’s
of Rights were sufficient. His motivation was to ensure that the U.S. Constitution
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would not be able to override the state declaration of rights in state constitutions.
Mason’s argument favoring the establishment of a federal Bill of Rights failed to
convince the delegates and was opposed by every state delegation at the
Constitutional Convention. (Patrick, 2003).
As a result of the vote against his proposed Bill of Rights, Mason voted
against the Constitution on the grounds that it had no “Declaration of Rights.”
Mason registered his disapproval on his copy of the proposed Constitution as
follows (Patrick, 2003):
There is no declaration of any kind for preserving the Liberty of the press,
the Trial by Jury in civil Causes, nor against the danger of standing Army
in the time of Peace. This Government will commence in a moderate
Aristocracy, it is at present impossible to forsee whether it is will, in its
Operation, produce a Monarchy, or a corrupt, oppressive Aristocracy, it
will most probably vibrate some years between the two, and then
terminate in the one of the other.
George Mason, 1787
In October 1788, James Madison took up the cause of adding a Bill of
Rights to the U.S. Constitution. Originally opposed the idea of a Bill of Rights as
first proposed, he now supported it. Madison could now see the value of a Bill of
Rights as one that could aid citizens in rallying against a future oppressive
government (Patrick, 2003).
There is potential tyranny of the majority as the main threat to individual
rights in a government based on sovereignty.” The primary purpose of a
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constitution he thought was to limit power from any source, including the
power of the majority, in order to protect the rights of individuals against
tyranny.
James Madison, 1878
Madison wanted government to embody majority rule of elected
representatives, but he felt that the majority’s power must be limited. Otherwise,
the rights of those the majority disliked would be compromised and worst yet, lost
(Patrick, 2003).
In 1789, Madison, a Congressman from the State of Virginia, drafted a Bill
of Rights and presented it to the first Congress of the United States. His work on
the draft was influenced by the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights in the Virginia
State Constitution. Madison’s draft Bill of Rights included 12 articles. It was his
intent that the proposed articles be inserted into sections of the U.S. Constitution.
However, the House of Representatives decided that the proposal should be
treated as an amendment to the Constitution. (Patrick, 2003).
After many debates and changes to the original proposal, the first
Congress ratified 10 of the 12 proposed articles in 1791. The first two proposed
articles, which concerned the number of constituents for each Representative
and the compensation of Congressmen, were not ratified. Articles three through
12, however, ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures, constitute the first
10 amendments of the Constitution, and are now known as the Bill of Rights
(Patrick, 2003).
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The following are the 10 amendments to the Constitution in their original
form, as ratified in 1791.
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment II
A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.

Amendment III
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed
by law.

Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

Amendment VII
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
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Amendment VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Amendment IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.
(U.S. Constitution - Bill of Rights Adopted 1791)

First Amendment Historical Perspective
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for redress of grievances.
(United States of America Constitution, 1791).
The religion decrees are known as the Establishment clause and the Free
Exercise clause. The Establishment clause was created to separate religion and
government in an effort to avoid the church becoming an influence in government
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operations. The Free Exercise clause guaranteed the American citizens that the
government would not interfere with religious practice (Hamburger, 2002).
As simple as the First Amendment seems to be, applying it to
circumstances implicating government action and individual practices, kept the
courts busy. Written more than 200 years ago, the First Amendment grants
citizens of the United States the freedom to exercise religious beliefs and the
freedom from government intervention in establishing a religion. Philip
Hamburger traces the history of the premise that citizens of the United States
have held for many years, that the First Amendment establishment requires
separation of church and state (Hamburger, 2002).
There are scholars who believe that the creation of the U.S. Constitution’s
First Amendment religion clause came about due to centuries of religious
oppression (Flowers, 1994). Many of the founders of America traveled a long
way through perilous conditions to be able to practice religious freedom. In
addition, many of the first settlers were members of the Anglican Church, which
was the established church in England at the time. Their purpose for coming to
the new world was to explore its economic potential (Hamburger, 2002).
One of the first established the Anglican Church as the official religion of
the colony. While there were other churches in the colony, the government
provided the clergy of the church with tax dollars for salaries and other support
(Hamburger, 2002).
Another group emigrating from England and whose ideas on religion did
not conform to those of the Anglican Church: the national Church of England.
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The Puritans, as they called themselves, felt that the Anglican Church was too
closely aligned with Roman Catholicism. The Puritans came to the new world in
1620, landing in Plymouth Mass. Their motivation was to create an ideal churchstate colony (Hamburger, 2002).
The founder of Pennsylvania was a Quaker named William Penn. The
Quakers believed that there was an inner light inside each person that
represented God. Each person’s experience and involvement with God was to be
unique and direct. They believed that the “imposition of governmental conformity
in religious ideals disparaged each person’s unique experience and involvement
with God” (Hamburger, 2002).
As a result of the number and diversity of religious beliefs in the new world
and the past experiences with religious strife that existed in Europe during
previous centuries, our founding fathers kept these issues in mind as they
developed and wrote the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, there is no mention of
religion in the Constitution except for Article IV, Clause 3, which states, “No
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust
under the United States.” This clause is referred to at times as the “religion test”
and its premise is that no U.S. citizen would be required to belong to any specific
religion order to hold an appointed or elected office (Levy,1986).
Within the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights there is no direct
mention of separation of church and state. The question then arises as to where
the concept of separation of church and state originated? Hamburger points out
that it is actually a letter written by Thomas Jefferson, in 1802, to the Danbury
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Baptist Association that first addresses the concept of a separation between
church and state. Jefferson wrote, “I contemplate with sovereign reverence that
act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise therof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church and State”
(Hamburger, 2002).
Hamburger also argues that Jefferson’s intention in claiming a separation
of church and state was based on his distaste for the Federalist clergy of New
England. Other historians claim Jefferson wrote as he did because he was
addressing the congregation of a denomination of which he was not a member
(Eidsomoe, 1987). Jefferson wanted to remove all fears that the state would seek
to impose its will upon the church. His words were actually derived from the
words of Roger Williams, a Baptist preacher from Rhode Island. The “wall”
Jefferson referred to was understood as one-directional; its purpose was to
protect the church, yet the church was to be free to teach the people Biblical
values (Ibid). Williams had said:
When they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between
the garden of the Church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever
broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made his garden
a wilderness, as at this day. And that therefore if He will eer to please to
restore His garden and paradise again, it must of necessity be walled in
peculiarly unto Himself from the world.
(Eidsomoe, 1987)
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Mark DeWolfe Howe makes a good point in supporting Jefferson’s
statement with this view:
The First Amendment was seen in the eighteenth century as a way
religion and Churches would be protected from the state while Jefferson
sought to protect the state from the demands of Churches. (Howe, 1965).
The topic of religion in schools was also addressed by theorists Alexis De
Tocqueville and Horace Mann. In 1835, De Tocqueville observed American
society and culture, and noted that his theories were similar to those of Mann’s
ideals (De Tocqueville, 1835, p. 315).
De Tocqueville stated:
In New England, every citizen receives the elementary notions of human
knowledge; he is taught, moreover, the doctrines and the evidences of his
religion, the history of his country, and the leading features of its
Constitution. In the states of Connecticut and Massachusetts, it is
extremely rare to find a man imperfectly acquainted with all the things and
a person wholly ignorant of them is a sort of phenomenon
(De Tocqueville 1835, p. 315).
De Tocqueville did not believe a republic could exist without morals. He
stated, “I do not believe that a people can have morals when it has no religion”
(Ibid, p. 290).
In 1837, Horace Mann served as secretary to the Board of Education for
the state of Massachusetts. His relentless efforts ti change public education not
only affected the state itself but the young and growing United States. He felt
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strongly that education constituted preparation for life and he believed in the
need for teaching morals. Although he felt strongly on the matter, he did not
advocate that public schools teach one religious creed. He was also opposed by
church officials for advocating nonsectarian education. Their opposition,
however, only served to arouse public sentiment for reform of the public school
system. In his Final Report to the Massachusetts State Board of Education
(1848), Mann wrote:
If a man is taxed to support a school where religious doctrines are
inculcated which he believes to be false, and which he believes that God
condemns, then he is excluded from the school by divine law, at the same
time he is compelled to support by the human law. This is a double wrong.
(Religious Fundamentalism and American Education, 1990, p. 92).
Mann did not oppose the use of Bible readings in the classroom. However,
he resisted any notion that schools use sectarian books (Kniker, 1997).
The U.S. Supreme Court, over the years, has examined a large number of
cases presented by petitioners claiming that their rights under the First
Amendment have been violated. This is evident in cases that have been decided
by the Supreme Court throughout history. There is still a need for interpretation
of the First Amendment and for the Court to define where the line for separation
of church and state needs to be drawn. The original intent of framers’ of the U.S.
Constitution is still continually debated. Scholars argue that this is because the
language is ambiguous.
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Americans are generally known to be a spiritual / religious people. An ongoing study of American public opinion conducted since 1944 (Gallup’s Princeton
Religious Research Center, 1996) has shown that Americans consider
themselves religious. According to the study, 90% of Americans state that they
believe in a God. With such a strong showing, one can conclude that there is
significant religious influence in American life. However, we also see through
today’s media a nation that is committed to protecting its public institutions from
religious influence (Bishop, 1999).
Richard Garnett summarized the courts recent approach to the religion
clauses relevant to this study:
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the court has made it
increasingly clear that the First Amendment forbids viewpoint
discrimination in the administration of public-welfare programs and also
that religious believers and institutions may not be singled out for special
disadvantages and burdens (Garnett, 2003).

The Blaine Amendment
In 1875, Senator James G. Blaine, Republican for the state of Maine,
submitted a proposal to add an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Blaine, who
attempted three times to seek the Republican nomination for the candidacy for
President of the United States, wrote the proposed amendment to read as
follows:
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No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in
any State for the support of public fund there for, nor any public lands
devoted there to, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor
shall any money so be raised of lands so devoted be divided between
religious sects of denominations.
(Proposed U.S. Constitution Amendment written by Senator James
Gillepsie Blaine, 1875).
Senator Blaine wanted to be sure that there would be no spending of
United States tax dollars on any religious organizations. At the time, the First
Amendment only regulated actions by the federal government and not state
governments. Several states were providing funding to religious schools and
activities and in some cases were recognizing official state churches (National
Association of Secondary School Principals, 2003). According to the NASSP
organization, the United States Catholic population was growing at rapid rate and
benefited greatly from states that funded religious schools. Scholars have argued
that Blaine’s (a Protestant) motivation for creating the proposed amendment was
personal resentment towards the Catholic Church and it’s stronghold on state
governments (National Association of Secondary School Principals, 2003).
The Blaine Amendment passed the House of Representatives (180 -07)
but failed to pass in the Senate by four votes (The Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, 2003). After the proposal died in Congress, supporters of the proposal
made efforts to modify state constitutions pushing to have versions of the
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proposed Blaine Amendment in every state constitution. The strategy employed
by Blaine supporters was most forcefully directed at states seeking admission to
the union after 1875. These states were pressured by supporters of Blaine to
include a version of the proposal in their state constitution in order to gain
necessary support for ratification from Congress (Boston, 2002).
State constitutions that were ratified after 1875 have constitutional
language that is similar to Blaine’s amendment proposal. Currently there are 37
states with Blaine language in their constitutions (Ibid). In 1982, the State of
Massachusetts, a heavily Catholic-populated state, made an effort twice through
the pro-voucher forces to repeal the Blaine Language in its constitution. In 1982,
the vote was 62% against changing the language. In 1986, the vote was 70 %
against changing the language (Brnovich, 2003).
Ohio is another example of state that is finding conflict with the Blaine
language in its constitution. In Zelman vs. Simmons-Harris (536 U.S. 639, 2002),
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the states had the right to decide whether or
not to legally adopt school voucher programs as long as they maintained a
neutral stance toward religion. School vouchers are designed to allow students
the option of choosing to attend a private sectarian elementary or high school
and have the state pay an equal share of the tuition that they would receive from
attending a public elementary or high school education (Zellman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639 2002). This case will be examined in more depth later in
this chapter.
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The Blaine Amendment language in the Washington constitution was a
point of contention in the Locke v. Davey case. The State of Washington argued
that the state’s voter-ratified constitution contained a form of the Blaine
Amendment prohibiting the state from funding religious training. The argument
from Davey that refusing to pay on an issued scholarship, to a student who had
declared religion as a major was a violation of the U.S. Constitution First
Amendment.

History of the Promise Scholarship
In 1999, Washington Governor Gary Locke signed the Promise
Scholarship legislation. The Promise Scholarship law was designed to serve high
school students who were ranked in the top 10% of their graduating classes and
were identified as having a financial need. The award was valued at $1,225
annually. During the 2000 Washington legislative session, the program was
expanded to include students graduating in the top 15% of their class and those
scoring 1,200 or above on their first attempt at the national Scholastic Aptitude
Test. In the 2000-2001 academic year, the award was increased to $1,542 from
the previous $1,225. Finally, in 2002, the legislature voted to make the program
permanent. (Higher Education Coordinating Board of the State of Washington
Website, http://www.hecb.wa.gov/index.asp 2006).
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Background of the Locke v. Davey Case
Joshua Davey was an above average high school student from a single
parent home. In August 1999, Davey was awarded Washington’s Promise
Scholarship in an amount of $1125. In the spring of 1999, he was accepted to
Northwest College, an Assembly of God affiliated institution located in Kirkland,
Washington. He began attending there that fall. In his first year of college, Davey
declared a double major in business administration and pastoral ministries. He
had always planned to attend a sectarian institution and hoped to become a
minister.
Northwest College’s pastoral ministry program was designed to “help men
and women develop their gifts so that these students can become leaders who
have the tools to make a difference in communities, whether in their local
neighborhood or overseas. The school prepares students for all areas of
vocational ministry, including pastoral ministries, youth ministry, children’s
ministry, and missions” (Northwest College Catalog, 2004 p. 3).
While attending college in the fall of 1999, Davey was informed by the
college that they received notice from the Higher Education Board of the State of
Washington that students receiving the Promise Scholarship that were majoring
in pastoral studies would no longer be eligible for the scholarship. The college
notified Davey that he was deemed ineligible for the scholarship, but if he
dropped his pastoral ministries major he would again qualify. Davey felt strongly
that maintaining his scholarship eligibility by dropping his pastoral ministries
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major, would not be ethical. Instead, he decided to challenge the ruling of the
HECB Board and take up the matter in court (Locke v. Davey, 2003).
In January 2000, Davey brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington against the governor of Washington and
members of the HECB. He sought reinstatement of the scholarship, damages
and fees. Davey’s suit claimed violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, as well as the Washington State Constitution.
Davey cited the decision of Church of Lukumi Babalu, INC. v. City of
Hialeah, (508 U.S. 520, 1993) in support of his position. In Church of Lukumi
Babalu, INC. the Court addressed and ordinance that subjected a law to strict
scrutiny where the law in effect prohibited the killing of animals when done for
religious purposes. Davey also cited McDaniel v. Paty (435 U.S. 618, 1978) for
the proposition that a state may not use a person’s religious exercise as a
criterion for denial of a benefit, absent a compelling state interest. These cases
are examined in depth later in the chapter.
The judge in the district court granted HECB’s motion for summary
judgment, ruling that while a state may not discriminate against a student on the
basis of religion, it is not required to pay for his religious pursuits. The court citied
Harris v. McRae (448 U.S. 297, 1980) and Rust v. Sullivan (500 U.S. 173, 1991)
in which the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld the power of governments to
selectively fund the exercise of Constitutional rights (Davey v. Locke 2000 U.S.
DIST. LEXIS 22273).
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The district court also rejected Davey’s freedom of speech and association
claims because he did not point to any restriction on his right to free speech.
The court also rejected Davey’s claim that his due process was violated (Ibid)
Davey appealed the decision of the U.S. District Court to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court ruled in a split decision 2-1 in
favor of Davey. Judge Pamela Ann Rymer and Judge Ronald M. Gould were in
the majority. Judge M. Margaret McKeown voted in dissent (Ibid).
The panel majority reasoned that Davey’s Free Exercise rights were
violated. The majority acknowledged the selective funding cases such as Rust
and Regan, but the court found them not applicable to the current case because
they involved programs set up for the government’s own purposes.
Washington’s Promise Scholarship had a broader purpose: to fund the
educational pursuits of outstanding students. Invoking the “public forum”
reasoning of Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia 515
U.S. 819 (1995), which focused on Free Speech rather than Free Exercise, the
majority held that the theology exclusion was impermissible view point
discrimination allegedly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas. Rymer
wrote, “The bottom line is that the government may limit the scope of a program
that it will fund, but once it opens a neutral forum, with secular criteria, the
benefits may not be denied on account of religion” (Ibid p. 10152).
The Governor and HECB argued that even if strict scrutiny applies, the
policy survives such scrutiny because there is a compelling state interest in
upholding the Establishment Clause of its state constitution. The Ninth Circuit
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majority determined, however, that the state’s interest was less compelling
because the scholarship funds do not directly go to the institution, but are
awarded to the student on the basis of secular criteria and are applied to
religious studies only indirectly as a result of independent student choice.
Judge Rymer also reasoned that the restriction on theology majors is
similar to an unconstitutional condition, penalizing the exercise of a Constitutional
right, because the scholarship would not necessarily pay for religious studies, but
might instead be used for any education-related expense, such as food and
housing. The majority, however declined to rule on Davey’s other Constitutional
claims. Judge Rymer stated, "A state law may not offer a benefit to all ... but
exclude some on the basis of religion. Washington's restriction disables students
majoring in theology from the benefit of the scholarship." (Ibid p. 10148)
Justice M. Margaret McKeowan dissented concluding that the Washington
statute "has successfully navigated the tensions between the free exercise of
religion and the prohibition of its endorsement." Justice McKeown also wrote:
The simple truth is that Washington has neither prohibited nor impaired
Davey's free exercise of religion. He is free to believe and practice his
religion without restriction ... The only state action here was a decision
consonant with the state Constitution, not funding 'religious instruction.
Davey is free to use his scholarship at a religious institution. He is
absolutely free to discuss religion and study it for purposes of becoming a
minister. He suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of the State’s
decision to fund other educational pursuits.
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Justice M. Margaret McKeowan (Davey v. Locke No. C0061R 2000 p. 10161).
Governor Locke appealed the decision petitioned the court for a rehearing
en banc. The request was denied and the Governor then filed a petition with the
U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in February 2003. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on May 19, 2003 and established a briefing schedule and
scheduled oral argument for December 2, 2003.

Relevant Judicial Precedent
The briefs presented to the court in behalf of Governor Locke and Joshua
Davey cited numerous prior cases to support their legal positions. The following
past Supreme Court cases were presented by the petitioner and the respondent.
These cases are presented in legal brief format and in chronological order to
assist in analysis of the Supreme Court religion clause jurisprudence. A detailed
explanation of the legal brief format will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Name of case: Reynolds v. United States
Citation: 98 U.S. 145
Date of decision: 1878
Vote: 9-0
Author of opinion: Chief Justice Morrison Waite
Legal topics: Constitutional Law & First Amendment
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Facts: This case involved a Mormon polygamist, George Reynolds, who was
convicted under a federal bigamy statute. He argued that he had married
again in accord with his religious obligations and that therefore his criminal
conviction violated the First Amendment. At the trial, the accused proved
that at the time of his alleged second marriage he was, and for many
years before had been, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, commonly called the Mormon Church, and a believer in its
doctrines; that it was an accepted doctrine of that church "that it was the
duty of male members of said Church, circumstances permitting, to
practice polygamy” (Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S. 145 1878).
Question presented: Whether religious belief can be accepted as a justification of
an overt act made criminal by the law of the land.
Answer: No
Court’s reason: Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite declared that federal statute
constitutionally could punish criminal activity regardless of religious
beliefs. Simply, religious practices that impaired the public interest did not
fall under the protection of the First Amendment (Reynolds v. United
States 98 U.S. 145 1878).
Significance: This case is the first time the Supreme Court had to address the
scope of the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.

Name of case: Cantwell v. State of Connecticut
Citation: 310 U.S. 296

48

Date of Decision: 1940
Vote: 9-0
Author of opinion: Justice Owen Roberts
Legal topics: Constitutional Law & First Amendment
Facts: In 1940, Jesse Cantwell, a Jehovah’s Witness, and his sons often
preached on street corners and distributed religious material in support of
their beliefs. The event that spurred the case occurred when the father
and sons were proselytizing in a predominantly Catholic neighborhood.
Two pedestrians, who happen to be Catholic, heard an anti-Roman
Catholic message on Cantwell’s portable phonograph and reacted angrily.
The Cantwells were arrested for violating a local ordinance requiring a
permit for solicitation and pursuing activities inciting a breach of the peace.
Question presented: Are general regulations on solicitation legitimate when
restrictions are enforced against religious speech?
Answer: The court held that while general regulations on solicitation were
legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not.
Court’s reason: The statute allowed for local officials to determine which causes
were religious and which ones were not religious, therefore it violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the message the Cantwell’s
professed was offensive to many, it did not entail any threat or bodily
harm, therefore it should be protected as religious speech. The Supreme
Court’s opinion in this case rejected the State of Connecticut’s argument
that the First Amendment did not apply to the State of Connecticut. The
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Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment--which reads that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law," makes the First Amendment applicable at the state level.
(Cantwell v. State of Connecticut 310 U.S. 296, 1940).
Significance: For the first time, the Supreme Court specifically stated that the
Free Exercise of Religion clause of the First Amendment applies to states
as well as to the federal government. The Supreme Court had to decide
on a case that addressed the First Amendment but set the stage for the
court’s stance on the Fourteenth Amendment.

Name of case: Lemon v. Kurtzman
Citation: 403 U.S. 620
Date of decision: (1971)
Vote: 7-0
Author of opinion: Chief Justice Warren Burger
Legal topics: Constitutional Law & First Amendment
Facts: The Lemon case involved controversies over laws in Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute provided financial support for teacher
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public
schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct supplemental salary payments
to teachers in non-public elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to
"church-related educational institutions" (Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 620
1971).
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Question presented: Do the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the
First Amendment's Establishment clause by making state financial aid
available to church-affiliated educational institutions?
Answer: Yes
Court’s reason: The Supreme Court ruled that to be constitutional, a statute
must have a secular legislative purpose, it must have principal effects
which neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion. The court found that
the subsidization of parochial schools furthered a process of religious
inculcation, and that the continuing state surveillance necessary to enforce
the specific provisions of the laws would inevitably entangle the state in
religious affairs. The court also noted the presence of an unhealthy
divisive political potential concerning legislation which appropriates
support to religious schools (Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 620 1971).
Significance: In the Lemon decision, the court created the “Lemon test” as a
template for determining whether state action violated the Establishment
clause of the First Amendment. The court applied the test by asking and
answering three questions. 1) Does the statute or action have a secular
legislative purpose? 2) Is the principle and primary effect of the state
actions neutral regarding religion? 3) Does the statute or action entail an
excessive government entanglement with religion? The statue or action
must have a secular purpose, be neutral regarding religion, and not entail
excessive entanglement to pass constitutional muster.
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Name of case: McDaniel v Paty
Citation: 435 U.S. 618
Date of decision: 1978
Vote: 8-0
Author of opinion: Justice Warren E. Burger
Legal topics: Constitutional Law & First Amendment
Facts: McDaniel was an ordained minister who was barred from serving in the
Tennessee’s constitutional convention. A statute prevented ministers of
the gospel, or priest(s) of any denomination whatever from taking part in
the state’s convention. McDaniel alleged that his First Amendment rights
were violated by the restriction.
Question presented: Can the State of Tennessee prohibit ordained ministers or
priests from holding a public office?
Answer: No
Court’s reason: Tennessee’s statute improperly forced citizens to choose
between exercising two of their fundamental rights: freedom to practice
religion and the ability for citizens to hold public office. The disqualification
of clergy from holding public office had a historical basis as 11 of the
original 13 colonies had such provisions. However, the Court ruled that the
State of Tennessee’s statute prevented McDaniel from simultaneously
exercising two of his fundamental rights. While Tennessee may have
originally had a legitimate interest in keeping clergy from participation, this
interest has not been shown to exist any longer. Safeguards exist to
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ensure that, if elected, clergy will not create too close an alliance between
church and state. The decision by the Supreme Court begins by
establishing that the exclusion of clergy from public office was initially
justifiable and that the right’s of ministers to hold public office is not an
absolute right. However the Tennessee statute was struck down because
the state failed to prove a compelling need to have the restriction
(McDaniel v Paty 435 U.S. 618, 1978).
Significance: The Supreme Court accepted that original exclusion of clergy from
public office may have been justifiable, but that this was no longer true.
The fact that a practice goes back to the colonial period is not sufficient to
allow it today. This principle is not followed consistently. Legislative
chaplains were found permissible almost entirely on the basis of their
traditional place. This case established that a state law cannot violate the
U.S. Constitution. A state cannot establish a law that would ban a
candidate because he/she was an ordained minister. This statute was
discriminatory towards religion. The Court also applied the Lemon test
and found that the restriction was not neutral towards religion.

Name of case: Norwood v. Harrison
Citation: 413 U.S. 455
Date of decision: 1973
Vote: 7-2-0
Author of opinion: Chief Justice Warren Burger
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Legal topics: Constitutional Law & First Amendment
Facts: A three-judge District Court sustained the validity of a Mississippi
statutory program under which textbooks were purchased by the state and
lent to students in both public and private sectarian schools, without
reference to whether any participating private school had racially
discriminatory policies. Appellants, parents of four schoolchildren, filed a
claim alleging that by supplying textbooks to students of sectarian private
schools, the state therefore was providing direct aid to racially segregated
education.
Question presented: Whether a state program under which textbooks are loaned
to racially segregate sectarian private schools violates the Establishment
clause.
Answer: Yes
Court’s reason: Private secular schools have the right to exist and to operate, but
the state is not required by the Equal Protection clause to provide
assistance to private schools equivalent to that it provides to public
schools without regard to whether the private schools discriminate on
racial grounds. Free textbooks, like tuition grants directed to students in
private schools, are a form of tangible financial assistance benefiting the
schools themselves, and the state's constitutional obligation requires it to
avoid not only operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools
but also providing tangible aid to schools that practice racial or other
invidious discrimination (Norwood v. Harrison 413 U.S. 455, 1973).
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Significance: The constitutional obligation of the State "requires it to steer clear,
not only of operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools,
but also of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other
invidious discrimination."(Norwood v. Harrison 413 U.S. 455, 1973 p. 467).
States need to abide by their constitutions as well as the U.S. Constitution.

Name of case: Widmar v. Vincent
Citation: 454 U.S. 263
Date of decision: 1981
Vote: 8-1
Author of opinion: Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Legal topics: Constitutional Law & First Amendment
Facts: The University of Missouri at Kansas City adopted a policy providing that
its facilities could not be used by student groups “for purposes of religious
worship or religious teaching.” (Widmar v. Vincent 454 U.S. 263 1981 p.
265) The school believed that the action was required under the
Establishment clause. A student religious group that had previously been
permitted to use the facilities sued the school after being informed of the
change in policy. They asserted that their First Amendment rights to
religious free exercise and free speech were being violated.
The policy read as follows:
4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or
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religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. The
general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds
for religious worship or religious teaching is a policy required, in the
opinion of The Board of Curators, by the Constitution and laws of
the State and is not open to any other construction. No regulations
shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other
appropriate recognition of religion at public functions held in
University facilities.
4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds
may be used for religious services but not for regular recurring
services of any groups. Special rules and procedures shall be
established for each such chapel by the Chancellor. It is specifically
directed that no advantage shall be given to any religious group.
University of Missouri--Kansas City Student Union Policy, 1970
(Widmar v. Vincent 454 U.S. 263 1981).
Question presented: Does the Establishment Clause require state universities to
limit access to their facilities by religious organizations?
Answer: No
Court’s reason: Because the university had generally permitted its facilities to be
used by student organizations, it must demonstrate that its restrictions are
constitutionally permitted. An equal access policy would not necessarily
violate the Establishment clause. The three-pronged Lemon test would not
be violated by such a policy. It would have a secular legislative purpose
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and not foster excessive government entanglement. The second part, that
the policy’s primary effect would advance religion, is what the university
claimed, “...This Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the prohibition
against the "primary advancement" of religion” (Widmar v. Vincent 454
U.S. 263 1981 p. 267). The state does not necessarily approve of all
groups who use the open forum, and the forum is open to non-religious as
well as religious groups.
Justice White dissented arguing that not allowing the religious
group would only have a minimal impact upon members' free exercise:
Respondents complain that compliance with the regulation would
require them to meet "about a block and a half" from campus under
conditions less comfortable than those previously available on
campus. I view this burden on free exercise as minimal. Because
the burden is minimal, the State need do no more than demonstrate
that the regulation furthers some permissible state end. The State's
interest in avoiding claims that it is financing or otherwise
supporting religious worship - in maintaining a definitive separation
between church and State - is such an end. That the State truly
does mean to act toward this end is amply supported by the
treatment of religion in the State Constitution. Thus, I believe the
interest of the State is sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of
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the minimal burden on respondents' ability freely to exercise their
religious beliefs (Widmar v. Vincent 454 U.S. 263 1981p. 289).
Significance: This case plays a significant role in how the courts and government
agencies understand the concept of equal access when it comes to
allowing religious groups to use government facilities. Government
agencies that open their buildings to be used by community organizations
must open their buildings to religious organizations on an equal basis.
This case initiated the Supreme Court’s philosophy on viewpoint neutrality.
Viewpoint neutrality is a basic legal guideline that the Supreme Court
created to ensure that government actions applied to all groups on a
nondiscriminatory basis. The government may not discriminate and favor
a specific group over another.

Name of case: Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind
Citation: 474 U.S. 481
Date of decision: 1986
Vote: 9-0
Author of opinion: Justice Thurgood Marshall
Legal topics: Constitutional Law & First Amendment
Facts: The plaintiff was a State of Washington blind resident who wanted to use
his state financial assistance to attend a religious college. The petitioner
was suffering from a progressive eye condition and applied to the
Washington Commission for the Blind for vocational rehabilitation
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assistance pursuant to a Washington statute. At the time, he was
attending a private Christian college seeking to become a pastor,
missionary, or youth director. The Commission denied aid on the ground
that it was prohibited by the state constitution, and this ruling was upheld
on administrative appeal. Witters then brought an action in state superior
court, which affirmed the administrative ruling on the same state-law
grounds. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the ruling but based it
on the Establishment clause of the First Amendment, holding that the
provision of aid to petitioner would have the primary effect of advancing
religion in violation of that clause
Question presented: Can the state refuse public funding to an individual who
chooses to use the funds to attend a religious college under the First
Amendment Establishment clause?
Answer: No
Court’s reason: The court ruled that this did not violate the First Amendment's
Establishment clause since the money did not go directly from the state to
the religious institution, but to an individual who determined its use.
Justice Thurgood Marshall applied the Lemon test and concluded that
there was no violation. The question that had to be determined was
whether the funding of grant money had the effect of promoting religion. In
analyzing the claim, the court scrutinized the Washington program and its
awarding procedure to determine how the aide was applied. The court
concluded that, "As far as the record shows, vocational assistance
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provided under the Washington program is paid directly to the student,
who transmits it to the educational institution of his or her choice" (Witters
v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind 474 U.S. 481, 1986 p.
487).
Significance: This case established the defining difference in self directed student
aid versus institutional directed financial aid. The court examined whether
or not the State of Washington’s program had a “primary or principal
effect” of advancing religion and ruled that it did not. In relations to the
Locke v. Davey case this was a significant outcome as Davey’s complaint
argued the same point. (Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind 474 U.S. 481, 1986 p. 484).

Name of case: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah
Citation: 508 U.S. 520
Date of decision: 1993
Vote: 9-0
Author of opinion: Justice Anthony Kennedy
Legal topics: Constitutional Law, First Amendment
Facts: In South Florida, many Cuban refugees practice the Santeria religion,
which combines a traditional African religion with elements of Roman
Catholicism. An important Santeria ritual is animal sacrifice. When a
Santeria church announced plans to open in Hialeah, Florida, the city
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council enacted three ordinances designed to prohibit any animal
sacrifices by the church. The ordinances were as follows:
Ordinance 87-40, which incorporates the Florida animal cruelty laws and
broadly punishes “whoever unnecessarily or cruelly kills any animal," and
has been interpreted to reach killings for religious reasons; Ordinance 8752, which defines "sacrifice" as "to unnecessarily kill an animal in a ritual
not for the primary purpose of food consumption," and prohibits the
"possession, sacrifice, or slaughter" of an animal if it is killed in "any type
of ritual" and there is an intent to use it for food, but exempts "any licensed
food establishment" if the killing is otherwise permitted by law.
Ordinance 87-71, which prohibits the sacrifice of animals, and defines
"sacrifice" in the same manner as Ordinance 87-52; and Ordinance 87-72
which defines "slaughter" as "the killing of animals for food" and prohibits
slaughter outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses, but includes an
exemption for "small numbers of hogs and/or cattle" when exempted by
state law. (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah 508
U.S. 520, 1993).
The church sued the city and city officials, claiming that the
ordinances violated its rights under the Free Exercise clause of the First
Amendment. The district court found that the ordinances were not directed
solely at the church and that the prohibition of ritual sacrifice was
Constitutional (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah
508 U.S. 520, 1993).
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Question presented: Can a city constitutionally enact ordinances that are
designed to prohibit certain religious practices?
Answer: No
Court’s reason: The Supreme Court found that the ordinances were not neutral
and that they were directed solely at the Santeria church. Justice Kennedy
noted, “Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never
permissible, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid
unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
advance that interest. A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious
practice without a secular meaning discernible from the language or
context” (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah 508 U.S.
520, 1993 p. 528).
The court then held that the ordinances were not narrowly tailored
to discourage the Santeria ritual because they advanced the preferred
governmental interests; the health risk of animal sacrifices to participants,
the emotional injury to children who witnessed the sacrifices, the need to
protect animals from unnecessary killings, and the need to restrict the
slaughter of animals to areas zoned for slaughterhouse use. The
exception was only when the conduct was motivated by religious beliefs.
The Free Exercise clause commits government itself to religious
tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state
intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its
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practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty
to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.
Justice Kennedy
(Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah 508 U.S.
520 1993 p. 529).
Significance: The court’s decision determined that a law must be generally
applicable and neutral. A state government cannot pass laws which
unfairly burden a religious group. This case also demonstrated that the
Supreme Court’s philosophy on viewpoint neutral doctrine under the First
Amendment by showing that the ordinances that were enacted were not
neutral, they were biased towards one particular group. In this case it was
biased towards the Santeria church. Religious rituals involving animal
sacrifices are legal according to the court but how and where they are
conducted that has a compelling government interest.

Name of case: Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia
Citation: 515 U.S. 819
Date of decision: 1995
Vote: 5-4
Author of opinion: Justice Anthony Kennedy
Legal topics: Establishment clause
Facts: Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University
Student Activities Program for $5,800 from a student activities fund, which
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got its funding from mandatory contributions from students (called a
student activity fee), to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A
Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University Student
Activity Program refused to provide funding for the publication on the
grounds that publication “primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality as prohibited by Student
Activity Fee Guidelines” (Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia 515 U.S. 819, 1995 p. 823).
Question presented: Whether the University of Virginia violated the First
Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the
same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run
magazines.
Answer: Yes
Court’s reason: The University of Virginia’s denial of funding to Rosenberger,
due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his
speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The court noted that no
matter how scarce university publication funding may be, if it chooses to
promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Further
more, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious
content, the court found the university's publication policy to be neutral
toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause.
The court concluded by stating that the university could not stop all
funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic
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perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech
as the exclusion of only one. The university must provide a financial
subsidy to a student religious publication on the same grounds or criteria
as other student publications. Whether or not the publication primarily
promotes or manifests a particular belief about a deity or an ultimate
reality is immaterial. Viewpoint discrimination as in this case is an
egregious form of content discrimination (Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the University of Virginia 515 U.S. 819, 1995).
The government must abstain from regulating speech when the
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction…. Viewpoint-based
restrictions are proper when the University does not itself speak or
subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends
funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. A
holding that the University may not discriminate based on the
viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not
restrict the University's own speech, which is controlled by different
principles (Justice Kennedy, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the University of Virginia 515 U.S. 819 1995 p. 829 ).
Justice Souter, Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Breyer joined in the dissent. Justice Souter wrote the dissent. He held
that Wide Awake was a religious magazine promoting a specific religious
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agenda which they argued to support with activity funds was an outright
violation of the Establishment clause.
Using public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching the word
is categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause, and if the
Clause was meant to accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar this
use of public money…. The Court is ordering an instrumentality of the
State to support religious evangelism with direct funding. This is a flat
violation of the Establishment Clause. (Justice Souter,Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia 515 U.S. 819, 1995 p. 832).
Significance: Funding programs in college must be viewpoint neutral when
applied to religious and non religious organizations.

Name of case: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
Citation: 536 U.S. 639
Date of decision: 2002
Vote: 5-4
Author of opinion: Chief Justice William Rehnquist
Legal topics: Establishment Clause
Facts: The City of Cleveland, Ohio’s school district enrolled 75,000 children. The
majority of the children were from low income and minority families. The
school district had failed to meet any of the State of Ohio’s 18 standards
for minimal acceptable performance. The district initiated the Pilot Project
Scholarship Program that worked as a school voucher program. Parents
could take a set amount of money awarded to them and apply it to another
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school—including sectarian schools—that met the program’s criteria
(Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639, 2002).
Question presented: Whether an Ohio school voucher plan, in which the vast
majority of participating students in the program attend sectarian schools,
violated the Establishment clause of the First Amendment.
Answer: No
Court’s reason: Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority reasoned that the
voucher program helped lower income children receive a better education
without reference to religion. The program is neutral on its face and does
not favor religious over nonreligious schools. True private choice
programs do not violate the Establishment clause of the First Amendment.
A government program does not violate the Establishment clause if the
government aid is provided directly to the individual student or parent, who
then makes a choice of schools. The Ohio voucher program was a neutral,
private choice program that did not violate the Establishment clause
(Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639, 2002).
That the program was one of true private choice, with no evidence
that the State deliberately skewed incentives toward religious
schools, was sufficient for the program to survive scrutiny under the
Establishment Clause" (Chief Justice Rehnquist – Majority Opinion,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639 2002 p. 8).
Justice Souter’s dissented. He reasoned that the majority
undermined the very point of prohibiting a religious establishment. Justice
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Stevens also dissented. He wrote that the educational crisis in Cleveland
was not something which should influence a constitutional question. He
also argued that the range of public school choices was not relevant to the
point that there is no real range of choices among private schools. Finally
he reasoned;
The voluntary character of the private choice to prefer a parochial
education over an education in the public school system seems to me
quite irrelevant to the question whether the government's choice to pay for
religious indoctrination is constitutionally permissible. Today, however, the
Court seems to have decided that the mere fact that a family that cannot
afford a private education wants its children educated in a parochial
school is a sufficient justification for this use of public funds (Justice
Stevens (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639 2002).
Significance: This decision reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s philosophy on
viewpoint neutrality and self directed aid versus institution directed aid.
The decision appears particularly relevant to Locke v. Davey. The
Washington aide was deposited to the students account at the institution.
The student then decided how to apply the aide. The dissent however
provides a template for the majority in the Locke v. Davey case. This
case’s outcome supported Davey’s argument in regards to his claim of
violation of his rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise clause, in
particular to the violation of the viewpoint neutrality philosophy so set by
the Supreme Court to date.
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Gary Locke, et al., v. Joshua Davey 2003
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
On February 24, 2003, Governor Gary Locke filed a petition for writ of
certiorari. The Supreme Court controls its docket and therefore petition
arguments address the national importance of the dispute. The question
addressed by the petitioners to the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the Free
Exercise clause of the First Amendment required a state to fund religious
instruction if it provided college scholarships for secular instruction. The
petitioners were Gary Locke, governor of the State of Washington; Marcus S.
Gasoard, executive director of the Higher Education Coordinating Board; Bob
Craves, chair of the Higher Education Coordinating Board; and John Klacik,
associated director of the Higher Education Coordinating Board. Christine O.
Gregoire, attorney general of the State of Washington; William Berggren Collins
Sr., assistant attorney general counsel of record of the State of Washington; and
Michael J. Shinn, assistant attorney general of the State of Washington acted as
counsel for the petitioners (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Locke, 2003).
The defendant noted in the proceedings was Joshua Davey, student at
Northwestern College and recipient of the State of Washington’s Promise
Scholarship. Representing Joshua Dave were Jay Alan Sekulow, counsel of
record and director of the American Center for Law & Justice. He was assisted
by Walter M. Weber, David Cortman, Stuart Roth, Colby M.May, and James M.
Hendersen Sr. also of the American Center for Law & Justice. Also assisting with
the defense, Richard Bersin of the Law Office of Richard Bersin.
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The petitioners argued that the decision rendered by the Ninth Circuit’s
conflicted with the State of Washington’s Supreme Court’s decision in Witters v
Washington Commission for the Blind (112 Wash. 2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119, 1989).
The Witters case held that the state did not violate the Free Exercise clause of
the First Amendment when it followed the command of the state constitution and
refused to provide public funds for religious instruction. The Ninth Circuit court
concluded the exact opposite (P. Locke, 2003).
The petitioners argued that Davey vs. Locke and Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind, were very similar according to the
petitioner’s argument, which asserted that a precedent had been set with the
Witters case. The Washington Supreme Court’s decision held that providing
funds to Witters would violate the Washington State constitution, which prohibits
the funding of religious instruction through the use of public funds. The
Washington Supreme Court used its ruling in the Witters case to resolve another
case, State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 146 Wash 2d 445, 48 P.3d 274 (2002). In
the Gallwey case, The Washington Supreme Court discussed Witters with
approval and upheld that a student aid program could not be used to attend
religious colleges because public funds could not be used to pay for religious
instruction (P. Locke, 2003).
In an effort to persuade the court, the petitioners contended that the
conflict between the Ninth Circuit Court and the Washington Supreme Court was
significant, and needed immediate resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court, stating
that the proper rule of law to be applied to Washington was unknown. Petitioners
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asserted that resolving the conflict between the courts on the state and federal
level would establish national uniformity and eliminate confusion (P. Locke,
2003).
The petitioners further argued that the case needed to be heard because it
involved the validity of a provision in the Washington constitution, which prohibits
funding religious instruction and imposes a stricter separation of church and state
than the Establishment clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The petitioners argued that the provision to not have the state fund religious
education had been in existence and an exercise of legislative power since 1889.
They emphasized that 14 other states had the same or similar restrictions in their
constitutions restricting financial aid for students thereby establishing the national
significance of the case (P. Locke, 2003).
In their petition for a hearing, the Locke group highlighted the dissenting
opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court to further support their claim. They asserted
that the dissent rejected the notion that the denial of the funds was a violation of
the Free Exercise clause. Under this analysis, Davey still had the right to pursue
a theology degree, but the state would not be required to pay for it.
The petitioners asserted that the dissent was correct in concluding that in
the cases of The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah and Mc
Daniel v. Paty (435 U.S. 618, 1978), were inapplicable to the dispute.
“Washington has neither prohibited nor impaired Davey’s free exercise of his
religion. He is free to believe and practice his religion without restriction.” wrote
Justice Mc Keown (Locke v Davey, 299 748 9th Cir. 2002 p. 10161).
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The petitioners pleaded in their written arguments for the Supreme Court
to hear this case in an attempt to clear the confusion that the Ninth Circuit Court
majority opinion had created in ruling in favor of Davey.

Response to the Petitioner
On April 10, 2003, the respondents filed their brief in response to the
petition. The respondents replied that the Ninth Circuit Court correctly decided
the case and that there was no need for the Supreme Court’s attention.
The argument presented by the respondent focused on the Court’s
viewpoint neutrality jurisprudence. Respondents posed the issue presented by
the petition as follow: “If a state chose to award scholarships based on neutral
criteria to students based on financial need and academic performance, does the
state violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution when
it withdraws the scholarship from a student who is otherwise eligible except for
the fact the student chooses to declare a major in theology taught form a
religious perspective?” (Respondent, Davey 2003 p. 40)
The respondents argued that this case need not be reviewed by the
Supreme Court because the alleged conflict presented by the petitioners, the
Ninth Circuit Court’s ruling in Locke v. Davey and decision rendered by the
Washington Supreme Court on Witters v. State Commission for the Blind (112
Wash. 2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119,1989,) was nonexistent. Simply stated, any conflict
between state constitutional law and federal constitutional law defers to the well
established rule of federal supremacy (Respondent, Davey 2003).
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In the respondent’s brief, the Petitioners argued that the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in the Witters v
Washington case (474 U.S. 481, 1986) by rejecting the supreme court’s first
holding that the federal Establishment clause posed no bar to a neutral education
that allowed recipients, by their own independent choice, to pursue religious
studies (Witters v State Commissions for the Blind 474 U.S. 481, 1986, pp. 48589).
The respondents further asserted that the Witters case was used by the
Washington Supreme Court as a tool to gauge issues that came before them that
dealt with the Washington constitutional law prohibiting using public funds to pay
for religious instruction. However, the respondent argued that a number of cases
that the Washington Supreme Court had ruled on wandered from the strict
separation that they used to set said precedent. (Respondent, Davey 2003)
The case of Maylon v Pierce County (131 Wash. 2d 779, 935 1271, 1997)
was one example in which the Washington Supreme Court did not abide by the
Witters ruling. The Washington Supreme Court ruled in Maylon that “only
appropriations with a religious purpose violate the state Constitution. Thus, a
state scholarship program with a secular purpose like the assistance program in
Witters and the Promise Scholarship awarded to Davey would satisfy
Constitutional review. Any money used to accomplish any objective other than
worship, exercise, instruction, or religious establishment is not within prohibition”
(Maylon v Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 935 p.2d 1271, 1997).
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In State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm (146 Wash. 2d 445, 48 P.3d 274, 2002),
the respondents argued, the Washington Supreme Court used the Maylon case
above the Witters case, giving it only small acknowledgment, in helping to decide
the Gallwey case, and stated that the Maylon case governed educational
assistance cases. Basically, while the Washington Supreme Court claimed that
the Witters case was their steadfast ruling on the public funding of religious
training, cases ruled on by the Washington Supreme Court show that this was
not always true, thus invalidating the state’s conflict argument.
The respondents also made the point that the petitioners cited
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufman (419 U.S. 888, 1974) in which in the respondent denied
bus transportation to all non-public schools, whether they were religious or not.
This meant that the state denied the benefit to students because of their
enrollment in non-public schools, not because they were enrolled in a religious
school. If the State of Washington were to restrict the Promise Scholarship to
state schools only, then the Luetkemeyer v. Kaufman (419 U.S. 888, 1974) case
would have some Constitutional merit. However, here the State of Washington
discriminated on the basis of religious viewpoint of the student’s selected major,
and not the public/non-public nature of the institution the student attended.
Furthermore, the respondents argued that this case was an especially
poor candidate for review because the real issue is that if a state chooses to
award a scholarship on a neutral basis to financially-needy, academically-gifted
college students, it may not discriminate and remove the scholarship just
because the student declares a major in a religious subject taught from a
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religious viewpoint. Under settled law such an act was unconstitutional
undermining the necessity for Court Review.
Under the Promise Scholarship, the courses a student chooses are
irrelevant. The major the student declared led to the removal of scholarship
funds. Thus, a Promise Scholarship recipient could take many theology courses,
as long as the student’s major was not theology. If you reverse the argument,
and a Promise Scholarship recipient declares a major in theology, however, and
only takes courses such as English, math, science, or social studies during his
first two years of college, he is no longer eligible for the scholarship according to
the State of Washington, simply because they declared a theology major.
In addition, the respondents argued that the criterion set forth by the State
of Washington pointed out that it was the declaration of a major that put the
student in jeopardy of losing the scholarship. Since the scholarship was for the
first two years of a recipient’s education, that student could wait until his/her third
year to declare a theology major and could have even taken all the courses for
said major but still be eligible for the Promise Scholarship. For that student an
obvious way to keep the scholarship would be to circumvent the system by
deferring the declaration of a major.
The respondents concluded their arguments by pointing out that the
petitioners had not demonstrated an argument in that the State of Washington’s
had a compelling state interest in a separation of church and state
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Petitioner Reply
The Petitioner filed a reply on April 21, 2003. However, after a complete
and exhaustive search of several law libraries and databases, this brief could not
be located.

Petition Granted
On May 19, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court granted petition to Gary Locke
and Joshua Davey to argue the case before the Supreme Court. Petitioner briefs
on the merits on the case were filed by both parties.

Merit Brief for the Petitioner
On July 17, 2003, the Petitioner, Gary Locke, filed a brief on the merits of
the dispute. The petitioner argued that the Washington constitution provided that
no public money shall be appropriated or applied to religious instruction.
Following this constitutional command, Washington does not grant college
scholarships to otherwise eligible students who are pursuing a degree in
theology.
The petitioners continued their argument asserted that this provision has
long been interpreted as establishing a clear separation of church and state. This
provision prohibits both religious exercises or instruction in public schools and
the public funding of such activities. The exclusion of a theology degree from the
scope of Washington’s Promise Scholarship program does not violate the Free
Exercise clause of the First Amendment (Merit Brief for Petitioner, p. 20).
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The Petitioner also contended that the Supreme Court has held that the
government’s decision not to fund the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe that right. The petitioners cited: Maher v. Roe (432 U.S. 464, 1977);
Harris v. McRae, (448 U.S. 297, 1980); Regan v. Taxation With Representation
(461 U.S. 540, 1983); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) to support their
assertion. (Merit Brief for Petitioner, p. 20).
The petitioners then argued that Washington’s decision not to subsidize
religious instruction to implement its state constitutional policy of separation of
church and state did not infringe Davey’s right to seek a theology degree. The
Petitioner continued contending the Promise Scholarship did not impose
“unconstitutional conditions” on the recipient of the funding. Rather, it limited only
the uses to which the program’s funds may be applied. Students pursuing a
theology degree at one institution may still use the scholarship to pursue a
separate secular degree at a second school. Thus, there was no requirement for
a relinquishment of rights that prohibited the recipient from engaging in protected
conduct, but only a limit on the scope of the funding program (Merit Brief for
Petitioner, p. 21).
Petitioners also claimed that enrollment requirements of the Promise
Scholarship program did not prohibit or burden Davey’s religious beliefs or
practices in violation of the Free Exercise clause. The state did not impose
regulatory requirements or impact Davey’s practice of religion beyond the choice
not to fund his degree in theology. However, the Ninth Circuit majority held that
Washington’s Promise Scholarship law was not neutral and was subject to strict
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scrutiny under Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (508 U.S.
520, 1993). It concluded that the Promise Scholarship program was
discriminatory because it funded the secular study of religion and excluded only
theology “taught from a religious perspective” (Merit Brief for Petitioner, p. 21).
This 9th Circuit ruling follows the precedent the U.S. Supreme Court has been
setting on the philosophy of view point neutral doctrine in which the Petitioner
argues that the Promise Scholarship is not a forum
The Ninth Circuit majority concluded that the Promise Scholarship
program constituted a limited fiscal forum that must be administered on a
viewpoint neutral basis under Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors (515 U.S. 819,
1995). However, the purpose of the Promise Scholarship was not to create a
forum for the exchange of views, but to facilitate the education of low and middle
income students. Rosenberger did not apply, just as it did not apply to a library’s
acquisition of internet terminals and books to facilitate research and learning in
United States v. American Library Association (123 S. Ct. 2297, 2003) (Merit
Brief for Petitioner, p. 22).
In summary, the petitioner presented their arguments to support their view
that the Ninth Circuit Court ruled in error to the case. The State of Washington
Constitution is clear on its no funding of religious training with State funds, not
subsidizing religious instruction does not infringe on Davey’s right to seek a
theology degree. The Promise Scholarship program did not prohibit Davey’s
beliefs and in final the Promise Scholarship was not a forum to exchange views
but a way to facilitate the education of low to middle income students.
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Respondents Brief on the Merits
On September 8, 2003, the respondent, Joshua Davey, filed his brief on
the merits. In it he argued that the state’s expressed, discriminatory
disqualification of otherwise eligible scholarship recipients, solely because they
declare a major in pastoral studies violated the Free Exercise clause of the First
Amendment. He cited, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, (508
U.S. 520, 1993) and McDaniel v. Paty, (435 U.S. 618, 1978) to support his
argument. He asserted that the state’s discrimination against religious viewpoints
is explicit and undisputed. (Merit Brief for Respondent, p. 15).
Addressing the Petitioner’s argument, Respondent contended that Davey
could have simultaneously attended two colleges, each part time, and received
the Promise Scholarship at one college while pursuing a theology degree at the
other. The respondent rebutted this claim by asserting that aside from the
logistical nightmare in doing so, the fact of discrimination remains. The state
forces only theology majors to undertake such complicated measures to maintain
scholarship eligibility. The state’s interest in enforcing what it claims are more
strictly separationist requirements in its state constitution cannot trump federal
constitutional rights. This anti-religious, viewpoint-based discrimination clearly
offends the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (Merit
Brief for Respondent, p. 16).
Davey continued his argument addressing how the State of Washington
violated the Free Speech clause. The State of Washington’s discrimination
against those students who declare a major in theology that is taught from a
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religious viewpoint. Respondent reasoned that the outcomes in Rosenberger v.
Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (515 U.S. 819, 1995) supported this
argument. Discrimination against the religious viewpoint of private speakers is
unconstitutional regardless of how one characterizes the forum at issue. The
State of Washington penalized the exercise of personal religious choices with the
forfeiture of over $2,500 worth of state scholarship funds to which the recipient
would otherwise be entitled. Because the state’s anti-religious discrimination
embodies hostility, not neutrality, toward religion, and because a disqualification
tied to private religious choices yields impermissible state entanglement with
religion, the challenged restriction also violates the Establishment clause of the
First Amendment(Merit Brief for Respondent, p. 16).
Finally, Davey argued that the state’s expressed, intentional discrimination
against those persons who chose to pursue a theology degree taught from a
religious perspective failed both strict scrutiny and rational basis review under the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Merit Brief for
Respondent, p. 17).

Petitioners Reply Brief
The petitioners countered arguments in Davey’s brief that claimed the
State of Washington violated the Establishment clause of the First Amendment.
The petitioners wrote that the Establishment Clause does not provide protection
in religious matters prohibited by the Washington constitution. In Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind (474 U.S. 481, 488, 1986), the
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U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Washington did not violate the Establishment
clause when it provided state aid to a student to be used to support his religious
education. However, the Washington Supreme Court ruled in the Witters case
that the state constitution prohibits the use of public moneys to pay for such
religious instruction. (Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind
474 U.S. 481, 488, 1986) The difference in these decisions reflects the fact that
the Washington constitution protects individual conscience in religious matters
that are not protected by the Establishment clause has established a broader
separation of church and state (Ibid).
The petitioners agreed to the fact that the aid to the student in Witters was
used for religious education. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the
program did not violate the Establishment clause because the neutrally available
state aid did not “confer any message of state endorsement of religion” (Ibid p.
488).
The petitioners argued that Davey claimed that article I, section 11 in the
Washington constitution was hostile to religion because it arose out of antiCatholic bigotry related to the Blaine Amendment. (Merit Brief Reply by
Petitioners, 2003)
The history of the adoption of article I, section 11 does not suggest in any
way that the language in the Washington constitution was not the product
of anti-Catholic prejudice, as Davey suggests.
(Merit Brief Reply by Petitioners, 2003 p. 6)
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Furthering their arguments, the petitioners wrote that the eligibility
requirement in the Promise Scholarship did not violate Davey’s right to freely
exercise his religion. The Petitioner disputed Davey’s statement that Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (508 U.S. 520,1993) addressing a
city ordinance that prohibited the church members from practicing rituals of their
religion was similar (Ibid).
This statement is erroneous, as we find that not funding Davey’s
scholarship so that he may study to be a minister does not prohibit or
regulate Davey’s practice of his religion. The scholarship stipulation does
not impose an unconstitutional condition on Davey.
(Merit Brief Reply by Petitioners, 2003 p. 9)
The petitioners next addressed Davey’s claim that his amici argued that
the scholarship discriminated against religion on its face and is, therefore, subject
to strict scrutiny. Davey made essentially two arguments. First, Davey seemed to
argue that any law that refers to religion is facially discriminatory. Second, Davey
argued that the scholarship discriminates on its face because they claim it only
prohibits teaching theology from a religious point of view (Ibid, 2003).
In Davey’s view, teaching comparative religion in public colleges and
universities constitutes teaching theology from the non religious point of
view. Thus, Davey claims viewpoint discrimination as if public universities
taught Protestant theology but the state would not permit scholarships to
teach Catholic theology.
(Merit Brief Reply by Petitioners, 2003 p.12)

82

The petitioners claimed that Davey’s comparison was erroneous:
Theology and comparative religion do not represent different viewpoints
about the same subject. Theology is the study of the nature of God and
religious truth. It is designed to inculcate belief (or disbelief) in God. A
degree in theology prepares students for positions of religious leadership.
There is no dispute that this was the degree Davey was seeking. In
contrast, courses involving religious ideas in public colleges and
universities in Washington are studied as an aspect of the general
intellectual and cultural history of societies and civilizations
(Merit Brief Reply by Petitioners, 2003 p. 13).
Davey argued that Washington Rev. Code § 28B.10.814 was biased
because it would apply to individuals who seek a degree in theology who never
intend to pursue a career in the ministry. The petitioners pointed out that Davey’s
argument ignores the fact that the use of public funds for religious instruction in
itself is objectionable.
Petitioners were puzzled by Davey argument that a program that
facilitates a broad spectrum of educational activity is a forum, yet his argument
did not define the purpose of a forum, which is to encourage a diversity of views
from private speakers (Merit Brief Reply by Petitioners, 2003).
The purpose of the Promise Scholarship is not to facilitate diversity of
views from students or teachers. It is to provide education. Since the
Promise Scholarship does not establish a forum, it does not violate
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the Free Speech clause for Washington to adhere to the neutral line
between secular and religious instruction
(Merit Brief Reply by Petitioners, 2003 p. 18)
The petitioners concluded their reply by stating that Davey’s claim that the
state’s refusal to contribute to a student choosing to seek a degree in theology
demonstrates hostility toward religion that violates the Establishment clause. The
State of Washington’s refusal to pay for religious instruction due to its
constitutional mandate does not translate into proof that the state is hostile
toward religion (Merit Brief Reply by Petitioners, 2003).
In summary, we have heard from both parties, examined the argument of
both parties through analysis of the documents submitted in support and against
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and the Briefs on the Merits. The dispute
aroused interest in various organizations not directly involved the case. The
briefs expressing those views will be examined next.

Amicus Curiae Briefs
An amicus curiae brief is Latin term that means “friend of the court.” Chief
Justice William Rehnquist once wrote that an amicus curiae is, “Someone who is
not a party to the litigation, but who believes that the court's decision may affect
its interest" (Rehnquist, 2001, p. 89). An amicus curiae brief can often provide
valuable information about legal arguments or in some cases how a decision
might affect people other than the parties to the case.
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The petition for certiorari by Gary Locke was filed February 24, 2003. The
Institute for Justice filed an amicus brief on April 10, 2003, prior to the court’s
decision on the petition. Twenty-four additional amicus briefs were filed following
the court’s decision granting the petition.

Amicus Curiae Briefs in Support of the Petitioner - Gary Locke
Amici curiae briefs were filed in support of petitioner Gary Locke, governor
of the State of Washington. The Amici included the ACLU, the American Jewish
Congress, the Anti Defamation League, the Historians and Law Scholars, the
National School Board and the States of Vermont, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Oregon and South Dakota. All the arguments presented a similar theme.
Simply, history supported the State of Washington in denying funding for
religious training and that the State of Washington’s denial of funding did not
infringe Davey’s right to Free Exercise, since he remained free to pursue his
religious calling at the school of his choice, at his expense.
The amicus curiae brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. was
one of the first to be filed. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is a
nationwide, nonprofit, nonpartisan, membership organization dedicated to
preserving the principles of liberty and equality embodied in the Constitution
and this nation's civil rights laws (Amicus Curiae ACLU et al., 2003). The ACLU
contended that the State of Washington did not engage in viewpoint
discrimination or violate Joshua Davey’s right to Free Exercise when it declines
to use state tax dollars to subsidize clergy training
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One of the issues the ACLU felt was not being addressed was in defining
what it means to study theology. In an attempt to define the word theology, the
ACLU defined it as that which “encompasses training to become a religious
minister, it does not include a course of study in which one learns about one or
more religions, such as that pursued in obtaining a comparative religion or
religious studies degree” (Amicus Curiae, ACLU et al., 2003).

.

The ACLU also argued that by holding that Washington state must either
abandon its scholarship program or make it available on an equal basis to
students who wish to use public funds for clergy training, the Ninth Circuit Court
proceeded on the assumption that, at least in this context, any state expenditure
that is permitted by the Establishment clause is constitutionally required by the
Free Exercise clause. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has never endorsed that
view. Instead, the court has held that so long as they do not violate either the
Free Exercise clause or the Establishment clause, states are entitled to exercise
their own best judgment on how to structure the complex relationship between
government and religion. Just like in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (536 U.S. 639,
2002), the court’s opinion stated that states can choose to include parochial
schools within a public voucher program. (Amicus Curiae, ACLU et al., 2003).
The amicus curiae of the American Jewish Congress, an association of
Jewish Americans organized to defend Jewish interests at home and abroad
through public policy advocacy using diplomacy, legislation, and the courts.
They argued that the “constitutional roots of a ban on aid to religious education
and the rule that the bare denial of a subsidy to a constitutionally protected

86

activity is not a penalty” (Amicus Curiae, ACLU et al., 2003). As a result, the
refusal to fund theology majors by the State of Washington, is constitutional.
The American Jewish Congress further argued that Davey’s brief states
that history tells us that the Blaine Amendment included in Washington’s
constitution came about due to the controversy over funding Catholic education.
However, the American Jewish Congress contended that it is difficult to prove
that the Blaine Amendments were instituted due to anti-Catholic motives.
Therefore, the court should see this as a non-issue (Amicus Curiae, ACLU et al.,
2003).
Finally, the American Jewish Congress argued that history and court
precedent are against constitutionally mandated financial subsidies. In
invalidating a single aspect of one state’s college aid program, the question in
financial aid to religion cases will no longer be, as it has been, “is this aid
permissible or forbidden?” It will be instead “is this aid forbidden or required?”
That fundamental restructuring of the legal framework for deciding Establishment
clause cases would startle generations of judges, lawyers, politicians and
academics (amicus curiae, American Jewish Congress, 2003).
The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) submitted a brief in support of Locke.
The group identifies itself as one of the world’s leading organizations fighting
hatred, bigotry, discrimination, and anti-Semitism. The ADL claims to maintain a
deep commitment to the principles of religious liberty that are enshrined in the
religion clauses of the First Amendment.
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Their brief of amicus curiae (Anti Defamation League et al., 2003), claims
that the State of Washington protected the religious exercise rights of all its
citizens by providing greater anti establishment protections than does the United
States Constitution. In doing so, the State of Washington did not fund the
respondent’s educational training to become a minister. Davey’s Free Exercise
rights were not violated as he was able pursue his religious calling at the school
of his choice.
Unlike the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah (508
U.S. 520, 1993) case, Davey’s religious practice has not been outlawed by the
state. He could attend the school of his choice and study the ministry of his
choice.
If Davey’s educational pursuit to become a minister was funded, then a
state could be required to fund a broad range of religious activity under
circumstances that may threaten Establishment clause goals. At risk was a
tipping of the balance between the religion clauses, with Free Exercise being
given unprecedented importance at the expense of Establishment clause
principles (Amicus Curiae, Anti Defamation League et al., 2003).
By refusing to fund Davey’s pursuit of a Pastoral Ministries Degree, Davey
was not harmed and he was not unduly suppressed from practicing his religion.
“Davey is free to pursue his calling as a minister of his faith. Unlike the Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah (508 U.S. 520, 1993) case,
Davey’s religious practice has not been outlawed by the state; he can attend the
school of his choice and study for the ministry. Unlike Minister Paul McDaniel,
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Davey is not forced to choose between a fundamental civil right and his religious
worship,” the ADL wrote in its amicus curiae brief. (Amicus Curiae, Anti
Defamation League et al., 2003 p. 5).
As for addressing the history of the non-funding of religious training and
the Blaine Amendments in the United States of America, the Anti Defamation
League argued that to say “as diversity of religious beliefs and practices has
grown in this country, so too has the important protections that the Blaine
Amendments offer” (Ibid p. 26).
The Blaine Amendment of 1876 arose as a result of a complex dynamic of
forces that intersected over the issue of American public schooling. Supporters
and opponents were motivated by concerns about universal free public
education, protecting the integrity of public school funding, the obligation of
states to provide universal education, the federal role in ensuring and funding
education at the state level, and the funding of religious instruction and training
(Ibid 2003).
An amicus brief was filed by Historians and Law Scholars, a group of legal
and religious historians and legal scholars who have studied, taught, and written
in the area of constitutional and religious history and the First Amendment. They
focused on the history of the evolution of the no-funding and nonsectarian
principles during the nineteenth century and the incorporation of those principles
in the law (Amicus Curiae, Historians and Legal Scholars, 2003).
Historians and Legal Scholars argued that the no-funding principle, that
was based on notions of religious liberty and liberty of conscience, came about
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prior to and independently of the advent of Catholic parochial schooling. The nofunding principle was incorporated into many state constitutions during the
nineteenth century for reasons unrelated to anti-Catholic dislike (Ibid).
They continued by addressing the Blaine Amendment of 1876. The
argued that the amendment supporters and opponents were motivated by
concerns about universal free public education, protecting the integrity of public
school funding, the obligation of states to provide universal education, the federal
role in ensuring and funding education at the state level, and the funding of
religious instruction and training (Ibid).
The Historians and Legal Scholars conceded that there may have been
some resentment against Catholic immigrants and parochial schools which may
have motivated some supporters during the time the amendment was being
presented. However, that was not the only basis for the amendment or rationale
for its support (Ibid).
There is no evidence that the framers of the Washington Constitution were
motivated by anti- religious or Catholic animus in enacting Article I, section
11. As can best be determined, no delegate to the 1889 state convention
expressed any animus toward Catholic or religious schooling in voting on
Article I, section 11 or Article IX, section 4. On the contrary, the framers of
the Washington Constitution revealed a sensitivity to religious issues by
securing “perfect toleration of religious sentiment” in the state’s organic act
(Ibid p. 26).
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Amicus Curiae Briefs in Support of the Respondent – Joshua Davey
Amicus briefs in support of the respondent, Joshua Davey, also had
similar arguments yet some took different approaches to presenting them. The
underlying theme presented by the supporters of the respondent was the State of
Washington’s lack of viewpoint neutrality in the Promise Scholarship and the
discriminatory principles of the Blaine Amendments.
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al., a bi-partisan, interfaith,
public-interest law firm dedicated to protecting the free expression of all religious
traditions and the equal participation of religious people in public life and public
benefits.
The Fund started their argument in support of the respondent by focusing
on the evolution of viewpoint neutrality.
Laws that single out the religious generally (or those of a particular
religion) for exclusion from government educational benefits are
widespread in this country and share a common and pernicious heritage.
(amicus curiae, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al., 2003 p. 3)
The Becket Fund continued its argument with the notion that religion in
this country has a tradition of being discriminated against. The brief pointed out
that its roots don’t come from James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, or the
Constitution, but instead have come about due to a societal change that
responded to a growing sub culture of American society that held religious beliefs
that rivaled the dominant religious beliefs of the time. They posited that those
Americans with ancestral roots in America were able to make the law and
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disguise it as religious freedom and to use such tools to create a hostile
environment for incoming immigrant Catholics (Ibid).
When Catholics and other religious minorities threatened that dominance
by growing in numbers and resisting religious assimilation, the result was a
nativist movement that urged the passage of laws – including the federal Blaine
Amendment and similar state laws that targeted “sectarian” schools for special
disadvantage to enforce the movement’s hostility to these religious newcomers.
They argued that Washington State’s constitutional exclusion of “sectarian”
schools from government educational funding is a classic example (Ibid).
The Black Alliance for Educational Options took a different angle in its
argument. The Black Alliance for Educational Options is a non-profit,
intergenerational organization of educators, parents, students, community
activists, public officials, religious leaders, and business people. The mission of
the Black Alliance for Educational Options is to actively support parental choice
to empower families and increase educational options for black children (amicus
curiae, Black Alliance for Educational Options, 2003).
In its approach, the Black Alliance for Educational Options demonstrated
with new found research that the Supreme Court’s decision in Zelman v. Harris
was showing that young black Americans are really benefiting from the
opportunity to use school vouchers. “School choice programs of the sort
approved in Zelman particularly benefit the minority and low-income children,” it
said (Ibid p. 8). As in the Locke v. Davey case, this ruling should be upheld
because if a “state establishes a comprehensive program by which it chooses to
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fund private educational options, it may not, consistent with the obligation of
even-handedness inhering in both the First Amendment and Equal Protection
Clauses, selectively refuse to provide funding for otherwise eligible students
opting for a private religious education” (Ibid p. 6).
The Black Alliance for Educational Options contended that in order for
African American children to be given equal opportunity, they must secure a
quality education. If public schools cannot provide this, then they should be
allowed access to private schools that do.
A growing body of research suggests that vouchers are having a positive
impact on participating students and their families (largely African-Americans)
and on the public school systems that now are required to compete for students.
Although the programs are still in their infancy and the studies reporting progress
are preliminary, the results achieved thus far strongly indicate that the school
choice experiments should be allowed to continue, without the invidious sword of
Blaine Amendment-inspired jurisprudence hanging over them (Ibid).
The Black Alliance for Educational Options points out that by the State of
Washington trying to create a higher wall of separation between church and
state, it actually discriminated against religion. “The state can choose not to fund
private schools at all, but it cannot withhold from religious schools the assistance
it is prepared to extend to all other private schools comparably situated, without
violating the core nondiscrimination guarantee of the Free Exercise and Equal
Protection Clauses” (Ibid p. 7).
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The United States Department of Justice also filed a brief in support of the
respondent explaining the appropriate application of the First Amendment and its
clauses in conjunction with the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Justice department argued that a sate is required to “maintain
a position of neutrality with respect to religion and forbidding discrimination on
account of religious beliefs or practices” (amicus curiae, United States, 2003 p.
6).
The provision of the Washington program that disqualified otherwise
eligible students from a Promise Scholarship based solely on their decision to
pursue a theology degree taught from a religious perspective directly
contravenes those constitutional commands. Indeed, that provision engages in
quintessential viewpoint discrimination against the study of religion from a
religious perspective and sends the stigmatizing message that the State
disfavors promising students who choose to pursue such religious studies (ibid).
The Common Good Legal Defense Fund is a not-for-profit organization
dedicated to the conversion of culture. Common Good serves its mission through
four pillars of participation: the dignity of all human life, primacy of the family,
authentic human freedom, and solidarity with the poor. The Your Catholic Voice
Foundation is dedicated to the social teaching of the Catholic Church and serves
the same four mission points.
The amicus curiae of the Common Good Legal Defense Fund and Your
Catholic Voice Foundation supports the argument that the Blaine Amendments
are the cause of the prejudices against religion that we see in today’s society.
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When they were enacted, public schools were of Protestant influence, which is
no longer the case today. These amendments, they argued, are old and no
longer hold true to their original intent. (Amicus Curiae of the Common Good
Legal Defense Fund, et al., 2003)
They continued their brief by arguing that the majority of citizens support
the accommodation and tolerance of religion, recognizing that religious persons
and institutions play a vital role in society and promote the common good. As
professor John Jeffries Jr. has written concerning the Blaine amendments, “The
right response is not refinement but repudiation”. (Jeffries & Ryan, 2001) The
time has come to put Blaine and a century of discrimination wholly behind us
once and for all. The treatment of Mr. Davey is repugnant to the legacy of
authentic freedom protected by the Constitution of the United States of America
(Ibid p. 18)
The State of Alabama also filed in behalf of the Respondent. In its brief,
the state outs itself as a holder of the Blaine Amendments in its own constitution
and calls upon the Supreme Court to uphold the Ninth Circuit Court’s ruling and
allow states to begin the process of removing these Blaine Amendments from
their state constitutions, believing them to be discriminatory (amicus curiae, State
of Alabama, 2003).
Alabama also claims it is a long a vocal proponent of federalism as a
bedrock feature of the United States Constitution. Alabama has a strong interest
in ensuring that principles of federalism are not distorted to justify statesponsored religious discrimination (amicus curiae, State of Alabama, 2003).
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The State of Alabama had a similar state grant program to the Promise
Scholarship. Alabama’s program also excluded religious participants to comply
with the Blaine provision of the Alabama constitution. The program defined an
“eligible student” as one that “is not enrolled and does not intend to enroll in a
course of study leading to an undergraduate degree in theology or divinity” (Ala.
Code § 16-33A-1(4)(f), 1975).
The exclusion of religious participants was thought to be required by the
Blaine Amendments that were in Alabama’s constitution. This was in result of an
opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court Justices that expressed that a proposed
students grant program in 1973 violated Alabama’s Blaine provision, as well as
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it did not
stipulate that the award couldn’t go to a student who was pursuing a degree in
theology or divinity. In 1978, a revised student aid program was designed and
included such verbiage to exclude those students pursuing a degree in divinity or
theology based on the past opinion of the State of Alabama Supreme Court. (Ala.
Code § 16-33A-1(4)(f), 1975).
The Institute of Justice, the Center for Education Reform, CATO Institute,
Citizens for Educational Freedom, and the Goldwater Institute amicus brief also
supported the petitioner. The Institute for Justice is a nonprofit, public interest
law firm dedicated to protecting individual liberties. The Center for Education
Reform is a national voice for more choices in education and more rigor in
education programs. The CATO Institute is nonpartisan public policy research
foundation dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free
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markets, and limited government. The Citizens for Educational Freedom is a
national organization dedicated to supporting parents’ rights to choose schools
for their own children. The Goldwater Institute is a nonprofit, independent,
nonpartisan, research and educational organization dedicated to the study of
public policy. One of the central missions of the Goldwater Institute is studying
and promoting parental decision making and control in education.
The amicus curiae by this group argued that Washington has violated “no
less than four provisions of the federal Constitution.” First, the state’s denial of a
scholarship to Davey solely because he opted to pursue pastoral studies at a
religious college violated his rights under the Free Exercise clause of the First
Amendment. Second, Washington’s action constituted viewpoint discrimination
under the Free Speech clause. It was only because Davey’s college “taught
theology from the perspective of religious truth that Washington disqualified him
from state aid.” Third, in excluding theology majors, the state “plainly draws a line
on the basis of religion, a suspect classification under the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Finally, it asserted that Washington
deliberately hindered religion as against non-religion, violating the principle of
neutrality that the court invoked in its Establishment clause cases (amicus curiae,
CATO Institute, 2003).
The Council for Christian Colleges & Universities et al., a group of
religious educational institutions that are concerned about the protection of
religious liberty for themselves and their students, including protection against
discrimination on religious grounds. The Council argued that “any program
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funded under neutral criteria will result in differential impacts because of the
differences in the choices and personal characteristics of students of different
faiths. These varying disparate impacts do not justify purposeful, facial
discrimination against religious choices compared with all other choices of major”
(amicus curiae, Council for Christian College & Universities et al., 2003).

Oral Arguments
Once the Supreme Court grants a request for certiorari, it establishes a
briefing schedule and sets a date for oral arguments. The oral argument was
heard on December 2, 2003. The court provides transcripts of the argument.
However, the transcripts did not identify the justice that posed a particular
question. When identified, the justice name is given. Only one attorney may
argue for each side unless the court grants the ability to have more than one
argue prior to the oral arguments. Each side has 30 minutes to argue.
Additional time may be requested but is rarely given by the court. (Rules of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 2007)
This researcher wrote a letter to the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court
requesting permission to attend the oral argument for the purpose of research for
this dissertation. The researcher’s request was approved. The Clerk provided a
special pass and seat for the oral argument in Locke v. Davey. Per the courts
instruction, no recording devices are allowed in the chambers during arguments
except for paper and writing instrument. The following discussion of the oral
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argument were taken from the transcription of the arguments provided by the
Court.
The researcher was present for the oral arguments. Narda Pierce, Esq.,
argued the case for the State of Washington in support of the petitioners. Jay
Sekulow, Esq., and Theodore B. Olsen, Esq., of the United States solicitor
general’s office argued in support of the respondent.
The first to present was Ms. Pierce in support of the petitioner. Counsel
Pierce began her argument by discussing the State of Washington’s
constitutional limits on funding religion in or funding religious activities and in its
ability to regulate religious activities. However, the Justices interrupted Counsel
Pierce’s argument with questions. Chief Justice Rehnquist began by asking if Ms.
Pierce thought that the provision in Washington State Constitution prohibiting the
funding of religious activities meant more than if it was just a statute.
Ms. Pierce replied that the Supreme Court has recognized that a state
constitution is adopted by all the voters of the state as opposed to the adoption of
a statute. The next Justice quickly interrupted Ms. Pierce questioning the
program itself. “Was the Promise Scholarship similar to a voucher program?” the
Justice inquired. Ms. Pierce answered by explaining that the Promise
Scholarship worked like a voucher to the extent that it would be used for
educational expenses. However, she argued that it was not like a paycheck
where a person has those funds as his/her private funds and may apply those
funds however the student decided.
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Justice Sandra Day O’Conner then asked if it was known how many states
had similar provisions or laws in their constitution. Ms. Pierce replied it varied,
depending on the particular provision, but that the provision prohibiting use of
public funds for religious instruction was in approximately 36 state constitutions.
The next question asked was whether or not these provisions in state
constitutions came about due to the Blaine Amendment. Ms. Pierce argued that
the Washington provision was not the Blaine Amendment, which refers to the use
of public funds in schools under sectarian control. The current provision under
discussion was a separate provision from those put forward by the Blaine
Amendment proponents. While the provision was not in the original proposed
constitution set forth by the framers of the State of Washington, it was added
during the constitutional convention. In addition, Ms. Pierce argued there is no
evidence that suggests the State of Washington had any anti-Catholic motive
when the provisions were added to the state’s constitution.
Justice Scalia interrupted and quickly began probing the logic behind her
arguments. He asked if a state prohibited only the study of theology from a
Catholic perspective, would that survive? Ms. Pierce stated no, it would not.
What the state did here was prohibit public funds for religious instruction
whenever it occurs. Justice Scalia then asserted the state is not permitted to
discriminate between religion in general and non-religion.
Ms. Pierce argued that the line between funds for secular purposes and
for religious purposes is a line recognized by the Supreme Court in past cases.
The line recognizes both the values of the Establishment clause and the Free
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Exercise clause of the Constitution. Justice Scalia continued to argue that it still
treats religion different from non-religion. You can study anything you like and get
it subsidized except religion. How does this not violate the principle of neutrality?
Is the State of Washington trying to make the distinction between the
training of how to be religious and the study of what people believe? Was that the
distinction the State of Washington was trying to make? Ms. Pierce then agreed.
Justice Souter furthered the discussion. Justice Souter pressed the
argument by stating “if you agree then you must agree that if Washington funded
a school of Atheism but wouldn’t fund a school of religious nature then there
would be a violation of one or both of the clauses in the First Amendment.”
(Locke v. Davey Oral Arguments p. 9) Ms. Pierce stated yes, saying it is the
difference between being religious and studying religion that has been the courts
line over the years. In particular, the Schempp case that referred to the study
about religion versus the study of religion.
Another Justice then asked this question: “If Davey had not declared a
double major, could he have taken all the religious perspective courses. This
would have been permissible under the statue.” (Ibid p. 14) Ms. Pierce stated
that the statute focuses on whether a student is pursuing a degree in theology.
He could have taken all the courses under the ministry studies major as long as
he didn’t declare it as a major. But because he chose it as a major the state
denied the funding because it is an inherently religious program. The focus is on
the religious nature of the instruction and to look at the core course of study and
determine if it is in compliance.
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The Justices then pushed Ms. Pierce to establish the State’s interest in
refusing funding to a student if he/she selects a religious major. She stated that
the State of Washington’s interest was expressed in 1889 to protect the freedom
of conscience of all its citizens and in doing so to not compel its citizens to
provide public funds to support the promotion of religious beliefs with which they
may not agree.
Justice Scalia then asked if this meant that the state could decline to
provide fire protection to churches and synagogues since a firehouse is funded
through public funds. This public benefit is provided to both religious and nonreligious institutions equally yet citizens do not protest its use.
Ms. Pierce responded that the Supreme Court has already drawn that
distinction. Justice Souter then remarked that it seems as though the State of
Washington will certainly put out the fire in a church but it won’t spend public
funds for the purpose of persuading people that they ought to be inside the
church. Ms. Pierce responded that the distinction between providing police and
fire services to an organization and providing funding to assist in the educational
purpose of that organization was made in Norwood v. Harrison.
Ms. Pierce continued to argue for the State of Washington’s provision that
there is a rational basis for not funding religious instruction wherever it occurs, to
include a theology course. In this case, not providing funding does not infringe on
the student’s right to practice their religion.
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Attorney Jay Sekulow initially argued for the respondents. He opened up
his argument by addressing neutrality as it is applied to the law and how the
Promise Scholarship violates neutrality by discriminating against religion.
Mr. Sekulow continued his argument with how the State of Washington
had awarded the scholarship to Mr. Davey with no stipulations or restrictions as
to what major he may choose or what course of study to avoid. Mr. Davey
followed all the preset guidelines of the scholarship and was two months into his
classes when he was told that majoring in pastoral studies would negate his
Promise Scholarship. The scholarship check is sent directly to the student. It is
not written to the school nor can a school use it for any expenditure. The
institution’s role is to verify the student is enrolled. Therefore the restricting of
funds for this student is a violation of the Free Exercise clause.
The Justices then asked how the denying of funds was a violation of
Davey’s right to the Free Exercise of religion. While it might cost more to attend
college, it doesn’t restrict his ability to exercise his religion.
Mr. Sekulow responded that the State of Washington had acknowledged
the fact that Davey has the free exercise right to pursue a degree in theology.
The real question is the burden that the free exercise clause is placed under.
The benefit of the Promise Scholarship was available to a student however a
religious classification was utilized to deny the student access to those funds
even though he met the state’s criteria.
A Justice then asked then asked a question pertaining to the effect this
case would have on the school voucher decision that the Supreme Court ruled
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on in the previous year. Mr. Sekulow argued that under the voucher program
ruling that was rendered in the Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (Zellman v. Harris
2002), a state that offered a voucher program would have to include religious
schools in that program. A state may also choose to fund public schools only.
The gist of it, Mr. Sekulow argued, is that a state with a school voucher program
cannot say it will fund private schools and not fund religious private schools.
According to the respondent, this is a contradiction to the 37 States that hold
Blain Amendment type laws in their constitutions.
Justice Ginsburg then asked Mr. Sekulow to respond to the argument that
if a state were to issue funding to all professions, such as lawyers, doctors, etc.
but not for ministers would this be a violation of free exercise clause? Mr.
Sekulow responded that it would in fact be a violation and that he would argue
the same point, a violation of neutrality.
Mr. Sekulow was then asked if a student who studied literature from
instructors who taught literature from a religious perspective at a sectarian school
be funded? He responded with a yes. He added that what we are truly presented
with here today is that a statute which on its face states that a student who
qualifies based on academic requirements and economic need can go to any
qualified school, be it private, religious affiliated or state supported, and major in
any offered course of study except one, religion.
Mr. Sekulow then stated that the “play in the joints” statement, made by a
Justice during the oral arguments, between the Establishment clause and the
Free Exercise clause, gives states broad flexibility in establishing or not
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establishing programs. However, it is not permissible to use the “play in the
joints” to exclude religion, at least according to the prior precedent set forth by
the Supreme Court.
Theodore B. Olsen, Esq., solicitor general then proceeded to the podium
to present his argument in support of the respondent. Olsen argued that the
State of Washington was practicing religious discrimination by not funding a
student who studied religion. The Justices argued back that for centuries this
country had observed the notion that religious instruction not be funded by tax
dollars. Davey can practice his religion and still become a minister, he just has to
pay for it. He must practice it without subsidy.
Mr. Olsen continued to argue that this was discrimination, in the same way
that a Tennessee minister (McDaniel v Paty 435 U.S. 618, 1978) was removed
from office because he was a minister, and in the same way saying everyone will
have expenses paid for except for ministers.
The Court then asked Mr. Olsen if he would agree that if a school voucher
system excluded parochial schools, based on his stance, would be a violation?
Mr. Olsen replied that it would depend on how the program was structured but
strict scrutiny would be necessary.
Counsel Pierce reserved three minutes for rebuttal. Ms. Pierce reaffirmed
her original argument and challenged the statement, made by one of the justices,
that statute in which no aid shall be given to a student pursuing a degree in
theology was a matter of administrative ease. She argued that the statute
presented a question of entanglement. Should the state be involved in a class by
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class assessment of course work to determine if it is religious instruction or not?
The State of Washington does not operate that way. She continued her rebuttal
citing the Court’s decision in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for
the Blind (Witters v. Washington 474 U.S. 481, 1986) as supportive of her
position.
The State of Washington does not discriminate against religion because it
refuses to fund religious education she insisted. It merely extends that one
principle beyond what the Establishment clause requires.
Ms. Pierce concluded her argument asserting that the U.S. Supreme
Court has set precedence in allowing wide latitude in deciding on funding issues
allowing states to make their own policy statements. Justice Scalia argument that
a student awarded the Promise Scholarship and taking all religious courses, but
not declaring religious studies a major while he/she got funding, would be in
compliance with the statute was not rebutted by Counsel Pierce. Instead she
stated her belief that the problem would be a rare.
Justice Scalia got the last word. He addressed Ms. Pierce and reminded
the Court that Northwest College is a religious institution and theology classes
are a required part of the curriculum. This however is permitted by the
Washington State statute to be funded. Ms. Pierce attempted to argue back but
had run out of time.

The Locke v Davey Decision
The Locke v Davey decision will be presented in the legal brief format.
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Name of case: Locke v. Davey
Citation: 540 U.S. 712
Date of decision: February 25, 2004
Vote: 7-2
Author of opinion: Chief Justice William Rehnquist
Facts: The State of Washington had established the Promise Scholarship
program to assist academically gifted students within certain economic
stature, with funds to attend qualified post-secondary institutions. In
accordance with the State of Washington constitution, “students may not
use those funds at an institution where they are pursuing a degree in
devotional theology” (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004 p. 716).
In creating the Promise Scholarship in 1999, the State of
Washington legislature concluded it could help bridge that financial gap
and allow students such as Davey the opportunity to attend college.
According to the initial guidelines of the scholarship, students could spend
their funds on any educational related expenses, including room and
board (Ibid).
The funding for the scholarship came through appropriation from
the state legislature; the actual amount of the funding depended on the
total amount allocated to the program. In the 1999-2000 academic year,
that amount was $1,125; in 2000-01, that amount was $1,542 per school
year (Ibid).
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Eligibility for the Promise Scholarship required that students meet
four criteria. First, a student had to graduate from a private or public high
school within the State of Washington. Second, the student had to
graduate in the top 15% of his/her graduating class or attain a combined
score of 1200 on the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) or a score of 27
or better on the American College Test (ACT). Third, the student’s family
income must have been less than 135% of the state’s median income.
The final criterion was that the student must attend at least half-time in an
eligible post-secondary institution in the State of Washington and may not
pursue a degree in theology at the enrolled institution while receiving the
scholarship (State of Washington Higher Education Coordinating Board
Policy Manual, 1999).
Private institutions in the State of Washington qualified if they were
accepted by a nationally-recognized accreditation body (Locke v Davey
540 U.S. 712, 2004). Pursuing a degree in theology was not defined in the
statute; however both parties in the suit agreed that the statute as adopted
was consistent with the State of Washington’s constitution, which
prohibited the issuance of public funds to pursue degrees that are
“devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith” (Ibid p. 716).
If a student met all the requirements and the institution the student
attended determines that the student was not pursuing a degree in
devotional theology, then the scholarship funds were sent to the institution
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for distribution to the student, to be used for payment of tuition and other
related educational expenses (Ibid).
Joshua Davey met the criteria set forth for the Promise Scholarship.
He applied for and was awarded the scholarship. He chose to attend a
private Christian college, Northwest College, which is affiliated with the
Assembly of God denomination, and was an eligible institution under the
Promise Scholarship criteria set forth for eligible institutions. According to
Joshua Davey, he had always wanted to attend a Bible college and one
day become a minister, more specifically a church pastor. He selected a
double major in business management and pastoral ministries. However,
pastoral ministries is considered devotional study and therefore, Davey
was ineligible for the Promise Scholarship (Ibid).
In the fall semester of 1999, Davey met with the director of financial
aid at Northwest College and learned for the first time that he could not
use the Promise Scholarship if he was going to pursue a devotional
theology degree. He was advised that in order to receive the Promise
Scholarship, he must certify in writing that he was not pursuing such a
degree and in doing so must drop the pastoral ministries major. Davey
refused to do so (Ibid).
Davey then filed a lawsuit against various state officials in the
district court against the governor of Washington and members of the
Higher Education Coordinating Board (HECB), seeking reinstatement of
the scholarship, damages, and fees.
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Davey’s suit claimed violations of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, as well as the Washington State constitution. Davey
cited in his brief the decision of Church of Lukumi Babalu, INC. v. City of
Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993) to support his position. The case involved a
state law that prohibited the killing of animals when done for religious
purposes. The Court rejected Davey’s argument that the Supreme Court
ruling in this case made the Promise Scholarship Program actions
unconstitutional because it was not viewpoint neutral with respect to
religion. The Court stated that in the Locke v Davey case, the State of
Washington’s disfavor of religion is of a far milder kind and it imposes
neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite.
(Ibid)
Davey also cited McDaniel v. Paty for the proposition that a state
may not use a person’s religious exercise as a criterion for denial of a
benefit, absent a compelling state interest. Davey’s argument was that
denial of his scholarship based on his decision to pursue a degree in
pastoral studies violated, the Free Exercise clause, Establishment clause,
and Free Speech clause of the First Amendment as incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004).
The judge in the State of Washington’s District Court granted
HECB’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that while a state may not
discriminate against a student on the basis of religion, it is not required to
pay for his religious pursuits. The court relied upon cases such as Rust v.

110

Sullivan, Harris v. McRae and Regan v. Taxation With Representation in
which the Supreme Court had upheld the power of governments to
selectively fund the exercise of Constitutional rights. The district court also
rejected Davey’s Freedom of Speech and association claims because he
did not point to any restriction on his ability to speak, and the court
rejected Davey’s claim that his due process was violated (Ibid).
Davey appealed the decision of the U.S. District Court to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which then ruled 2-1 in favor
of Davey. The majority held that Davey’s Free Exercise rights were
violated. The panel acknowledged the selective funding in cases such as
Rust and Regan, but the court found them not applicable to the current
case as they involved programs set up for the government’s own
purposes. Washington’s Promise Scholarship had a broader purpose: to
fund the educational pursuits of outstanding students. Invoking the “public
forum” reasoning of Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia (focusing on Free Speech rather than Free Exercise), the court
held that the theology exclusion was impermissible viewpoint
discrimination allegedly aimed at the suppression of religious ideas. Judge
Ryemer wrote, “The bottom line is that the government may limit the
scope of a program that it will fund, but once it opens a neutral forum, with
secular criteria, the benefits may not be denied on account of religion”
(Davey v Locke 299 F.3d 748; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14461 p.
10152)(Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004).

111

The HECB board argued that even if strict scrutiny applies, the
policy survives such scrutiny because there is a compelling state interest
in upholding the establishment clause of its state’s constitution. The Ninth
Circuit Court found that the state’s interest was less compelling because
the scholarship funds do not directly go to the institution, but are awarded
to the students on the basis of secular criteria and are applied to religious
studies only indirectly as a result of independent student choice. The court
also reasoned that the restriction on theology majors is similar to an
unconstitutional condition, penalizing the exercise of a Constitutional right,
because the scholarship would not necessarily pay for religious studies,
but might instead be used for any education-related expense, such as
food and housing. The court, however declined to rule on Davey’s other
Constitutional claims (Davey v. Locke Ninth Circuit Opinion No. 00-35962
2002).
The dissenting judge in the Ninth Circuit, Justice M. Margaret
McKeowan, had noted this that the Washington statute "has successfully
navigated the tensions between the free exercise of religion and the
prohibition of its endorsement." Justice McKeown also wrote that "the
simple truth is that Washington has neither prohibited nor impaired
Davey's free exercise of religion. He is free to believe and practice his
religion without restriction ... The only state action here was a decision
consonant with the state constitution, not funding 'religious ... instruction' "
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(Ninth Circuit Justice M. Margaret McKeowan Davey v. Locke No. 0035962 2002 p.10161).
Question Presented: Does prohibiting a state funded scholarship to an individual
who chooses to use the funds to study theology when the state’s
constitution clearly states that no public monies shall be appropriated or
applied to religious instruction violate the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise clause? (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004).
Answer: No
Court’s reason: (Majority Opinion)
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion stated
that the U.S. Supreme Court is said to have always agreed that the two
clauses, The Establishment clause and the Free Exercise clause are
“frequently in tension.” However, there has been long-standing talk that
“there is room for play in the joints between them” (Locke v Davey 540
U.S. 712, 2004 p. 718).
What the Court means by this term “play in the joints,” is that there
are some actions that a state may prohibit that are allowed by the
Establishment clause but not required by the Free Exercise clause. In this
case, “the link between government funds and religious training is broken
by the independent and private choices of recipients” (Locke v Davey 540
U.S. 712, 2004 p. 719). Davey had a choice in declaring a major of
pastoral ministries and of the institution he decided to attend.
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The State of Washington could in fact permit Promise Scholarship
recipients to pursue a degree in devotional theology and be consistent
with the federal Constitution. The question that the Court felt was most
pressing was whether or not the State of Washington could deny funding
to Promise Scholars based on the State of Washington’s constitution,
which prohibits funding religious instruction that will prepare students for
the ministry (Ibid).
The Court rejected Davey’s claim of unconstitutionality due to the
Promise Scholarship program not being “facially neutral with respect to
religion.” Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed applicability of the Lukumi
precedent. In the Lukumi case (Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 1993), the city of Hialeah made it a crime to engage
in certain kinds of animal slaughter and the U.S. Supreme Court found
that the law was created to “suppress ritualistic animal sacrifices of the
Santeria religion” (Ibid p. 720). Rehnquist distinguished Lukumi writing the
opinion of the court that the State of Washington does not disfavor religion
as it does not impose criminal or civil sanctions on any type of religious
service or rite. The Promise Scholarship does not prohibit ministers the
right to participate in the political affairs of the community (McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 1978). It also does not force a student to choose
between his/her religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit. In
this case, the State of Washington has simply decided not to fund with
state tax dollars a “distinct category of instruction” (Ibid p. 721).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the State of Washington’s
constitution draws a more stringent line on the funding of religious
education than does the United States Constitution. Georgia, New Jersey,
Delaware, and Vermont, decided to prohibit establishment of an official
state religion and further placed in their state constitutions formal
prohibitions against using public tax funds to support the ministry (Ibid p.
722). Rehnquist argued that this reinforces the conclusion that early on,
states found no problem in excluding ministries from receiving state
dollars. Furthermore, Rehnquist notes that the State Of Washington allows
the Promise Scholarship to be used at an institution that promoted a
Christian educational philosophy and students can still take devotional
theology courses while receiving the Promise Scholarship. The State of
Washington merely intended to refrain from supporting the training of
ministers (Ibid p. 723).
The seven member majority concluded that the State of
Washington’s constitution and the Promise Scholarship did not
discriminate against religion. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court could not
conclude that the denying the funding for vocational religious instruction is
unconstitutional and Davey’s claim must fail (Ibid p. 725).
In summary, the Court ruled that disqualifying Joshua Davey, from
the State of Washington’s Promise Scholarship did not constitute a
violation of the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment.
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Dissenting Opinions:
Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion; Justice Thomas joined
the opinion. Justice Scalia started the dissent discussing the case of
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v. Hialeah (508 U.S. 520,1993) in
which the court held that “a law burdening religious practice that is not
neutral must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.” He argued that the
Promise Scholarship discriminated against religious training (Ibid p. 726).
To support his conclusion, Justice Scalia cited Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing (330 U.S. 1, 1947), where the Court stated “the State
of New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own
religion.” The State of New Jersey cannot withhold public welfare benefits
from any one individual because of religion preference. In the case
presented here, the state had adopted a generally public benefit and has
refused to allow an otherwise completely qualified student to use that
benefit because the student is majoring in theology. Justice Scalia finds
this is an outright violation of the Free Exercise clause (Ibid p. 726).
Historically, states have argued the premise of providing financial
means to fund religious education. The State of Virginia, for example, had
a bill in its legislature that provided for the support of Christian teachers.
Other states have similar laws that allowed for the funding of clergy from
state funds. While funding such endeavors from federal coffers has been
viewed negatively, such funding from state coffers is not barred. Justice
Scalia pointed out that “no one would seriously contend, for example, that
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the Framers would have barred ministers from using public roads on their
way to church!” (Ibid p. 729).
Justice Scalia continued that while the U.S. Supreme Court did not
dispute that the Free Exercise clause places some limits on public benefits
programs, the court did not find any violations of Davey’s rights based on
the contention of “play in the joints.” In simplest terms, a municipality
cannot discriminate. Justice Scalia pointed out in his example that a
municipality cannot discriminate against Black Americans, nor can it hire
in favor of them then argue “play in the joints” when sued. The Religion
clause must be neutral as well (Ibid p. 728).
Justice Scalia also used a practical argument that the State of
Washington was not protecting the pocketbooks of its citizens because the
tiny fraction of amount that would be affected by those Promise
Scholarships recipients that decided to choose to study theology would be
minuscule. In addition, Davey would graduate and give back to the
community through taxes paid for the rest of his life (Ibid, 2004).
Justice Scalia closed his opinion with the thought that this case is
about discrimination against a religious minority. The decision in this case
was limited to the training of the clergy, but its logic was extendable. “Will
we deny priests and nuns from prescription drugs benefits on the grounds
that taxpayers freedom of conscience forbids medicating the clergy at
public expense?” (Ibid p. 733).
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Justice Thomas also issued his dissent on the Locke v. Davey
case. Justice Thomas pointed out that both parties in the case agreed that
a “degree in theology” means a degree that is “devotional in nature or
designed to induce religious faith” (Ibid p. 734). Justice Thomas used this
as the basis for his dissent argument.
Justice Thomas wrote that it is his understanding that the study of
theology does not necessarily imply religious devotion or faith. The
Washington statute that prohibits the spending of public monies for
religious instruction does not define the term theology. Justice Thomas
used two dictionaries to define the term theology: the American Heritage
Dictionary 1794 (4th edition 2000) and Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 1223 (1991). In the American Heritage Dictionary, the term
“theology” is defined as the study of the nature of God and religious truth.
In the Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, the term theology is
defined as the study of religious faith, practice and experience. Justice
Thomas wrote that using these two definitions, he concluded that the term
theology includes study from a secular point of view as well as a religious
one (Ibid, 2004 p. 735).
Justice Thomas surmised that in the case here, the state’s denial of
a Promise Scholarship to a student who is pursuing a degree in devotional
theology as both parties agreed to early on in their briefs, was then a
violation of the neutrality principle set forth by the courts and was evident
(Ibid, 2004).

118

Summary
In this chapter, significant court decisions associated with the
Establishment clause and Free Exercise clause were reviewed and analyzed.
Presented in the chapter was an introduction to the history of the First
Amendment, an overview of the Bill of Rights, a historical overview of the Blaine
Amendment, History of the Promise Scholarship, a Background of the Locke v.
Davey case, relevant judicial precedent for impacting the outcome of Locke v.
Davey, the petition for writ of certiorari by Gary Locke, the response to petitioner
by Joshua Davey, the merit brief by Gary Locke, the respondents merit brief by
Joshua Davey, the merit brief reply to respondent by Gary Locke, the amicus
curiae briefs in support of petitioner, the amicus curiae briefs in support of
respondent, the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court were reviewed and
analyzed and in final the opinion of the court was presented.
The Locke v. Davey case surrounded the issuance of a state funded
scholarship that was being used for the purpose of religious instruction. The
question the Supreme Court needed to address was if a state provides college
scholarships for secular instruction, does the First Amendment's Free Exercise
clause require a state to fund religious instruction? The advocates for the State of
Washington claimed that the state’s constitution prohibited the funding of
religious training. The advocates for Davey argued that not providing funds
violated the Free Exercise clause and Establishment clause of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the viewpoint neutrality principle set
forth by the Supreme Court. In this case the Supreme Courts rejected Davey’s
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invitation to extend the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality to circumstances where a
states constitution strictly prohibited the use of public money religious training.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
A Qualitative Legal Research Design
The purpose of this study was to analyze and consider the impact of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Locke v. Davey (2003). This case
examines the Constitutional dimension of a state’s right to decide whether or not
public funds awarded as a scholarship to a student be withdrawn if the student
elects to use the funds for pastoral studies. The study entails the investigation of
First Amendment Religion clauses jurisprudence.
In an effort to analyze constitutional jurisprudence, one must understand
the nature of legal research. This study employs legal research methods. These
methods include locating relevant Supreme Court decisions, party briefs, amicus
briefs, treatises, and scholarly journal articles. Supplementary materials are
utilized to understand legal precedents and attempt to explore the implications of
judicial decisions.
Specific legal issues and court cases from both the federal and state
levels were reviewed for relevance. A review of the State of Washington’s
constitution and statutes was also pursued. To amass facts for legal research,
one must understand the nature of educational legal research method to
determine what sources are available for such research.
Understanding and employing methods of legal research was an essential
ingredient in answering the research questions posed by this study. To prevent
flawed educational policymaking, administrators must understand the sources of
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law under which they operate. Administrators should take care not to institute
educational policy that is not based on appropriate legal authority such as federal
of state constitutions or state boards of education (LaMorte, 2008).
At the federal level of law making, one must study the United States
Constitution and amendments as a legal and primary source of information. Case
law would complement the study on the Constitution, as one should examine the
outcomes and rulings of court cases and the precedents set by the courts’
decisions in interpreting constitutional conflicts and issues as they arise. Statutes
also play an important role in creating educational policy for the administrator.
Statues are enacted by Congress and take the form of a law. Finally, under the
federal level, an researcher should review executive orders issued by the
President of the United States that may apply to education and attorney general
opinions. The attorney general opinion is thought more to be advisory in its role
in education as it is an opinion based on case law and not a court ruling
(LaMorte, 2008).
At the state level of law making, a higher education researcher must
consult the state’s constitution as we see in the lawsuit that occurred in the Locke
v. Davey case (2003). Case law and state statues are also important sources for
review in assisting with creating sound educational policies. Case law review
assists by revealing legal precedent set by the courts. Courts are not obligated
to follow precedents or distinguish prior rulings so that the law offers guidance for
decision making.
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State statutes are a significant source for educational researchers as they
identify the will of the state legislatures regarding appropriate state policy.
Consulting these resources within a state structure can assist a researcher in
identifying current state legislative policy. A state’s attorney general is also an
important source for opinion in regards to researching potential legal pitfalls in
educational policy making, as the attorney general is charged with providing an
provide advisory opinion on legal issues and legal precedent to help reveal the
state of current law. (LaMorte, 2008).
Legal research is an essential ingredient in this investigation. It is a
process that identifies the law that governs an issue and then assists in the
search for material that may explain or analyze that law. Successful identification
of these resources aides scholars in understanding the applicable jurisprudence
and analyzing the implications of the current decision to that jurisprudence
(Cohen & Olsen, 2000).
In implementing legal research, the researcher used The Legal Research
Manual: A Game Plan for Legal Research and Analysis (1984) by Christopher G.
Wren and Jill R. Wren. The text presents a procedure for legal research that
breaks it down to components that allow a researcher to better organize and
conduct a legal study (Wren & Wren, 1984).
To thoroughly research the law on a particular topic, one must tap many
resources. These sources include legislative activity, judicial decisions, and legal
scholarship. Good legal research requires one to understand which resources to
consult, as every situation is unique. This requires the researcher to be flexible
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as experienced researchers know which sources are more useful or most
effective (Cohen & Olsen, 2000).
In the United States, laws are derived from numerous sources from the
U.S. Constitution to the promulgation of municipal agencies. It is a system based
on federalism both federal and state governments have law making powers.
Each level has its own legislative, judicial and executive branches which share
the responsibility of creating laws.
The legislative branch lawmakers are elected by citizens to represent their
views in the policy making. The legislature’s role is to raise money through
taxation, spend it on the needs of the people, define crime, regulate commerce,
and determine public policy by enacting statues (Cohen & Olsen, 2000).
The executive branch of the U.S. government is charged with the
enforcement of the law. However, it also has the power to create legally binding
rules. For instance, the President and most state governors can issue executive
orders and administrative agencies can provide detail regulations governing
activity within their areas of expertise such as the Environmental Protection
Agency (Cohen & Olsen, 2000).
The concept of Federalism is also apparent in the structure of our judicial
system. In addition to the Federal Court system, each state has its own judicial
structure. Both federal and state courts interpret and apply the law. They also
measure laws against provisions of state and or federal Constitution. The term
used to identify the later function is judicial review. So the judicial branch
determines the Constitutionality of laws adopted by the legislative and executive
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branch. It also interprets and applies laws to various situations. Judges apply the
language of the Constitution and statues to court cases, often involving
circumstances that could not have been foreseen when the laws were enacted.
By doing so, Judges shape and create common law. Through established court
cases or precedent, the courts evaluate legal issues and pass judgment. Over
time, laws may change; however using precedent allows the court to be both fair
and create stability. The decisions rendered by the courts are important, as they
impact future court decisions. This is called stare decisis (Latin) which means to
stand by that which is decided (Cohen & Olsen, 2000).
Article III of the U.S. Constitution establishes the Supreme Court. The
power to create additional federal courts is vested with Congress. The Supreme
Court controls its docket by selecting the cases it will hear. Four Justices must
vote to hear the dispute for it to be placed on the courts docket for decision.
Educational researcher’s needs are somewhat different than those of
attorneys, law students, and judges. Attorneys engage in legal research to
practice law, while educators seek out answers or reasons laws were created or
supported in the courts. Scholars also include journal articles and other non-law
related resources as secondary research material to the study of their legal
subject (Lowe & Watters 1984).
The legal research pursued in this study will be an analysis of the Locke v.
Davey briefs, petitions, amicus curiae briefs, oral arguments, and all relevant
court cases that are deemed to be relative to this research.
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A petition of writ of certiorari is a document filed by a losing party, from a
lower appellate court, with the Supreme Court asking it to review and reconsider
the decision of the lower court. It includes a list of the parties, a statement of the
facts of the case, the legal questions presented for review, and arguments as to
why the court should grant the petition a hearing (Wren & Wren, 1986).
Merit briefs are written arguments that are submitted by the petitioner and
the respondent before presenting their oral arguments. The brief summarizes the
facts of the case, as well as the legal reasoning behind their arguments (Wren &
Wren, 1986).
Amicus curiae is a Latin term that means “friend of the court.” These briefs
provide complementing information in many Supreme Court matters, both at the
petition for writ of certiorari stage and when the court is deciding a case on its
merits. These briefs provide valuable information about legal arguments or how a
case might affect people other than the parties to the case. These briefs attempt
to persuade the Supreme Court by providing legal arguments that support and
supplement the position of the party they are filing on behalf of. Only those
individuals and/or organizations that receive permission from the Court may
submit an amicus brief. (Wren & Wren, 1986).
Relevant jurisprudence was analyzed using the case brief format to assist
in making the case analysis more efficient, orderly and reduce the potential for
personal bias. Briefing a case involves placing relevant case information in a
specific order. A case brief is a legal research technique that allows the
researcher a more efficient method of note taking of cases and can aid the
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researcher as an analytical tool. The case brief format follows:
Name of case: The Case Name
Court citation: The court citation assigned to the case
Date of decision: The date of the decision
Vote: How the justices voted
Author of opinion: Who wrote the opinion?
Legal topics: What area of law was addressed by the case?
Facts: Facts of the case.
Question presented: What question to be answered by the court?
Answer: How did the court answer it?
Court’s reason: What were the court’s reasons/arguments for the answer
they gave?
Significance: What kind of impact does the decision on the case make?
(Wren & Wren, 1986)
Reading a case requires a researcher to extract all of the implications of a
court’s decision and, using the case brief technique, the researcher can then
focus on crucial aspects of the case and sorting through the arguments (Wren &
Wren, 1986).

Micro / Macro Analysis
The decision in Locke v. Davey will be analyzed using a micro and macro
analysis. Using the works of two legal scholars, the researcher will attempt to
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draw conclusions on the justices ruling, based on their theoretical and
philosophical legal observation and experience.
The micro analytical lens is offered by Benjamin Cardozo in his classic
work entitled The Nature of the Judicial Process. Benjamin Nathan Cardozo was
born May 24, 1870. At the age of fifteen, Cardozo entered Columbia University
and graduated in 1889. He then entered immediately Columbia Law School.
After two years of law school, Cardozo left Columbia to practice law. He did not
obtain his degree in law. From 1891-1914, Benjamin Cardozo practiced law in
New York City. (Polenberg, 1997)
In the November 1913 elections, Cardozo was narrowly elected to the
New York County Supreme Court, the same trial court on which his father had
served. Cardozo took office on January 5, 1914. Less than a month later,
Cardozo was designated to sit on the New York Court of Appeals, the highest
court in the state. Cardozo was appointed to a seat on the Court of Appeals in
1917, and was elected to that seat the same year. Cardozo remained on the
Court of Appeals until 1932, becoming Chief Judge on January 1, 1927. In 1921,
Cardozo gave the Storrs lectures at Yale, which were later published as The
Nature of the Judicial Process. This book enhanced greatly Cardozo's reputation,
and the book remains valuable today for the light it throws on judging.
Cardozo, was nominated by President Herbert Hoover to the U.S. Supreme
Court after Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes resigned from the Supreme Court due
to age. Approximately two weeks later, the Senate unanimously approved
Cardozo's nomination. (Polenberg, 1997)
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While serving on the Supreme Court, Justice Cardozo wrote the decisions
that upheld the Social Security Act in May 1937. In late 1937, Cardozo suffered
another heart attack, and in early 1938, he suffered a stroke. He died on July 9,
1938. (Polenberg, 1997)
The text, The Nature of the Process by Benjamin N. Cardozo, was based
on four lectures he gave before the law school at Yale University. Cardozo
provides a judicial decision making template. The template is composed of a
number of components. Cardozo suggests that in order to be an effective judge,
one must not just consider the written law and past legal precedence but they
must also have deeper understanding of the law and must create a personal
philosophy about legal decision making. Cardozo calls this “The Method of
Philosophy” in his first lecture, and asserts that a Judge needs to consider many
things when contemplating a decision, including the ability to understand what
areas provide more weight than others do. Cardozo writes that a judge’s judicial
philosophy needs to be a blend of logic and experience; in doing so, a judge will
have a basis for judicial decision-making. (Cardozo, 1921 p. 27)
In Cardozo’s second lecture entitled “The Method of History Tradition and
Sociology,” he addresses other areas a judge should give credence to. They are,
in summary, the sprit of the law, history or customs, past court rulings, and
importance of justice. (Cardozo, 1921 p. 47)
In Cardozo’s third lecture, he discusses the method of sociology and the
judge as legislator. He examines at length the quandaries of decision making
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with the many outside influences that a judge will face. A justice must look to
establishing social justice. (Cardozo, 1921 p. 94)
In his fourth lecture, Cardozo addresses the topic “adherence to
precedent.” It is Cardozo’s viewpoint that “precedent should be the rule not the
exception” (Cardozo, 1921, p.145). Following of judicial precedent is the “laying
of ones own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by
others” (Cardozo,1921, p.145). Cardozo is referring to previous judges who have
ruled on cases of similar nature. Keeping judicial precedent in mind however, a
judge must also realize that while a ruling may have met judicial review in one
generation, the same ruling may be outdated and not applicable in more recent
generations.
The researcher read Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s text and interpreted the
judicial making process as described earlier. As it pertains to this study, the
decision of Chief Justice Rehnquist will be analyzed to determine if there is
evidence the chief justice subscribes to the judicial decision making template
offered by Judge Cardozo. This will give some insight into the decision making
process used by Justice Rehnquist. (Cardozo, 1921).
The macro analytical lens is provided by the legal scholar Jeffery Rosen in
his recent work entitled The Most Democratic Branch (2006). Jeffery Rosen is
currently a Professor of Law at George Washington University and he is the legal
affairs editor of The New Republic. He has authored numerous legal books; The
Supreme Court: The Personalities and Rivalries that Defined America, The Most
Democratic Branch, The Naked Crowd, and The Unwanted Gaze. Rosen is a
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graduate of Harvard College (B.A.), summa cum laude; Oxford University (B.A.),
where he was a Marshall Scholar; and Yale Law School. (Rosen, 2006)
In his book, The Most Democratic Branch, Rosen submits the theory that
while the Supreme Court is perceived as an independent entity making rulings
based on Constitutional interpretation not based on political or popular views, it
has not entirely held tight to this conventional wisdom. Rosen theorizes that the
Supreme Court has rested its rulings of American public sentiment towards
important issues that face the nation. He also contends that the court often will
follow public opinion. Rosen reasons that failing to defer to public opinion means
that the Supreme Court engages in “judicial unilateralism.” Rosen defines this as
“a court’s decision to strike down federal or state laws in the name of a
Constitutional principle that is being actively and intensely contested by a
majority of the American people” (Rosen, 2006, p.8). According to Rosen, when
the Supreme Court engages in judicial unilateralism, its decision will usually
result in adverse results (Rosen, 2006, p. 8).
Rosen argues that the Supreme Court has issued rulings in the wake of
public opinion with case example Korematsu v United States (323 U.S.
214,1944). In the Korematsu case, it was decided that many Japanese
Americans, who were American citizens, were placed in fortified encampments
because of their ancestry was of Japanese heritage. Due to the fears of the
general American public (those not of Japanese ancestry) and in correlation to
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the order was generally supported
by the American public (Rosen, 2006).
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Rosen argues that there other cases that show that the Supreme Court
does not always act as an independent institution, but does tap the pulse of the
politics at the present time as well (Rosen, 2006).
Using Rosen’s work, The Most Democratic Branch, the researcher will
apply Rosen’s theory of Supreme Court Decision making using the Locke v.
Davey case. If Rosen’s theory is accurate, then the decision of the case will
reflect the public sentiment at the time.

Oral Argument Attendance
In addition, this researcher attended the oral argument of the Locke v
Davey case before the United States Supreme Court. This experience provided
an invaluable perspective in the case as a participant observer. As a participant
observer in a qualitative research design, a researcher must consider his own
reactions to events to be a legitimate part of the study and worthy of reporting
(Gall, 1996).
In preparing for oral arguments, each of the Supreme Court Justices
prepare in their own way. According to the late Chief Justice Rehnquist in his
book The Supreme Court (2001), several Justices are provided with “bench
memos” by their law clerks. These memos give the Justices that they work for a
summarized version of the case with pros and cons of the arguments. Other
Justices, such as Rehnquist, chose to read the cases themselves including the
lower court’s opinion. They then discuss the case’s merits and arguments with
their law clerks. Allowing enough time to think about a case, its impact, and the
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Constitution, is an important part of the preparation for Justices as the oral
argument date approaches (Rehnquist, 2001).
The oral argument process at the Supreme Court adheres to strict time
constraints. Attorneys have only 30 minutes to argue their case. (Unless further
time is granted pursuant by leave of the court.) During the argument Justices
pose questions that counsel are obliged to respond to. The amount of time given
for argument has changed over time, and according Chief Justice Rehnquist, a
good lawyer should be able to make his point in 30 minutes (Rehnquist, 2001).
As witnessed by the researcher, each attorney was constantly interrupted
by the Supreme Court Justices during the oral arguments. The questioning
seemed to be an intense experience and the attorneys’ answers reflected
examples of their arguments applied to the law. This experience presented to the
researcher just how prepared and how strong the arguing skills of the
representing attorneys were. Attending the oral arguments allowed the
researcher to understand the problems some of the Justices were having in
resolving the dispute. It also gave some insight as to which judges seemed to
side with the petitioners or respondents.
The researcher used the oral argument transcript of the case to derive the
significance of the arguments. The transcript was also helpful in determining
their impact, if any, that they had on the court’s decision.
Scholars often debate the need for oral arguments. The Justices appeared
to the researcher to be very prepared and astute. He was able to witness history
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being made and marveled as the Justices hammered away at the lead attorneys,
sometimes asking multiple simultaneous questions.

Summary
In this chapter, we examined the design of the research project. Education
legal research is conducted through the examination of such sources such as
past cases, petitioner and respondent briefs, amicus briefs, and journal articles.
An overview of where the law comes from was presented, to give the reader a
better understanding of the presentation of the Locke v. Davey case. Case briefs
were discussed and explanations as to why they are used in legal research were
presented. An explanation of how the researcher was going to analyze the case
using a macro lens via the text by Jeffery Rosen and using micro lens via the text
by Benjamin Cardozo was presented. Finally, the role of participant observer was
explained and presented, as the researcher attended the oral arguments and
used his observations to further his analysis of the case.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
This chapter answers the research questions posed in Chapter I. This
chapter will also present the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v.
Davey (No. 02-1315, 2003). Additionally, this chapter will examine the decision
making process by Justice Rehnquist by using the text The Nature of the
Process (1921) by Benjamin Cardozo and the Supreme Court decision making
philosophy using the text The Most Democratic Branch (2006) by Jeffery Rosen.
This chapter will also examine the impact of the Locke v. Davey (2004) decision
on higher education.

Research Questions and Answers
How did the Supreme Court resolve the Free Exercise and Establishment clause
issues presented in the Locke v. Davey case?
The Court issued its opinion. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling that Davey’s Constitutional rights to the Free
Exercise and Establishment clause of the First Amendment were not violated.
The majority dismissed the possibility that hostility toward religion was evident in
the withdrawal of the Promise Scholarship awarded from Davey. The Court found
that the Promise Scholarship program actually “goes a long way toward including
religion in its benefits” (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004 p. 724). Since
Northwest College, an eligible institution under the Promise Scholarship program,
has a Christian perspective and requires its students to take at least four
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devotional classes, the program is considered by the majority to accommodate
religion (Ibid p.724).
Chief Justice Rehnquist found a tension between the Establishment and
Free Exercise clauses and looked to the “play in the joints between them” in
order to resolve the issue in this case (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004 p.
719). An example of the term “play in the joints,” is if a state would permit the
funding of religious training, it does not mean it is required to do so by the First
Amendment. Just because something is allowed does not imply it is required.
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that this “play in the joints” would allow a
state to fund religious education without violating the Establishment clause. This
ruling really supports a state’s right to adopt a more “stringent establishment
provision standard than demanded by the First Amendment” (McCarthy, 2004)
without interfering with the right to Free Exercise (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712,
2004 p. 719).
The term of “play in the joints” has irked some scholars--in particular Carl
H. Esbeck , a professor of law at the University of Missouri - Columbia, School of
Law. Professor Esbeck writes that the Supreme Court sees the Free Exercise
clause as pro-religion and the Establishment clause as not anti- religion, or a way
to keep religion in check (Esbeck, 2006).
Such a view places the nine Justices in the power seat, balancing freeexercise against no-establishment, in whatever manner a five to four
majority deems fair and square on any given day. Such unguided
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balancing accords maximum power to the Court (or worse, power to one
“swing” justice), while trenching into the power of the elected branches.
(Carl H Esbeck, 2006 p.1333)
Sahrah M. Lavigne, a 2007 University of Maine School of Law graduate,
wrote that the “Supreme Court has struggled with the countervailing directives of
the Free Exercise clause and the Establishment clause for decades in particular
in the area of public funding of religious schools” (Lavigne, 2007, p. 511).
Lavigne’s assessment of the struggle is that funding of religious schools is a comingling of church and state which in turn violates the Establishment clause. The
counter-argument is that withholding public funds that fund religious schools
would “place a burden on those wishing to send their children to religious
schools” (Lavigne, 2007, p. 512). As a result of this lack of funding, children are
denied the ability to practice their faith and thus violating the Free Exercise
clause. However, she asserts, the ruling in Locke v. Davey is clear, since the
government does not provide funding it does not hinder an individual’s ability to
practice his or her religion (Lavigne, 2007)

What were the major cases the Supreme Court used to reach their decision?
The major cases that influenced the court’s decision were Rosenberger v
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia 515 U.S. 819 (1995), Widmar v
Vincent 454 U.S. 263 (1981), Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the
Blind 474 U.S. 481 (1986), Zellman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) and
Lukumi Babalu, INC. v. City of Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993). These cases
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embodied concepts related to the Fourteenth Amendment (states’ rights) and the
Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist found a
tension between the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses and looked to the
“play in the joints between them” in order to resolve the issue in this case (Locke
v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004 p. 719)(Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New
York 397 U.S. 664, 1970). Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged, however, that
this “play in the joints” would allow a state to fund religious education without
violating the Establishment clause. Justice Rehnquist appears to have rejected
viewpoint neutrality even though he embraced the concept in similar cases that
involved government funding religion during his tenure on the Supreme Court.
The court rejected Davey’s argument that because the program is not
facially neutral, it is presumptively unconstitutional. Rehnquist rejected the
arguments because it “would extend the Lukumi line of cases beyond not only
their facts but their reasoning” (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004 p. 720). In the
Lukumi decision, the court held that the law refusing to pay for ministerial studies
sought to suppress the customs of a particular religion, while the burden on
Davey’s Free Exercise is “far milder” Church of Lukumi Babalu, INC. v. City of
Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Specifically, the court found that the Promise
Scholarship program “does not require students to choose between their
religious belief and receiving a government benefit.” Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist wrote, “Training someone to lead a congregation is an essentially
religious endeavor… Indeed, majoring in devotional theology is akin to a religious
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calling as well as an academic pursuit" (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004 p,
721).
The majority rejected Justice Scalia’s argument that generally available
government benefits should be part of the “baseline against which burdens on
religion are measured,” asserting that religious and secular education are
fundamentally different (Ibid p. 721). Since training a minister is a “religious
endeavor,” is motivated by a “calling,” and involves an issue explicitly addressed
in the constitution, Rehnquist concluded that it was reasonable that Washington
would treat this education differently from its secular counterpart (Ibid p. 721). To
demonstrate the extent of anti-establishment concerns, Rehnquist referenced
revolts provoked by taxes collected to support church leaders and numerous
state statutes prohibiting the use of government funds to support the ministry.
(Ibid p, 722)
The Court held, based on the state’s substantial interest in avoiding
Establishment problems and the absence of any animus toward religion, that
prohibiting use of a government scholarship funds for vocational religious
instruction imposes a relatively minor burden and is not “inherently
constitutionally suspect” (Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 2004 p. 721).
The outcome of the Locke v. Davey case rested on the Fourteenth
Amendment defining a state’s jurisdiction to fund or not fund religious education.
In the Locke v. Davey case, the State of Washington’s constitution barred the
legislature from funding the training of any religious education and, as such, the
Supreme Court ruled that a state can decide if it wishes to fund religious training.
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What was the rational of the justices who disagreed with the Courts holding?
Justice Scalia dissented and filed an opinion in which Justice Thomas
joined. Justice Scalia argued that a law that burdens religious practice which is
not neutral on its face must face the “most rigorous of scrutiny” (Locke v. Davey,
540 U.S. 712, 2004 p. 726). Furthermore, he cited a longstanding principle that
states “cannot exclude individual[s] … because of their faith, or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation” (Everson v. Board of Ed. of
Ewing, 1947). He continued, “When the state makes a public benefit generally
available, that benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on
religion are measured” (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004 p. 727). Scalia
concluded that exclusion from those benefits based on religion constitutes a Free
Exercise violation.
Scalia charged that the majority’s use of historical “uprisings” is
“misplaced.” Since the laws involved in those events were laws that singled out
ministry for support, and not laws which concerned the inclusion of them for
financial aid, public reaction to them is irrelevant. As Scalia pointed out, “No one
would seriously contend, for example, that the Framers would have barred
ministers from using public roads on their way to church” (Ibid p. 727-728).
Justice Scalia concluded, if there were any “play in the joints,” it would not
be implicated by this case, as the Promise Scholarship program did not present a
“close call,” since the program was not neutral on its face. Highlighting the
absence of any attempt by the majority to defend the neutrality of the Promise
Scholarship program, Scalia rejected the notion that the minimal burden imposed
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and its benevolent purpose “render its discrimination less offensive.” He argued
that, assuming there is some threshold harm requirement (which he contended
there is not), Davey certainly met it when he was unable to apply his Promise
Scholarship to the course of study he wished to pursue (Locke v Davey 540 U.S.
712, 2004 p. 728).
Chief Justice Rehnquist countered Justice Scalia’s argument by stating
that Justice Scalia believes that training for religious professions and training for
secular professions are interchangeable. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
studying religion is akin to a religious calling as well as an academic pursuit and
the subject of religion is unique in its study. Every religion has a different
viewpoint to its core belief. Therefore, Rehnquist concluded that the training of
religious professionals and secular professionals are not interchangeable (Ibid p.
729).
In closing, the dissent warned that the ruling in the Locke case could be
extended beyond training of clergy to denial of prescription drug benefits to
ministers and the like.
Justice Thomas also wrote a dissent. He noted that the statute
implementing the Promise Scholarship program did not exclude through
definition a degree in theology. Were the term construed broadly to apply to
devotional and non-devotional study of theology, this would raise a different
Constitutional question. Because the parties had stipulated that the language of
the statute means to exclude devotional study only, Thomas joined in Scalia’s
interpretation of the law. "Let there be no doubt: This case is about discrimination
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against a religious minority," Justice Thomas wrote. "In an era when the court is
so quick to come to the aid of other disfavored groups, its indifference in this
case, which involves a form of discrimination to which the Constitution actually
speaks, is exceptional" (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004 p. 733).

What additional questions have emerged as a result of the
Supreme Court’s decision?
Confusion over the status of the Blaine Amendments will continue to rise
from the Supreme Court’s decision. The Blaine Amendments argument that
Davey brought forward claiming a violation of the First Amendment of the
Constitution was not addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision. Therefore
issues regarding the Blaine Amendment’s constitutionality were not addressed by
the court.
In 2004, the State of Florida was faced with a similar Blaine Amendment
predicament. In the case of Holmes v. Bush (No. 04-2323, 2006) the Florida
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of their state's school voucher
program. The State of Florida constitution has a provision in it that obligates the
state to provide "a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free
public schools" (Holmes v. Bush No. 04-2323, 2006). The program permitted the
use of voucher funds at religious schools. In a 5 – 2 vote, the Florida Supreme
Court (Holmes v. Bush, No. 04-2323, 2006) invalidated the program under the
Florida constitution, claiming that the program violated the provision because it
"diverts public dollars into separate private systems parallel to and in competition
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with the free public schools that are the sole means set out in the Constitution for
the state to provide for the education of Florida's children" (Holmes v. Bush No.
04-2323, 2006). Currently a commission in the State of Florida is seeking to
amend their constitution to allow for the school voucher program to exist. There
is the potential that more of this type of litigation will arise due to failure of the
courts in addressing the Blaine Amendment issue.
Second, the Court’s decision also raises the question of the nature and
scope of a state’s power. Does this decision grant states the power or right to
exclude religious providers from state-financed programs for education or social
service if the providers’ activities include some form of religious instruction? Can
a state be free to exclude faith-intensive drug treatment programs from a statefinanced voucher arrangement for substance abuse treatment? Perhaps a state
could exclude a faith-based organization from state-funded programs even if
those organizations are only offering secular services in their publicly funded
activities (Lupu & Tuttle, 2004).
The Locke v. Davey (2004) case has been often referred to as the
“voucher two case” in the media. The case has similar tones to the Zelman
voucher case that the court previously addressed. The Zelman decision removed
the Establishment clause’s barrier to publicly funded school vouchers. State law
is the only remaining legal hurdle to implementing vouchers programs and
providing many other types of public assistance for religious schools.
If the Locke decision had gone the other way, it may have severely
affected the school vouchers issue and other state aid to sectarian schools. If
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individuals had the right to free exercise, free speech, or equal protection right to
use government aid in religious schools when the aid is available in other private
schools, then a removal of state barriers to publicly funded vouchers would be
imminent (McCarthy, 2004).
The Supreme Court’s decision also raised the issue of the impact this
case will have on the potential that those supporting school choice programs.
Blaine Amendments or other state constitutional provisions surrounding support
for such programs may be presented with arguments from school choice
opponents. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case raises issues regarding
any federally required affirmative obligation by a state to include children
attending sectarian schools in school choice programs (Liekweg, 2004). In
addition, the Supreme Court may have undermined the use of the neutrality
principle philosophy that the Court had used in cases involving indirect benefit to
religion.
Another concern is the increase efforts states will witness to circumvent
the letter of the law. As in the case with Locke v. Davey, other students in
Davey’s class could have been in all the pastoral ministry classes that Davey
was in and received the Promise Scholarship. The difference being, they would
wait to declare their pastoral ministries degree till after their first two years in
college. The Promise Scholarship was only awarded to student the first two years
of their academic career. Student’s who wished to major in pastoral studies did
not have to declare that major until after their first two years (McCarthy, 2004).
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Therefore, students could delay their selection of a pastoral ministry major since
the Promise scholarship funded only the first two years of their education.
A number of concerns have been identified since the Supreme Courts
Ruling on Locke v. Davey. These questions will most likely be addressed
sometime by the Court as new situations arise.

What impact did the Supreme Court’s decision have on institutions of higher
education and how did the court’s decision impact the 37 states that have Blaine
Amendments in their state constitutions?
With the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the State of Washington,
the impact on public institutions of higher education is minimal depending on a
States Constitutional interpretation. Many Christian colleges and universities
were cautious; fearing a decision in favor of Washington would affect state-based
financial aid for students. The president of the Council for Christian College
issued this statement about the ruling:
Today's decision does not jeopardize the right of students at Christian
colleges and universities, or those of other religious faiths, to continue
receiving state and federal student aid. Nor does it jeopardize other forms
of state support to religious educational institutions. The decision imposes
no new limits on the power of states to provide such support. Indeed,
nothing in federal law forbids states from removing existing restrictions on
the use of student aid for clergy training. The Supreme Court held 18
years ago that states may permit students to direct state aid to clergy
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training (Witters v. Washington Department of Services). Today's decision
reaffirms that well-settled precedent. Today's decision does not give states
a green light to discriminate against religion in other funding contexts. It
merely protects those 13 states that deny student aid to students training
for the clergy from lawsuits brought under the federal Free Exercise
clause. The Council calls upon those states to eliminate their
discrimination against these students through amendments to their
regulations, statutes or constitutions.
Robert C. Andringa
President of the Council of Christian Colleges
February 27, 2004

If the ruling had been in favor of Davey it is likely that the government
would be required to fund religious education. The government would have to
consider funding everything equally even if it involved the training of ministers as
the neutrality principle requires.
In the United States, religion is funded through voluntary contribution. In
Europe, churches are partially funded through government taxation. Not that this
case would lead the U.S. towards taxation for religious entities, but the logic it
travels on could lead it to that destination. This would have been a blow to the
separation of church and state so revered by Thomas Jefferson and endorsed
the founding fathers of the United States of America. Thomas Jefferson was
vocal among the founding fathers of the United States, who were careful to
include a separation of church and state in our Constitution. Moving towards a
requirement to fund minister training could nullify that intent.
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Higher education administrators should become more aware of public
funded scholarships. In particular, those administrators at private religious
affiliated institutions that receive state funds. This case examined a state funded
scholarship; however, it is not too far to reach a conclusion that other forms of
financial aid, such as Pell Grants, may be jeopardized if a student receives
public-sourced funds and studies a major of religious training. At the very least
some states would be discouraged from offering scholarships to avoid funding
religions studies or expensive litigation.
Since the ruling of the Court was in favor of Locke, there was no impact on
the 37 states that have Blaine Amendments in their state constitutions. Davey’s
argument addressed the Blaine Amendments arguing they were a violation of the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause. By withdrawing his Promise
Scholarship for choosing a major that was religion focused Davey argued that it
was a violation of the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court made it clear that it was not passing judgment on Washington's
Blaine Amendment. The Supreme Court majority opinion stated that since the
case was determined by merits other than the Blaine Amendments, they did not
wish to address them. The ruling in this case is simply that the State Constitution
prohibits the funding of religious instruction therefore they did not need to rule on
the larger federal question of the Blaine Amendments.
This decision by the Court is in contrary to the Becket Fund amicus brief
that provided an extensive historical description of the Blaine Amendment (Brief
for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, The Catholic League for Religious and
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Civil Rights, and Historians and Legal Scholars). The Supreme Court concluded
that the Blaine Amendment was not at issue in this case. The Promise
Scholarship provision excluding theological study was based on a different
provision of the state constitution, which prohibits funding for degrees that are
"devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith" (Locke v Davey 540
U.S. 712, 2004 p. 716).
Studying the history and evolution of the Blaine Amendments shows that
they were heavily influenced by anti-Catholic animosity (Hamburger, 2002). In a
legal viewpoint, the letter of the law of the Blaine Amendments was to disallow
tax dollars to go towards any religious training, while the intended spirit of the law
was to hurt Catholics that were trying to obtain state funds to establish their own
schools. Some may perceive the intention as discriminatory, while others find the
Blaine Amendments a necessary element to keep the church and state
separation (Hamburger, 2002).
In summary, the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Locke
v. Davey on Higher Education and the Blaine Amendments that were challenged
by Davey were identified and presented.

Does the Opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Locke v. Davey indicate that he uses
the judicial decision making template prescribed by Benjamin Cardozo in his
book The Nature of the Process?
In trying to understand the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision, it is
equally important to understand how Justices make their decisions. In the book
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The Nature of the Judicial Process, Benjamin N. Cardozo outlines a template for
the judicial-decision making process for judges. Originally given as a series of
lectures, Cardozo describes methods that guide a Judge when contemplating a
judicial decision. A Judge must understand what areas of judicial decision
making provide more weight than others do. Justice Cardozo summarizes the
methods that guide judicial decision making as follows:
My Analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more:
logic and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of
right conduct, are the forces which singly of in combination share the
progress of law.
Benjamin Cardozo (1921 p. 108)
In order to do this, Cardozo contends that a judge must use logic and
infuse their philosophy with it. Doing so, the judge will have a basis for proper
judicial decision-making. Other areas Judges must regard include the spirit of the
law, history or customs and past court rulings. Finally, the judge must attend to
whether his/her decision serves the principle of justice (Cardozo, 1921). Each of
these foundations for judicial decision making will be discussed.
When a judge examines a challenge to a law or statute, the judge must
determine what the letter of the law is compared to the spirit of the law. Spirit of
the law refers to the intended purpose the law was conceived by the elected
governing body. In Locke v. Davey, the letter of the law stated no public funding
should be applied toward ministry training. The spirit of the law, in this case,
dictates that same intention. However, Davey could have easily circumvented the
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letter of the law by accepting the Promise Scholarship and not declared a
pastoral ministry major while using scholarship funds. However, he could then
have taken all the classes in the pastoral ministry major, while being undeclared
or declared under a different major. In this case, the spirit of the law would have
been violated as Davey’s original intent was to become a minister. This is an
example of how a judge must take into account the intentions of the legislation
and law (Cardozo, 1921).
When taking into account the history of things or what the normal custom
is, a judge is really trying to identify how things have been and whether or not this
is an acceptable practice based on the law. The Supreme Court majority opinion
did this with the Locke v. Davey ruling as it examined the history of public funding
in the United States (Cardozo, 1921).
Court precedent is an important factor as well. It is similar to looking at
history in that a judge looks at the history of past court rulings in making a
decision. An attorney’s job is to present to a judge past court rulings that support
arguments or those that disarm other arguments. In the case of Locke v. Davey,
the Supreme Court considered many cases and presented opinions into whether
or not the cases applied to the Locke case. (Cardozo, 1921).
Finally, a judge must examine the outcome of a case and see if justice has
been served. This is in part due to society’s expectations that a judgment serves
justice. A judge is expected to protect society by providing judgments that serve
the greater good of humanity. (Cardozo, 1921).
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The template of judicial decision making presented by Cardozo can be
likened to laying a brick wall. A judge needs to have layers—or “bricks”--of
knowledge to be successful in presiding over cases. These layering of bricks
would include those skills mentioned earlier, such as logic infused with a judge’s
own philosophies or the spirit of the law versus the letter of the law. History or
customs involved and past court rulings or precedence and prevalence of justice
would also be considered bricks to create a strong base for legal rulings.
(Cardozo, 1921).
Opinions that come from the Supreme Court require much in the way of
introspective thinking. These opinions can have dramatic impacts and, as such,
Justices take much precaution and interest in each case argued. The Justices
must have years of experience and knowledge before they can be selected to sit
on the Supreme Court. Thus their continual education and experience becomes
a theoretical wall of bricks: strong and solid.
A careful analysis of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision making style in
Locke v. Davey confirms that the Chief Justice followed the Cardozo template on
judicial decision making. An independent evaluator, professor David L. Shapiro,
in 1976 wrote a preliminary review in the Harvard Law Review on then Associate
Justice Rehnquist’s decision making. The study provided insight into the Chief
Justice’s decision making style. Professor Shapiro wrote that one of the most
notable aspects of Chief Justice Rehnquist's career was his consistency. He
specifically identified three basic elements of the Rehnquist judicial philosophy:
conflicts between the individual and the government should be resolved against
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the individual; conflicts between state and federal authority should be resolved in
favor of the states; and questions of the exercise of federal jurisdiction should be
resolved against such exercise (Shapiro, 1976).
When examining the Chief Justice’s decision in Locke v. Davey, one can
make an argument that Chief Justice Rehnquist was indeed consistent with his
judicial rulings. Davey was the individual who had a conflict with the government
and the conflict was resolved against the individual. Just as Shapiro wrote about
Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1976.
In viewing the Locke v. Davey case in a micro view using Benjamin
Cardozo’s text in The Nature of the Judicial Process (2005), the researcher could
identify how Chief Justice Rehnquist came to his opinion based on his years of
experience at the bench. In particular, one can compare the Locke v. Davey case
outcome to the 1976 article that outlined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s judicial
philosophy in that he favored government over the individual.

How does the Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v. Davey fit with the theory
proposed by Jeffrey Rosen in his book The Most Democratic Branch regarding
the role of the Supreme Court in our system of government?
In the book The Most Democratic Branch (2006), Jeffery Rosen makes the
argument that while the Supreme Court is perceived as an independent entity
making rulings based strictly on Constitutional interpretation instead of political or
popular views, in truth it has strayed from this conventional wisdom. Rosen
contends that the Supreme Court has often rendered decisions based on the
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political views of the country’s majority opinion on important issues instead of
constitutional analysis.
In support of his theory, Rosen cites the case of Korematsu v. United
States (323 U.S. 214,1944). The Korematsu case addressed the constitutionality
of placing U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry in fortified encampments during
World War II. Rosen explains that due to the fears of the general American
public inflamed by the attack on Pearl Harbor and those not of Japanese
ancestry, the internment order issued by President Roosevelt’s executive order
was generally supported by the American public and upheld by the Supreme
Court.
Rosen reasons that there are other cases that show that the Supreme
Court does not act as an aloof independent institution but does tap on pulse of
the politics at the present time.
Another case that Rosen uses as an example is Lawrence v. Texas (539
U.S. 558 2003). The Court was revisiting the constitutionality of the sodomy laws
in Texas. The laws on the books in Texas made sodomy illegal for homosexuals.
Rosen asserts that society has become more accepting of homosexuality as he
wrote that America has a “shift in national attitudes toward homosexual conduct.”
(Rosen, 2006 p. 108) In his opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy cited numerical
evidence that the number of repeals of Sodomy laws in the nation was evidence
of a public shift in attitudes towards homosexuals. (Rosen, 2006)
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With the Supreme Court using collected data from public attitude such as
in the Lawrence v. Texas case in their opinions, one can see that Rosen’s theory
gains support.
In the case of Locke v. Davey, the researcher is convinced by careful
analysis that the Supreme Court’s decision steers away from the mainstream
thinking that set court precedent to date; thus, Rosen’s theory on the Supreme
Court decision making unsupportable. When the Locke v. Davey case emerged
in 2003, President George W. Bush, a Republican, had an approval rating 63%.
In 2003 USA Today reported that this was one of the highest ever for a
President. (Benedetto, 2003) With such a high approval rating for a republican
President one can conclude that conservative viewpoint was being favored in
America. Thus one can further conclude that such public support for a sitting
President who had an amicus brief submitted for the United States in support of
Davey might in fact, under Rosen’s theory, persuade the Court to rule with public
opinion.
The Courts had already set a judicial precedent on issues that face
discrimination up to this point were subject to the neutrality principal as earlier
argued. Cases such as Rosenberger v. Rector (515 U.S. 819,1995), Widmar v.
Vincent (454 U.S. 263,1981) and Zellman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. (2002)
show that precedence being shaped. For this case, according to established
precedent, discrimination based on religion was illegal.
However, the Court opinion on Locke v. Davey did not reflect the public
sentiment presented at the time. Thus, it can be argued that Rosen’s theory

154

should be rejected in the Locke v. Davey case. Given that a number of cases
don’t fit Rosen’s theory, the theory should be debunked.
But, there is also a persuasive argument to be made regarding the Locke
v. Davey case that can actually support Rosen’s theory to be applicable. Rosen’s
theory is that the Supreme Courts’ decision making is public sentiment oriented,
meaning that the Supreme Court’s decision making seems to align itself with the
majority view of the American people. In the Locke v. Davey case, the Promise
Scholarship was enacted by the State of Washington legislature. When Davey,
who earned the scholarship award, brought suit claiming his First Amendment
rights had been violated, there was no uproar from the State of Washington
legislature. There is no evidence that a Bill was ever presented to the legislature
to amend the State of Washington’s constitution regarding the prohibition of
funding ministerial studies. In addition, the State of Washington constitution,
which includes written text that mirrors the Blaine Amendment, was ratified in
1889 through an election by the citizens of the proposed state by an
overwhelming margin of 40,152 to 11, 879 (Washington Secretary of State Sam
Reed, 2008). Therefore, one may conclude, the Supreme Court is in fact making
their decision in favor majority opinion. Furthermore, since no amendment had
ever been introduced to counter the Washington code that prohibited the public
funding of religious training, one can properly infer that this is the current majority
view in the State of Washington (Washington Secretary of State Sam Reed,
2008).
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According to the Merriam – Webster Dictionary, theory is defined as “a
hypothesis assumed for the sake of argument or investigation or an unproved
assumption”. (Webster, 1981 p. 1200) Applying this definition, it goes to
demonstrate that the Locke v. Davey case raises questions as to Rosen’s
general theory on the foundation of Supreme Court decision making. It follows
that Rosen’s theory is too imprecise when applied to the Locke case since
plausible arguments can be made supporting and refuting the basis of the theory.
A theory, such as his, should be applicable to all cases. There is no clear tool or
application that can prove Rosen’s attempt to show that the Supreme Court
decides by taking public sentiment or political pressure. More guidance from
Rosen is necessary in order to gain confidence in the general nature of the
theory he has proposed. In addition, it is hard to gauge public sentiment in a
time period of history in the past. We have limited documentation—and even less
objective documentation--that can reveal historical public sentiment as a majority
in the U.S. We can make assumptions based on historical records and writing but
no opinion polls can be found that relate directly to past historical decisions by
the Supreme Court.

Summary
Chapter 4 presented the findings of the study. Specifically, each of the
research questions were answered. The major arguments in the judicial process
that influenced the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the Locke v.
Davey case were thoroughly analyzed. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
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majority opinion and concluded that the State of Washington did not violate the
Establishment clause or the Free Exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Justice Rehnquist based his decision in this case on the concepts of the
Fourteenth Amendment (state’s rights) and the Free Exercise clause. Chief
Justice Rehnquist found a tension between the Establishment and Free Exercise
clauses and looked to the “play in the joints between them” in order to resolve the
issue in this case (Locke v. Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004) . Rehnquist
acknowledged, however, that this “play in the joints” would also allow a state to
fund pastoral studies without violating the Establishment clause.
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas wrote the dissenting opinion. Justice
Scalia wrote that the U.S. Supreme Court does not dispute that the Free
Exercise clause places some limits on public benefits programs, but the court
does not find any here based on the contention of “play in the joints “as, under
law, a municipality cannot discriminate. Justice Scalia points out in his example
of how municipality cannot discriminate against Black Americans, nor can it hire
in favor of them then argue “play in the joints” when sued. The religion clause
must be neutral as well (Locke v Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004).
Justice Scalia continued by pointing out that throughout history, states
have provided financial means to fund religious education. The State of Virginia,
for example, had a bill in its legislature that provided for the support of Christian
teachers. Other states have similar laws that have allowed for the funding of
clergy from state funds. While funding such endeavors from federal coffers has
been hostile, such funding from state coffers is not barred. Justice Scalia pointed
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out that, “no one would seriously contend, for example, that the Framers would
have barred ministers from using public roads on their way to church!” (Locke v
Davey 540 U.S. 712, 2004).
The outstanding issues that remain regarding the Dave v. Locke case
include the addressing the legality of the language in state constitutions that
appear to be similar to the language of the proposed Blaine Amendment. This
was never addressed by the Supreme Court in this case. The other issue still
outstanding is the concern on state’s power. This raises questions such as did
the decision grant states the power to exclude religious providers from statefinanced programs for education or social service if the provider’s activities
include some form of religious instruction? Can a state be free to exclude faithintensive drug treatment programs from a state-financed voucher arrangement
for substance abuse treatment? These questions may have to be answered in
future Supreme Court opinions (Lupu & Tuttle, 2004).
The implications of the Locke v. Davey case were minimal when the
Justices ruled in favor of Governor Locke. States may refuse to fund from public
coffers religious training; however, the reverse is true, too as states may choose
to fund religious training. The ruling premise is similar to the Zelman v. Harris
(536 U.S. 639,2002) ruling that, according to the opinion of the Supreme Court,
states may choose to or choose not to fund school vouchers consistent with the
First Amendment.
Had the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Davey, some implications could
have surfaced. An example one can envision would be in using the philosophy of

158

viewpoint neutrality, as many writers and scholars expected the outcome of the
case to be decided on the merits of viewpoint neutrality. Many state constitutions
have language in them that forbid the spending of public monies on religious
training could have had legal claims brought against them.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, RECCOMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS
Summary of the Locke v. Davey Case
The Locke v. Davey decision established a boundary line to the Court’s
use of viewpoint neutrality in court cases regarding religion. The Supreme
Court’s ruling in support of a state’s right to decide to fund or not to fund religious
training appears to conflict with the Supreme Court’s past precedents of
viewpoint neutrality towards religion. The court rejected Davey’s argument that
because the program is not facially neutral, it was presumptively unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed because it “would extend the Lukumi line of
cases beyond not only their facts but their reasoning” (Locke v. Davey, U.S. 540
U.S. 712 2004 p. 720). In the decision on Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah (508 U.S. 520,1993), the Supreme Court held that the law sought to
suppress the customs of a particular religion, while the burden involved here is
“far milder” (Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535). Specifically, the court found that the
Promise Scholarship program “does not require students to choose between their
religious belief and receiving a Government benefit” (Locke v. Davey, U.S. 540
U.S. 712 2004 p. 713).
The United States Supreme Court held that a “devotional theology
exclusion from an otherwise inclusive aid program does not violate the Free
Exercise clause of the First Amendment” (Locke v. Davey, U.S. 540 U.S. 712
2004 p. 719). In a 7-2 decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justice
John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter,
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. The court held,
based on the state’s substantial interest in avoiding establishment problems and
the absence of any animus toward religion, that prohibiting application of a
government scholarship toward vocational religious instruction imposes a
relatively minor burden and is not “inherently constitutionally suspect” (Locke v.
Davey, U.S. 540 U.S. 712 2004 p. 733).
Chief Justice Rehnquist found a tension between the Establishment and
Free Exercise clauses and looked to the “play in the joints between them” in
order to resolve the issue in this case (Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York,
397 U.S. 664, 669,1970). Rehnquist acknowledged, however, that this “play in
the joints” would allow a state to fund religious education without violating the
Establishment clause. A state may fund religious education and other states
may chose not to fund religious education. (Locke v. Davey, U.S. 540 U.S. 712
2004)
The majority opinion rejected Justice Scalia’s argument that generally
available government benefits should be part of the “baseline against which
burdens on religion are measured” (Locke v. Davey, U.S. 540 U.S. 712 2004 p.
732).The court asserted that religious and secular education are fundamentally
different. Since training a minister is a “religious endeavor” that is motivated by a
“calling” and involves an issue explicitly addressed in the U.S. and state
constitutions, Rehnquist considers it reasonable that the State of Washington
would treat this education differently from its secular counterpart (Locke v.
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Davey, U.S. 540 U.S. 712 2004 p. 720). To demonstrate the extent of antiestablishment concerns, Rehnquist referenced revolts provoked by taxes
collected to support church leaders and numerous state statutes prohibiting the
use of government funds to support the ministry.
Dismissing the possibility that hostility toward religion motivated the law by
pulling the allocated funding for the scholarship, the court found that the Promise
Scholarship program actually “goes a long way toward including religion” (Locke
v. Davey, U.S. 540 U.S. 712 2004 p. 721).Since Northwest College, an eligible
institution under the Promise Scholarship program, has a Christian perspective
and requires its students to take at least four devotional classes, the program is
considered by the majority to accommodate religion.
The court held, based on the state’s substantial interest in avoiding
establishment problems and the absence of any animus toward religion, that
prohibiting application of a government scholarship toward vocational religious
instruction imposes a relatively minor burden and is not “inherently
constitutionally suspect” (Locke v. Davey, U.S. 540 U.S. 712 2004 p. 722)
The Supreme Court also did not address the arguments in regards to the
Blaine Amendments that Davey argued were unconstitutional. The Blaine
Amendment wording was included in state constitutions in the early part of the
20th century to prohibit funding from state public funds to private sectarian
schools. Scholars have argued that the inception of Blaine Amendments were a
result of an anti-Catholic movement in which private Catholic schools were
seeking state and local funding support from public coffers.
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v. Davey was that the Free
Exercise clause of the First Amendment did not require a state to fund religious
instruction, even if it provided college scholarships for secular instruction. The
court sent a clear message that failure to fund religious activity is not the same
as religious discrimination. Although there is a right to practice religion, there can
be no valid demand for the government to pay for it.
When the opinion on Locke v. Davey by the U.S. Supreme Court was
rendered, this researcher was surprised by the court’s opinion. The case looked
as if it clearly violated the neutrality principle. An examination of the cases that
the Supreme Court ruled on in the past one would draw such a conclusion that
the court would rule that it violated the neutrality principle. The following are
cases that pertain to the principle of neutrality:
In 1981, the case of Widmar v. Vincent (454 U.S. 263, 1981) was the first
case in a string of cases that addressed viewpoint neutrality with religion. The
University of Missouri at Kansas City ruled that its facilities could not be used by
student groups for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching. The school
believed that the action was required under the Establishment clause. A student
religious group that had previously been permitted to use the facilities sued the
school after being informed of the change in policy. They asserted that their First
Amendment rights to religious free exercise and free speech were being violated.
The court ruled that the Establishment clause not only did not require state
universities to limit access to their facilities by religious organizations, it
prohibited discrimination. The university had generally permitted its facilities to be
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used by student organizations and therefore it must demonstrate that its
restrictions are constitutionally permitted. An equal access policy would not
necessarily violate the Establishment clause. The three-pronged Lemon test
would not be violated by such a policy. It would have a secular legislative
purpose and not foster excessive government entanglement. The third part, that
the policy’s primary effect would advance religion, is what the university claimed.
Any such benefit at UMKC would be incidental, as the state does not necessarily
approve of all groups who use the open forum, and the forum is open to nonreligious as well as religious groups (Widmar v. Vincent, 1981).
In 1981, the case of Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia (515 U.S. 819,1995) the Supreme Court ruled that the University of
Virginia inappropriately denied funding to Wide Awake Productions. In its Lamb’s
Chapel decision, the court decided that the government may not regulate speech
based on its substantive content or the message it conveys. It is also
impermissible for the government to favor one speaker over another or impose
financial burdens on certain speakers because of their expression’s content. The
court also makes a distinction between content discrimination and viewpoint
discrimination. In Rosenberger v. Rector, the university did not exclude religion
as a subject matter for publications receiving funding. Rather, it selected for
disfavored treatment those student journals with religious editorial viewpoints. In
other words, the university barred the perspective, but not the general subject
matter. It would be proper for the school to engage in viewpoint discrimination if it
was the one doing the speaking. However, Wide Awake was an independent
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organization and contributed to the diversity of viewpoints that the Student
Activities Fund (SAF) was meant to foster. The granting of funds does not violate
the Establishment clause because the money was not raised by taxes. The
mandatory contributions to the SAF are held to be substantively different from tax
contributions. The money is meant to reflect the diversity of the student body and
is given to private contractors. The use of public facilities that was permitted in
Lamb’s Chapel involves government expenditures for the upkeep of the facilities,
in the same way that such funds are involved in this case. Finally, the student
publication is neither a religious institution nor a religious organization. This
decision extended the Lamb’s Chapel ruling that allowed public facilities to be
used for religiously-motivated presentations. In the Rosenberger decision, money
could be given directly to University organizations and publications conveying a
religious message (Rosenberger v. Rector, 1995).
In 2002, the Supreme Court heard the case of Zellman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. (2002), Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in
the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to
attend participating public or private schools of their parents’ choosing. Both
religious and nonreligious schools in the district participated. Tuition aid was
distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid was spent
depended solely upon where parents chose to enroll their children. In the 19992000 school year, 82 % of the participating private schools had a religious
affiliation and 96 % of the students participating in the scholarship program were
enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from
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families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin
the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment clause. The Ohio
District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Ohio Court of Appeals
affirmed.
The question presented to the Supreme Court was did the Ohio's school
voucher program violate the Establishment clause. The Supreme Court
responded with a closely divided opinion that it did not. In a 5-4 opinion delivered
by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the court held that the program did not
violate the Establishment clause. The court reasoned that, because Ohio's
program is part of the state’s general undertaking to provide educational
opportunities to children, government aid reaches religious institutions only by
way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients and the incidental
advancement of a religious mission, or any perceived endorsement, is
reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients and not the government.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the "Ohio program is entirely neutral with
respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals,
defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It
permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and
private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private
choice" (Zellman v. Harris, 2002).
In all three of these cases government action was judged by the viewpoint
neutrality principle. The Locke v. Davey case seemed to follow the similar
sequence; a student’s funding was withdrawn only because he chose to pursue a
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degree in pastoral ministries.
Another point this researcher found difficult to understand is that the
Supreme Court stated that the value of the scholarship was of little of no impact
to Davey. This researcher disagrees with the Supreme Court in that any time
funds that are withheld due to a student’s choice in major reduces that student’s
ability to make a choice, especially since there was no such stipulation in the
original write-up of the Promise Scholarship. Davey lost $2,700 in state aid by
losing this scholarship. The cost to attend Northwest College (a private college)
was approximately $15,000 a year. The scholarship selection criteria were
based on a student’s academic performance and financial need. Davey’s family
was already strapped for funding for him to attend college as predetermined by
the scholarship application (Berg & Laycock, 2004).
In summary, the Locke v. Davey case decision was reviewed and
compared to three other similar cases that had been decided by the Supreme
Court on the basis of the principle of view point neutrality. The researcher had
expected the case outcome to follow the neutrality principle that the Supreme
Court had established. The decision that was rendered seems to have put the
brakes on the viewpoint neutrality principle since the Court determined that
states should be the ones determining if religious education be paid by public
coffers.
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Recommendations for Further Study
The Supreme Court did not address the Blaine Amendments in its
decision on Locke v. Davey. Do the Blaine Amendments give states the ability to
be treat religion differently when it comes to the principle of viewpoint neutrality?
Further research into the history and intention of the Blaine Amendments and
their impact on society can result in a better understanding of their purpose.
Further studies should examine Supreme Court opinions using the general
theory proposed in The Most Democratic Branch (2006) by Jeffery Rosen as a
macro view explain the role of the Court in our system of governance.
Using Benjamin Cardozo’s book, The Nature of the Judicial Process
(2005), further studies should be conducted comparing the judicial decision
making template explained by Cardozo.
Conducting additional studies using a macro and micro lens will either
validate of the general theory proposed by Rosen and illuminate the decision
making style of various justices.
It is recommended by this researcher that further research be done
focused on the Chief Justices words “play in the joints” exploring the nature and
scope of the phrase as it relates to proper understanding between the Free
Exercise clause and the Establishment clause of the Constitution.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in his opinion:
The "play in the joints" between the two religion clauses allows states —
but does not require them — to support divinity studies. The state's
interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and
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the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise
Scholars. If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be
here.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist
(Locke v. Davey, 2004 U.S. Lexis 1626)
Such research could result in putting together a judicial test in which the
“play in the joints” applies. The test could be used as a proactive measure to aid
elected officials to resolve future issues.
Also, does providing state funded scholarship money for a student
pursuing a degree in pastoral ministries or religious training identify a state as
one that supports religion? What harm really comes about to a state or even a
community that does provide funding for religious training? A study should be
conducted to identify the pros and cons of public funds sponsoring religious
training. Can crime rates be reduced or perhaps can a decrease in prisoner
recidivism rates be a correlated result?
Further study should be conducted on the impact of scholarships on
students when it comes to making choices on college majors. Will offering
scholarship money to someone to study physics encourage more students to
study physics? The reverse question can also be explored, does denying
scholarship money to students because they have chosen a specific major result
in students choosing another major?
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Conclusions
In chapter one, Introduction to the Study, the case of Locke v. Davey was
presented and examined using the petitions submitted, an overview of the First
Amendment, including history and sample cases that have helped the courts to
define it meaning. The history and evolution of the separation of church and
state as well as an overview of the Blaine Amendments were also presented.
The research problem, research questions, and the significance of the study
were presented. The methodology of this study was introduced and a definition of
terms was presented.
In chapter two, significant court decisions associated with the Free
Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution were reviewed and analyzed. A history of the First Amendment,
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Blaine Amendments was presented and
analyzed. Also included were the amicus briefs and the oral arguments of the
case.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Locke v. Davey
case. The issue in this case was whether the Free Exercise clause of the First
Amendment required a state to fund religious instruction if it provides college
scholarships for secular instruction. Supporters of the question argued that the
principle of viewpoint neutrality, claiming that if secular instruction gets funding
then so should religious instruction. The opponents of the question argued that a
state’s constitution that prohibits such funding should be allowed to not fund
religious instruction.
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In chapter three, the research design was explained and procedures of
the legal analysis were presented. Resources were identified that helped in the
understanding and examining the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment
and the funding of religious training by public coffers.
An internal evaluation was conducted on all relevant cases to determine
the similarity of facts and the relationship of these facts tot eh research problem.
The legal significance and impact of each case was related to the research
problem.
A complete case analysis was also conducted on the amicus briefs,
petitions, oral arguments, and all relevant cases of the Locke v. Davey case. The
cases were arranged in brief format to make the case analysis more efficient and
guard against research bias.
The researcher also attended the oral arguments of the case and used the
transcripts of the oral arguments to better understand the legal significance of the
case. In chapter four, the major arguments in the judicial process that influenced
the Supreme Courts decision in the Locke v. Davey case were examined and
thoroughly analyzed. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and
concluded that Washington’s exclusion of the pursuit of a devotional theology
degree from its otherwise-inclusive scholarship aid program does not violate the
Free Exercise clause. This case involves the “play in the joints” between the
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses. Chief Justice Rehnquist based his
decision on the history the United States has had in regards to not funding
religious training with public funds, and that a state has the right under the
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Fourteenth Amendment to not fund religious training but conversely could if it so
chose to.
Justice Scalia wrote that if there were any “play in the joints” it would not
be implicated by this case as the Promise Scholarship program does not present
a “close call,” since the program is not neutral on its face. He argued that,
assuming there is some threshold harm requirement Davey certainly met it when
he was unable to apply his Promise Scholarship to the course of study he wished
to pursue. Justice Thomas wrote his own dissent to note that the statute
implementing the Promise Scholarship program does not define a degree in
theology. Were the term construed broadly to apply to devotional and nondevotional study of theology, this would raise a different Constitutional question.
The implications the Locke v. Davey case holds for the future of public
funding of religious training will depend on individual states and in how their state
constitution supports it. Those states with Blaine Amendments may have to
pursue constitutional amendments to remove the Blaine Amendments if the state
wishes to fund religious training. There are 37 states with language in their
constitutions that resembles the Blaine Amendments. What does the future hold
in store for them?
In chapter four all research questions were answered. A detailed and
extensive analysis of opinions of the Justices was performed. The major
arguments that were presented it the Locke v. Davey case were discussed.
Outstanding issues that surround the results of the case were identified and
discussed. An analysis of the Judicial decision making model by Benjamin
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Cardozo in his book The Nature of the Judicial Process (2005) was applied to
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision in the Locke v. Davey case. A similar analysis
was done of the Supreme Courts’ opinion in the Locke v. Davey case by applying
the written work of Jeffery Rosen in his book, The Most Democratic Branch
(2006).
In chapter five, the researcher summarized the case and examined the
intent of the neutrality principle by discussing three cases that the neutrality
principle was applied when the Supreme Court made their decisions on those
cases. Recommendations for further study were shared.
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EPILOGUE
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v. Davey in 2004, a number
of court cases have used the precedent in the Locke v. Davey decision. In this
section, the researcher will examine the current legal landscape in regards to the
Locke decision and present cases that used its precedent. In addition, the
researcher will examine what if anything the State of Washington has done since
the case was decided and if Northwest University made any changes to their
institution’s financial aid distribution. The researcher will also update the current
status of the parties in the litigation.

Court Cases since Locke v. Davey
Eulitt v. State of Maine (386 F 3d 344 1st Cir 2004)
In the case of Eulitt v. State of Maine, (386 F 3d 344 1st Cir 2004) we find
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that the state of Maine’s
law that allows local school districts to provide free public education by paying for
tuition expenses to private non sectarian schools but not to private sectarian
schools does not violate the equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The case was brought forward originally by
parents of children attending Catholic schools. Addressing the parents’ claim
that the law discriminated on the basis of religion, the court rejected the parents’
attempt to use the claim in terms of Equal Protection rather than Free Exercise of
religion. Using the Locke v. Davey 2004 opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals
noted, "the Free Exercise Clause's protection of religious beliefs and practices
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from direct government encroachment does not translate into an affirmative
requirement that public entities fund religious activity simply because they
choose to fund the secular equivalents of such activity. “ (Locke v. Davey, 540
U.S. 712 (2004) Maine’s refusal to provide public funds for religious education
does not interfere with parents’ fundamental right to choose religious education
for their children. Applying the factors in Locke v. Davey, the U.S. Court of
Appeals also rejected the parents’ contention that the statute’s exclusion of
sectarian institutions demonstrates animus against religion. The court points out
that the law does not impose criminal or civil sanctions on religious practice,
inhibit political participation, or require state residents to surrender their religious
convictions in order to receive the benefit offered by the state, in this case
secular education. (Eulitt v. State of Maine, 386 F 3d 344 1st Cir 2004)

Anderson v. Town of Durham (549 US 1051 2006) cert denied
In the case of Anderson v. Town of Durham (549 US 1051 2006) cert
denied, the state of Maine had an interesting dilemma. Some of Maine’s school
districts do not operate a high school. The state of Maine normal practice would
be to then pay for students in those specific school districts to attend private non
sectarian high schools. Sectarian high schools would not be eligible for those
funds. To address the alleged impropriety of the Maine statute, a bill was
introduced in Maine’s state legislature to repeal the section of the state’s tuition
payment statute that prohibited school districts from paying for sectarian schools.
The legislative effort failed however and the group of parents filed a law suit in

175

federal court. The U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit heard the case and relied
on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004),
concluding "the Free Exercise Clause's protection of religious beliefs and
practices from direct government encroachment does not translate into an
affirmative requirement that public entities fund religious activity simply because
they choose to fund the secular equivalents of such activity." The U.S. Court of
Appeals concluded that the U.S. Constitution does not require Maine to fund
tuition at sectarian schools. (Eulitt v. State of Maine, 549 US 1051 2006 cert
denied)
Addressing the same statute, a group of parents seeking to enroll their
children in private, sectarian high schools alleged that the section of the statute
barring the use of public funds for private, sectarian high schools violated the
First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise clauses and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and brought suit in state court state court
against three municipalities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the municipalities. The case went on to be heard in the state of Maine’s
Supreme Judicial Court who affirmed the lower court’s decision. The State of
Maine’s Supreme court reviewed both the state and federal court decisions
regarding the Maine statute and concluded that regardless of whether the rulings
were made prior to or after the Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
decision, the section of Maine’s tuition payment statute prohibiting payments to
private sectarian schools did not infringe on parents’ free exercise of religion
rights or violate the Establishment Clause. The court also failed to find any equal
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protection violation because the "statute does not infringe upon the fundamental
right to free exercise of religion in a constitutionally significant manner."
(Anderson v. Town of Durham 549 US 1051 2006 cert denied)

Bush v. Holmes (886 So. 2d 340 2006)
In the case of Bush v. Holmes, (886 So. 2d 340 2006) (Fla. Jan. 5, 2006)
the State of Florida offered residents a voucher program called the Opportunity
Scholarship Program (OSP). Originally, the program that was implemented
offered students who attended or who were assigned to attend failing public
schools allowing the option to choose a higher performing public school or a
participating private sectarian school. (Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340 2006)
The Florida Supreme Court ruled 5-2 that the state's Opportunity
Scholarship Program, a private school voucher program, violated the Florida
constitution's requirement that the state provide "a uniform, efficient, safe,
secure, and high quality system of free public schools." (Ibid p.4) The court
concluded that the OSP violates that provision because it "diverts public dollars
into separate private systems parallel to and in competition with the free public
schools that are the sole means set out in the Constitution for the state to provide
for the education of Florida's children." (Ibid p.4) Locke v. Davey relates to this
case as it involves the Blaine Amendments Had the Locke v. Davey addressed
the constitutionality of Blaine Amendments as its original intent, this particular
case may not have had to come this far.
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Colorado Christian University v. Weaver (534 Fed 3rd 1245, 2008)
In the case of Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, (534 Fed 3rd
1245, 2008) the Colorado Commission on Higher Education (CCHE) used a set
of criteria to establish whether or not an applying institution to its scholarship
program was sectarian. Private school students attending religious schools were
eligible except if the institution was deemed “pervasively sectarian.” When
Colorado Christian University (CCU) applied to participate in the state’s financial
aid programs, it was rejected on ground that it is a “pervasively sectarian”
institution.
To determination if an institution was sectarian the CCHE used six criteria.
There were: “(a) The faculty and students are not exclusively of one religious
persuasion. (b) There is no required attendance at religious convocations or
services. (c) There is a strong commitment to principles of academic freedom. (d)
There are no required courses in religion or theology that tend to indoctrinate or
proselytize. (e) The governing board does not reflect nor is the membership
limited to persons of any particular religion. (f) Funds do not come primarily or
predominantly from sources advocating a particular religion.” The Colorado
Commission on Higher Education (CCHE) found that CCU failed to meet at least
three of criteria: a, b, and d. (Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, (534 Fed
3rd 1245, 2008 p.7)
CCU filed suit in federal district court alleging that state’s decision to
exclude CCU from participation in its financial aid programs based on the finding
that CCU is “pervasively sectarian” (Ibid p.7) violates the Free Exercise of
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Religion, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses both facially and as
applied. The district court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment. It
relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712
(2004), that if “there is no manifest evidence that a challenged statute is
motivated by hostility towards religious beliefs or practices,” discrimination
against religion need only be justified by a rational basis. Applying the rational
basis test, the district court concluded the state “had a legitimate interest in
‘vindicating’ a provision of the Colorado Constitution that forbids appropriating
public money to aid religious institutions.” (Ibid p.13) (Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S.
712 2004)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that Colorado’s
scholarship programs for college and university students attending public and
private institutions within the state violated the First Amendment’s Establishment
and Free Exercise of Religion Clauses because of the exclusion of “pervasively
sectarian” institutions. Colorado provides scholarships for eligible students
attending public and private colleges and university in the state of Colorado.

Laskowski and Cook v. Spellings and University of Notre Dame
(546 Fed 3rd 822 2008)
In the case of Laskowski and Cook v. Spellings and University of Notre
Dame (546 Fed 3rd 822 2008) two tax payers, Joan Laskowski and Daniel M.
Cook, brought suit to the Secretary of Education Margaret Spelling and the
University of Notre Dame over a $500,000 grant that was issued to University of
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Notre Dame that was used to for a program called Alliance for Catholic Education
(ACE). This was a congressional one time appropriation for fiscal year 2000.
The appropriation was $500,000 to be given Notre Dame for redistribution to
several other religious colleges in order to enable them to replicate the ACE
program on their own campuses. (Laskowski and Cook v. Spellings and
University of Notre Dame 546 Fed 3rd 822 2008).
The taxpayers alleged that the grant violated the First Amendment's
prohibition against Congress's creating religious establishments, a prohibition
that the Supreme Court has interpreted to encompass any direct financial
support by the government of religious activities. The ACE program is a program
designed for training teachers in Catholic schools. It has three parts—
professional development, community life, and spiritual growth. The first part
consists of both teacher-training courses and field experience teaching at
Catholic elementary and secondary schools. The second consists of the
teachers' residing in faith-based communities while doing apprentice teaching in
those schools. The third is encouragement of the teachers to live and work in
accordance with the tenets of the Catholic faith. Thus, the program has both
secular and religious components. However, the program is not training
attendees to be priests or nuns. (Ibid)
The district court dismissed the suit as moot because the University of
Notre Dame had received and spent the grant, a one-time appropriation and the
likelihood of a future such earmark was too remote to warrant injunctive relief.
(Ibid) This case brings up the question of federal funds like the Pell grant. Can a
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student who receives a Pell grant attend Northwest University and study pastoral
ministries. The answer is yes, as the courts consider this as direct student aid
(going to the student to be used for education expenses) versus direct student
aid (Going to the institution for the institution to distribute). The Pell grant is
awarded to students to use towards accredited institutions for the sole purpose of
their education based on financial need. While the Promise Scholarship in the
State of Washington that was awarded to Davey falls under the same guidelines,
except that it was merit based (specific ranking in high school required while the
Pell grant does not ask for ranking or grades.) However, the awarding of the
Promise Scholarship depended on the student’s financial need (the student had
to be from a lower socio economic level) similar to the Pell grant. Why then can
one be used and the other not? The answer may be that the Pell grant is funded
at the Federal level that has no real stipulations on the use of funds and is issued
to the individual not the institution. A state may have more rules and guidelines to
adhere to, mainly its state constitution as well as the U.S. Constitution.
The current legal landscape around the use of funds from public coffers to
fund religious education or even education that is not directly religious in nature
but is provided by a religious entity is still not clear. As in the last case
discussed, Laskowski and Cook v. Spellings and University of Notre Dame (546
Fed 3rd 822 2008) the courts decided that since the money is already gone, no
need to rule on whether or not the appropriation was legal. It seems that the
courts are looking to avoid tackling the issue and this leaves the question on the
appropriation of state funds for religious education still unanswered by the courts.
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The Status of the Promise Scholarship
The Promise Scholarship offered by the State of Washington was a
legislated scholarship. The legislative appropriation is still on the books in the
State of Washington but was no longer funded by the legislature. Washington’s
higher Education Board has not posted a reason as to why, only to say that it
ended on the June 30, 2006.

The Status of Northwest College Financial Aid Policy
Northwest College is now Northwest University. Northwest University’s
mission as an Assembly of God higher education institute is still prominent.
However, applicants that imply they are interested in pursuing a pastoral ministry
major are now treated differently by the financial aid office. The Northwest
University’s financial aid office now only offers institutional funds (private
scholarships, etc.) and aid to students who state they will major in pastoral
ministries at the University. All state and federal aid is withheld for those seeking
that pastoral studies major but still used for those students studying other majors.

Joshua Davey
Joshua Davey graduated summa cum laude from Northwest University in
2003 and attended Harvard Law School soon after graduating in 2006. He
currently works for the Firm of McGuire Woods in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Davey’s area of legal experience is in areas of intellectual property litigation,
business torts, security litigation, products liability and collection actions.
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Gary Locke
In July of 2003, Governor Gary Locke announced he would not seek a 3rd
term in office. He was quoted say, “Despite my deep love for our state, I want to
devote more time to my family.” (Governors Communication office memo, July
21, 2003)
Upon leaving the office, Locke joined the Seattle office of international law
firm, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, in their China and Governmental-relations
practice groups. During the lead up to the 200 Democratic presidential primary,
Governor Locke signed on as Washington co-chairman of Democratic candidate
Hilliary Clinton’s bid for President. Gary Locke currently serves as President
Obama’s Secretary of Commerce.

Summary
In this epilogue, a number of court cases were discussed that followed
the Locke v. Davey (2004) case. The cases all presented here involved the
challenge of using public funds for secular education. An update on the status of
the Promise Scholarship was presented. Northwest Universities Financial Aid
Policy was discussed and the changes they implemented to avoid such issues in
the future. Finally, the current status of the parties tot eh litigation was
presented.
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